The University of Chicago
Law Review
Volume 62

Spring 1995

Number 2

© 1995 by The University of Chicago

Our Unconventional Founding
Bruce Ackermant
Neal Katyaltt
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

Three Legal Obstacles .................
A. Problems under the Articles .........
B. Problems with the Convention .......
C. Problems with State Constitutions ....
II. The Unconventional Run-up to Philadelphia
A. The Legal Background .............
B. The Mount Vernon Conference .......
C. The Annapolis Convention ..........
D. The Impact of Shays's Rebellion ......

........
........
........
........
........
........
........
........
........
E. The Continental Congress Gets on the Bandwagon .
F. Rhode Island's Protest ......................
G. Legality in Philadelphia .....................
III. The Unconventional Struggle for Ratification ........
A. Congress Supports the Convention .............
B. Violence in Philadelphia .....................
C. Congress's Stabilizing Role ...................
D. Congress as an Unconventional Actor ...........
E. The Bandwagon in the States .................
F. Diehards .................................

478
479
480
484
487
489
492
494
498
502
505
506
514
515
517
519
522
525
537

t Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University.
Third-year student, Yale Law School. Special thanks to Jeff Cohen, for his insights
into the law of treaties and the politics of Rhode Island, and to Jack Rakove, for keeping
us honest.

i-

The University of Chicago Law Review

IV. The Legalistic Founders? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Treaty or Constitution? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The Law of Treaties ........................
C. Unconventionality ..........................
V. The Transformation of the Convention .............
VI. The Founding Precedent ........................

[62:475
. . . . . .
. . . . . .

539
551
553
558
559
569

The Founding was a process, not merely an outcome. And yet
lawyers have given this fact short shrift. Over the last decade,
they have explored every detail of the original text with renewed
zeal; but the process that brought us the text remains virtually
unknown.
This is unfortunate, not only because the facts are fascinating in themselves. Their study will lead us to challenge pat
jurisprudential formulations that blinker constitutional understanding. It will also serve to frame the study of other great
transformations of American constitutional history-most notably
Reconstruction and the New Deal. We believe that Founding
patterns recurred at these other moments of grave crisis. But
this claim cannot be formulated, let alone tested, until we rediscover the distinctive ways in which the Founders won authority
to speak in the name of We the People in the 1780s.
Our view contrasts sharply with one recently presented by
Akhil Amar, who has sought to reassure the legal world about
the Founding.' Provoked by earlier claims from one of us,2 Professor Amar has tried to establish that the Founding was consummately legal. His work has led us to rethink the matter with
greater care. Nonetheless, we remain unpersuaded, and we shall
try to explain why.
Our main task, however, is to confront the problem raised by
the Federalists' flagrant illegalities. Movements that indulge in
systematic contempt for the law risk a violent backlash. Rather
than establish a new and stable regime, revolutionary acts of
illegality can catalyze an escalating cycle of incivility, violence,
and civil war. How did the Federalists avoid this dismal cycle?
More positively: How did the Founders manage to win acceptance

' See Akhil R. Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment
Outside Article V, 94 Colum L Rev 457 (1994); Akbil R. Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited:
Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U Chi L Rev 1043 (1988).
2 Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People: Foundations41-42 (Belknap, 1991).
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of their claim to speak for the People at the same moment that
they were breaking the rules of the game?
Our answer distinguishes the Federalists' challenge to the
preexisting rules from a broader attack upon an entire constitutional tradition. As an example of this second totalizing assault,
consider the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Before the Communists seized power in October, the previous Provisional Government had scheduled elections for a Constituent Assembly whose
task was the framing of a new Constitution. The Bolsheviks
allowed these elections to proceed, only to find themselves winning a minority of the seats. It was at this point that the question of total revolution had to be confronted: Would the Bolsheviks disband the Constituent Assembly and thereby break their
last institutional links to the past?'
The question provoked more anxious indecision than one
might imagine. Nonetheless, Lenin persuaded his comrades to
use the Red Army to disband the Assembly and to make a clean
break with the existing legal order.4 Rather than adapting preexisting constitutional ideas and institutions to broaden support
and gain consent, the Bolsheviks took a different path. The new
regime's fate would depend on institutions-most notably the Red
Army and Communist Party-that had no constitutional relationship, however remote, to the old regime.
But this is not what happened in the America of the 1780s.
The Federalists fought for a radical reorganization of existing
principles and institutions; but they were not longing for total
revolution.' It is this distinctive aspiration to revolutionary reform that set the stage for a unique approach to constitutional
revision. Although they did not play by the established rules for
amendment, the reformers tried to compensate for their legal
deficiencies through a remarkable bootstrapping process.' They
constructed new lawmaking processes out of older ideas and
institutions, seeking to infuse them with new meanings:

' See Edward H. Carr, 1 The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923 109-20 (MacMillan,

1950).
4 Id at 115.

For a philosophical critique of the totalizing concept, see Bernard Yack, The Longing for Total Revolution (Princeton, 1986). For an attempt to reconceptualize the revolutionary experience as a partial, but fundamental, break with the past, see Bruce
Ackerman, The Future of LiberalRevolution 5-24 (Yale, 1992).
' For a comparative perspective, see Jon Elster, Constitutional Bootstrapping in
Philadelphiaand Paris, 14 Cardozo L Rev 549 (1993).
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Granted, we did not play by the old rules. But we did something just as good. We have beaten our opponents time after
time in an arduous series of electoral struggles within a
large number of familiar lawmaking institutions. True, our
repeated victories don't add up to a formal constitutional
amendment under the existing rules. But we never would
have emerged victorious in election after election without
the considered support of a mobilized majority of the American People. Moreover, the premises underlying the old rules
for constitutional amendment are deeply defective, inconsistent with a better understanding of the nature of democratic
popular rule. We therefore claim that our repeated legislative and electoral victories have already provided us with a
legitimate mandate from the People to make new constitutional law. Forcing us to play by the old rules would only
allow a minority to stifle the living voice of the People by
manipulating legalisms that have lost their underlying functions.
For reasons that will appear, we call this the unconventional
argument. The Federalists' success at the Founding placed the
argument at the very heart of the American constitutional tradition. Their unconventional precedent created patterns of talk and
action that would be available to future generations of Americans
as they confronted the gravest crises in the history of the Republic. In response to Civil War and Great Depression, Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal Democrats once again found
themselves reenacting and transforming the Federalist precedent-breaking with the established system of constitutional
amendment, but democratically adapting preexisting institutions
to win a mandate from the People. We conclude with a brief
discussion of the patterns that link these three great moments of
revolutionary reform.

I. THREE LEGAL OBSTACLES
And the Articles of this confederation shall be inviolably
observed by every State, and the union shall be perpetual;
nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in
any of them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a Con-
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gress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by
the legislatures of every State.7
So reads the thirteenth and final article of the Articles of Confederation, which had gained the unanimous consent of the thirteen
states by 1781. After operating without any formal structure for
six years and six months, the Continental Congress could now
speak for the nation with a new authority-one that would allow
it to bind the country to the terms of a peace treaty with England
in 1783. Gaining unanimity was a real triumph, requiring four
years of political struggle and many acts of accommodation between the thirteen states.8
Yet only six years later, the Federalists refused to play by
the rules laid down with such great effort. After a summer of
secret meetings, the Philadelphia Convention went public with a
bombshell. Article VII of their proposal asserted that "[t]he Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for
the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so
ratifying the Same."9
A. Problems under the Articles
This single sentence assaulted the revisionary process specified by the Articles on four fronts. First, and most fundamentally,
it invited secession. It rejected the Articles' proud assertion that
"the Union shall be perpetual," and authorized nine states to
secede if the others insisted upon unanimity. As we shall see,
this threat was crucial in pushing states like New York and Vir-

Articles of Confederation, Art XIII.
s The Congress first met on September 5, 1774. Merrill Jensen, The Articles of

Confederation: An Interpretation of the Social-Constitutional History of the American
Revolution 1774-1781 57 (Wisconsin, 1970). On June 7, 1776, Richard Henry Lee of
Virginia proposed a resolution to the Continental Congress for a declaration of independence and for "a plan of confederation [to] be prepared and transmitted to the respective
Colonies .... " Id at 103. On July 12, 1776, a committee led by John Dickinson of Pennsylvania proposed a plan, which was debated for more than a year before Congress sent
the Articles to the states. There followed four years of complex negotiation, id at 126-39,

with Maryland and other states insisting upon a settlement of the western lands question
as a condition for ratification-which finally occurred on March 1, 1781, id at 238; Jack
Rakove, The Beginning of National Politics: An Interpretive History of the Continental
Congress 159-60, 164-65, 179, 248, 285-86, 352-54 (Knopf, 1979). See generally Jack P.
Greene, Peripheriesand Center:ConstitutionalDevelopment in the Extended Politiesof the
British Empire and the United States 1607-1788 154 (Georgia, 1986) ("Far from being an
inevitable development, the fabrication of such a union was highly problematic."); Peter S.
Onuf, Statehood and Union:A History of the Northwest Ordinance (Indiana, 1987).
" US Coast, Art VII.
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ginia to give the Constitution their reluctant endorsement. The
First Congress began as a secessionist body, meeting without the
approval of Rhode Island and North Carolina. Indeed, the secessionist Congress obtained Rhode Island's consent only after
threatening to impose economic sanctions if it continued to insist
on its rights under the Articles.'0
Second, the Founding text ignored the role the Articles expressly assigned to the Continental Congress for approving subsequent amendments. This omission was especially remarkable
since a number of states were reluctant to send delegates to
Philadelphia until the convention received express congressional
approval." Not surprisingly, the convention's silent end run
around the Congress led to a sharp confrontation immediately
after the publication of the Constitution, with Madison struggling
against efforts in the Continental Congress to require the convention to submit to preexisting rules.'
The Founders were no less contemptuous of existing authority on the state level. In the teeth of the Articles' express command, the proposed Constitution cut state legislatures out of the
ratifying process, replacing them with special conventions in each
state. Once again, this textual omission obscured a more complex
institutional reality. The Federalists, in fact, relied upon the
state legislatures to organize the elections necessary for their
conventions, giving their opponents a chance to block the call for
a convention. This was precisely what happened in Pennsylvania
at a vulnerable moment in the ratification process, leading the
Federalists to embrace outright violence in a desperate effort to
sustain political momentum. 3
Fourth, all this was done in the face of the Articles' express
claim to specify the exclusive means for its revision.
B. Problems with the Convention
As if this sharp break with the Articles were not problem
enough, consider the anomalous character of the assembly making the challenge. First, the convention was itself a secessionist
body. Rhode Island was the obvious holdout, refusing to send any

10

See text accompanying notes 197-201.

" See text accompanying note 77.
12

'

See text accompanying notes 117-24.
See text accompanying notes 127-28.

1995]

Our Unconventional Founding

delegates.14 But New York and Delaware posed serious problems
as well.
New York had sent three delegates to the convention, but
two walked out in despair upon observing the pronounced centralizing bias of the Federalist majority. Since the New York
commissions required a majority of delegates to bind the state,
the vote of the only remaining delegate, Alexander Hamilton, was
legally insufficient. The convention did not pretend otherwise. Its
journal treated New York like Rhode Island on the final vote approving the Constitution. Neither state was recorded as casting a
ballot. 5
The status of the Delaware signatures was no less problematic. Its legislature expressly barred the delegation from agreeing
to any proposal that deprived this small state of the equality in
voting power it enjoyed under the Articles. In signing for the
state, the Delaware delegation recognized that it was acting in
contempt of its commission. 6

We are presented, then, with the spectacle of ten delegations
urging nine states to bolt a solemn agreement ratified by all
thirteen. Even this understates the difficulty. In calling for the
Philadelphia Convention, the Continental Congress had charged
the delegates to meet "for the sole and express purpose of revising
the Articles."'7 Given this explicit language, did the delegates go

See text accompanying note 85.
5 After July 11, New York never voted in the convention. Compare Max Farrand, ed,

1 The Records of the FederalConvention of 1787 565 (Yale, rev ed 1937) (journal for July
10, 1787), with id at 577 (journal for July 11, 1787). On the last day, New York was
recorded as not voting on the question "The Constitution as Unanimously agreed to."
Farrand, ed, 2 Records of the Federal Convention at 641 (journal for Sept 17, 1787).
16 Merrill Jensen, ed, 1 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitu-

tion 203 (Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976), reprinting Act Electing and Empowering
Delegates, 3 February (providing that the delegates could "devis[e], deliberat[e] on, and
discuss[ ], such Alterations and further Provisions, as may be necessary to render the
F[ lederal Constitution adequate to the Exigencies of the Union," but "always and provided, that such Alterations, or further Provisions, or any of them, do not extend to that Part
of the Fifth Article of the Confederation of the said States ...which declares, that 'in

determining Questions in the United States in Congress assembled, each State shall have
one Vote'"). The Delaware problem was broadly recognized by the delegates to Philadelphia. See Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the FederalConvention at 4 ("On reading the Credentials of the deputies it was noticed that those from Delaware were prohibited from changing the Article in the Confederation establishing an equality of votes among the States.")
(footnotes omitted); id at 6 (noting same); id at 37 (reprinting discussion about the Delaware provision); Jonathan Elliot, ed, 1 The Debates in the Several State Conventions, on
the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General Convention at
Philadelphia,in 1787 345 (Taylor & Maury, 2d ed 1854) (remarks of Luther Martin to the
Maryland Legislature noting concern with the Delaware provision).
'5 Perhaps it is wise to place this formula in a larger context:
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beyond their legal authority when they ripped the Articles up
and proposed an entirely new text?
This charge was raised repeatedly-and justifiably in the
cases of Massachussetts, New York, and Connecticut, where
legislatures had expressly incorporated Congress's restrictive
language in their own instructions to delegates. 8 Other state
delegations, however, came with a broader mandate, allowing
them to make any constitutional proposal they thought appropriate. 9 Thus, while some key delegates may well have acted beWhereas there is provision in the Articles of Confederation & perpetual Union
for making alterations therein by the assent of a Congress of the United States and
of the legislatures of the several States; And whereas experience hath evinced that
there are defects in the present Confederation, as a mean to remedy which several of
the States and particularly the State of New York by express instructions to their
delegates in Congress have suggested a convention... appearing to be the most
probable mean of establishing in these states a firm national government.
Resolved that in the opinion of Congress it is expedient that on the second Monday in May next a Convention of delegates who shall have been appointed by the
several states be held at Philadelphia for the sole and express purpose of revising the
Articles of Confederation and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such
alterations and provisions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed
by the states render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government & the preservation of the Union.
Charles C. Tansill, ed, Documents Illustrative of the Formationof the Union of the American States 45-46 (US GPO, 1927).
S See Jensen, ed, 1 Documentary History at 209 (cited in note 16), reprinting New
York's February 26, 1787, resolution. Massachusetts's first resolution, passed on February
22 before it knew about Congress's resolution of the previous day, did not contain this
limitation. The House, however, repealed it on March 7, substituting a new resolution
containing the "sole and express" limitation to mirror Congress's prescription. Id at 205,
reprinting Resolution Authorizing the Appointment of Delegates and Providing Instructions for Them, 22 February; id at 207, reprinting House Substitute of 7 March for the
Resolution of 22 February. Connecticut was the only other state to impose a "sole and express" limitation. See id at 215-16, reprinting Act Electing and Empowering Delegates, 17
May.
'9 For instance, one of the first states to decide to send delegates to Philadelphia
in
1786, New Jersey, commissioned its delegates "for the purpose of taking into consideration the state of the Union as to trade and other important objects, and of devising such
further provisions as shall appear necessary to render the Constitution of the federal
government adequate to the exigencies thereof." Id at 196, reprinting Resolution Authorizing and Empowering the Delegates, 24 November. Absolutely no mention was made of the
Articles in this resolution, which took much of its language from the state's oft-quoted
legislation regarding the Annapolis Convention.
Virginia's early resolution similarly noted that the revision was not just for "the
Commercial Interests" but was a "revision of the Federal System to all its defects .... " Id
at 196, reprinting Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates, 23 November. The December
30 Pennsylvania resolution also granted power for the delegates to "devis[e], deliberat[e]
on, and discuss[ I all such alterations and further provisions as may be necessary to render the f[ lederal constitution fully adequate to the exigencies of the Union... ." Id at
199, reprinting Act Electing and Empowering Delegates, 30 December. The North Carolina delegates were "to discuss and decide upon the most effectual means to remove the
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yond their commission, this was not true of all.
In contrast, no state delegation had any similar warrant to
make an end run around the rules of revision found in the Articles of Confederation. The precise language of each delegation's
commission varied from state to state, but Virginia's was typical.
Its legislature had instructed delegates to participate in "devising
and discussing all such alterations and further provisions, as
may be necessary to render the Federal Constitution adequate... reporting such an Act for that purpose, to the United
States in Congress, as, when agreed to by them, and duly confirmed20by the several States, will effectually provide for the
same."
Such commissions expressly subordinated delegates to existing institutions and procedures. In joining the call for a convention, the Continental Congress also made it plain that the
Philadelphians' proposals could become the law of the land only if
they were "agreed to in Congress and confirmed by the states."2 '

There is not the slightest hint anywhere that the delegates were
authorized to break with the Articles and set up a new mechanism for popular sovereignty. Indeed, a number of delegates to
the Continental Congress refused appointments to the convention
because it was inappropriate to join in proceedings they would
later review as congressmen. As Richard Henry Lee explained in
a letter to John Adams: "Being a Member of Congress where the
plan of Convention must be approved," acceptance of a position
as a delegate would require him to "pass judgment at New York
upon his opinion at Philadelphia."'
defects of our fi lederal union, and to procure the enlarged purposes which it was intended to effect.... ." Id at 201, reprinting Act Authorizing the Election of Delegates, 6 January. Delaware's language was similar, id at 203; as was Georgia's, id at 204; Maryland's,
id at 222; and New Hampshire's, id at 224.
" Acts Passedat a GeneralAssembly ofthe Commonwealthof Virginia,October 16,1786January 11, 1787 11 (Richmond, 1787) (emphasis added). Such wording appeared in
virtually every resolution. See Jensen, ed, 1 DocumentaryHistory at 199-200 (cited in note
16) (Pennsylvania requiring "reporting such act or acts ... to the United States in Congress assembled, as when agreed to by them, and duly confirmed by the several states,
will effectually provide for the same"); the identical language used by Delaware, id at 203;
Georgia, id at 204; Maryland, id at 222; New Hampshire, id at 225; similar language used
by New York, id at 213. The second and final Massachusetts resolution provided for
congressional and state approval, id at 207, as did other states in a variety of formulations, id at 214 (South Carolina); id at 216 (Connecticut). North Carolina mentioned only
approval by the state. Id at 201. The only real exception was New Jersey, the one-sentence resolution of which omitted discussion of anything besides "talking into consideration" and "devising... further provisions." Id at 196, reprinting Resolution Authorizing
and Empowering the Delegates, 24 November.
21 Jensen, ed, 1 Documentary History at 187 (cited in note 16).
2 Ruth Bogin, Abraham Clark and the Quest for Equality in the Revolutionary Era,

484

The University of ChicagoLaw Review

[62:475

C. Problems with State Constitutions
The Federalists ran into a new round of legal trouble when
they sought to convene ratifying conventions in each of the thirteen states. By virtue of the Constitution's Supremacy Clause,
the Federalists' initiative amounted to a vast revision of each
state's constitution, and yet they proceeded in a manner utterly
indifferent to the formal mechanisms for amendment already
stipulated by state constitutional law.
Since the legal status of each ratifying convention depended
upon its particular state constitution, it will pay to distinguish
between two broad types-those that contemplated the use of
conventions in the process of state revision, and those that did
not.
Those that did included Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
Pennsylvania. The first two had formulated their constitutions
through a process by which a special convention made a proposal,
which was then approved by popular vote in town meetings.
Although Pennsylvania's Constitution of 1776 was enacted by the
legislature, it was widely recognized throughout America (and
abroad) as the most radically democratic document of its time.'
It is therefore revealing how carefully these three states dealt
with the convention mechanism. In each case, the constitutional
text did not give the legislature, or anybody else, the unfettered
right to call a convention whenever it was in the public interest.
To the contrary, conventions could only meet after a specified
number of years had passed-a seven-year interval was prescribed by New Hampshire and Pennsylvania; fifteen years by
Massachusetts. Only in the case of New Hampshire was the
convocation of such a convention automatic; Massachusetts authorized a meeting only if two-thirds of the voters throughout the
state agreed;' Pennsylvania required the approval of two-thirds
of a specially elected body of censors that met every septennium
to review the operation of government.25
1774-1794 134 (Fairleigh Dickinson, 1982). Abraham Clark similarly turned down his
Philadelphia appointment. Jonathan Dayton, who replaced Clark, reported that Clark
resigned because "he thinks there is a kind of incompatibility in the two appointments.
Id.
, Gordon S. Wood, The Creationof the American Republic, 1776-1787 226-27, 231-32
(Norton, 1972).
24 Mass Const of 1780, Ch VI, Art X, reprinted in Francis Newton Thorpe, ed, 3 The
Federaland State Constitutions, Colonial Charters,and Other OrganicLaws of the States,
Territories,and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America 1911
(Hein, 1993).
' Pa Const of 1776, § 47, reprinted in Thorpe, ed, 5 The Federaland State Constitu-
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These lengthy and regular intervals were not a detail. They
reflected a deep concern with stability characteristic of republican
thought." During and after the Revolution, Americans were
painfully aware of the Tory claim that, without the order supplied by the king, their infant republics would disintegrate
amidst constant factional strife.27 The careful structuring of the
convention process permitted a constitutional commitment to stability at the same time it expressed a faith in popular sovereignty.
Unhappily for the Federalists, their 1787 call for conventions
came at the wrong time in these three states. Pennsylvania's
Council of Censors had rejected a convention in 1784, and its
next meeting was not due until 1791. The next legal convention
in New Hampshire was scheduled for 1791, and in Massachusetts
for 1795. Moreover, the Federalists were calling for the wrong
kind of convention. In all three states the convention's job was to
make constitutional proposals, and not to ratify the initiatives
made by others. In the New England states, these proposals were
then presented to the voters in town meetings. Worse yet, the
constitutions of Massachusetts and New Hampshire had explicitly subordinated themselves to the Articles of Confederation:
The people of this commonwealth have the sole and exclusive right of governing themselves, as a free, sovereign and
independent state; and do, and forever hereafter shall, exercise and enjoy every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is
not, or may not hereafter be, by them expressly delegated to
the United States of America in CongressAssembled.'
Even without this delegation to the Articles of Confederation, it
should be plain that the legislatures of these two New England
states, along with Pennsylvania's, were blatantly violating their

tions at 3091 (cited in note 24).
' WiU Paul Adams, The FirstAmerican Constitutions:Republican Ideology and the
Making of State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era 137-44 (North Carolina, 1980);
J.G._A. Pocock, The MachiavellianMoment 3-80, 506-52 (Princeton, 1975).
' See, for example, Letter from George Washington to Henry Lee (Oct 31, 1786), in
John C. Fitzpatrick, ed, 29 The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources 34 (US GPO, 1938); Letter from George Washington to James Warren (Oct
7, 1785), in Fitzpatrick, ed, 28 The Writings of George Washington at 290-91.
' Mass Const of 1780, Pt 1, Art IV, reprinted in Thorpe, ed, 3 The Federaland State
Constitutionsat 1890 (cited in note 24) (emphasis added). New Hampshire copied essentially the same provigion into its constitution. See NH Coast of 1784, Pt 1, Art VII,
reprinted in Thorpe, ed, 4 The Federaland State Constitutions at 2454 (cited in note 24).
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constitutions in heeding the Federalists' call for ratifying conventions.29
The legal situation in most of the other states was more
propitious in one sense, less in another. Most of these states'
constitutions had been proposed by the legislatures, and often
enacted into law without any special form of consultation with
the electorate." Rhode Island and Connecticut continued to operate under Royal Charters which had always given them great
political autonomy-the legislatures simply striking the clauses
from the text that offered fealty to the British Crown."'
These texts would seem to give greater legal warrant to
legislatures wishing to follow Philadelphia. As the source of the
existing state constitutions, weren't they legally free to propose a
new method for its amendment? Yes, but at the same time, the
Federalists' challenge to legislative supremacy seemed more of a
frontal assault on existing constitutional principles. 2
29 Once the Federalists established their unconventional precedent, Pennsylvania's
revolutionaries quickly proceeded to use it as a springboard for the illegal reconstitution
of the state regime. Rather than waiting for the next meeting of the Council of Censors
scheduled for 1791, radicals led by James Wilson took the law into their own hands in
1789. See text accompanying notes 125-27. Three other cases of illegality at the state level-involving Delaware in 1791, Rhode Island in 1841, and Maryland in 1850-are discussed in John Alexander Jameson, A Treatise on the Principlesof American Constitutional Law and Legislation:The ConstitutionalConvention; its History, Powers, and Modes of
Proceeding§§ 223-29 at 213-21 (Myers, 1869) (photographic reprint by Rothman, 1981).
o In four instances, state legislatures proposed and implemented constitutions as if
they were statutes, without any advance authority or subsequent ratification by the people. The states were Virginia (1776), New Jersey (1776), Rhode Island, and Connecticut
(the latter two through the continuation of their colonial charters). In three cases, state
constitutions were adopted by legislatures authorized by popular vote to approve changes,
but were "not submitted in any manner to the people." The states were Delaware (1776),
Georgia (1777), and New York (1777). In four instances, legislatures with advance authority from the people to approve constitutions distributed copies before their enactment to
give the people a chance to suggest changes. These states were Maryland (1776), Pennsylvania (1776), North Carolina (Dec 1776), and South Carolina (1778). Roger Sherman
Hoar, ConstitutionalConventions: Their Nature, Powers, and Limitation 4 (Little, Brown,
1917). Only the Constitutions of New Hampshire (1778 and 1781-83) and Massachusetts
(1780) were submitted to the people. Id.
31

Id.

' Georgia's legislature was the only state to take the illegalities of the Founding seriously enough to recognize the immediate need for explicit constitutional change on the
state level. On January 30, 1788, it resolved to "name three fit and discreet persons from
each county, to be convened at Augusta by the executive, as soon as may be after official
information is received that nine States have adopted the Federal Constitution; and a
majority of them shall proceed to take under their consideration the alterations and
amendments that are necessary to be made in the Constitution of this State .....
Jameson, American ConstitutionalLaw § 148 at 134.
This turned out to be easier said than done. It took no fewer than three conventions
before an acceptable constitution was worked out. See id §§ 148-49 at 134-36.
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Especially when the Philadelphians altogether lacked the
legal authority from these legislatures to make such an end run;
especially when they were calling on popular conventions to
rubber-stamp proposals that they, without any direct authorization by the voters, saw fit to make.'
II. THE UNCONVENTIONAL RUN-UP TO PHILADELPHIA
To sum up, we can do no better than repeat the reaction of
John Quincy Adams, then twenty years old:
But to crown the whole the 7th: article, is an open and barefaced violation of the most sacred engagements which can be
formed by human beings. It violates the Confederation, the
13th: article of which I wish you would turn to, for a complete demonstration of what I affirm; and it violates the
Constitution of this State, which was the only crime of our
Berkshire & Hampshire insurgents [in Shays's Rebellion].
As a justification for this, it is said, that in times of

great distress and imminent danger, the Constitution of any
country whatever must give way; and that no agreements
can be put in competition, with the existence, of a nation;
but here, in order to apply this proposition, which is undoubtedly true, two points are to be established: the first,
that we are now in this tremendous situation, where our
Even John Jay-one of the voices of Publius-was especially anxious about this
point. Writing to Washington before Philadelphia, he expressed alarm:
[The policy of such a convention appears questionable; their authority is to be
derived from acts of the State Legislatures. Are the State Legislatures authorized, either by themselves or others, to alter constitutions? I think not; ... perhaps it is intended that this convention shall not ordain but only recommend; if so there is danger that their recommendations will produce endless discussions, perhaps jealousies
and party heats.
Would it not be better for Congress plainly and in strong terms to declare that
the present Federal Government is inadequate to the purposes for which it was instituted,... but that in their opinion it would be expedient for the people of the States
without delay to appoint State Conventions (in the way they choose their general
assemblies) with the sole and express power of appointing deputies to a general Convention, who, or the majority of whom, should take into consideration the Articles of
the Confederation, and make such alterations &c .... No alterations in the government should I think be made, nor if attempted will easily take place, unless deducible from the only source ofjust authority-the People.
Letter from John Jay to George Washington (Jan 7, 1787), in Charles R. King, ed, 1 The
Life and Correspondence of Rufus King 208-09 (Putnam, 1894). As we shall see, Jay and
others were still making this objection at the Continental Congress when the authority of
the convention was debated in February 1789; and this leitmotif continued in the ratification debates.
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very national existence, is at stake; the second that no better
remedy can be found than that of a revolution.-The first it
appears to me, no man in his Senses, can pretend to assert:
our situation it is true is disagreeable; but it is confessedly
growing better every day, and might very probably be prosperous in a few years without any alteration at all. [Blut
even if some alteration be necessary, where is the necessity
of introducing a despotism, yes, a despotism; for if there
shall be any limits to the power of the federal Congress, they
will only be such as they themselves shall be pleased to
establish.'
Note what the young Adams is not saying. He is not reporting that the Federalists of his acquaintance are spending lots of
time and energy defending the legality of their conduct. He presents them as placing their break with the "the most sacred engagements which can be formed by human beings" on explicitly
revolutionary ground-the same ground upon which Shays's
rebels had stood only two years before. Indeed, there are remarkably few public efforts by Federalists to disguise the revolutionary character of their enterprise with legalistic argument. By
their words and deeds, leaders like Madison and Wilson repeatedly indicated their belief that revolutionary, rather than legalistic, arguments provided their best defense.3 5
For Adams, and for us, this makes another question more
important: How, if at all, did the Federalists differ from Shays's
rebels in their decision to take the law into their own hands? It is
here, we think, that the notion of unconventional adaptation
comes into play. While much about this phenomenon may be obscure, at least one thing is clear: If the Federalists were going to

3' Letter from John Quincy Adams to William Cranch (Oct 14, 1787), in John P.
Kaminski and Gaspone J. Saladino, eds, 14 The DocumentaryHistory of the Ratificationof
the Constitution 223-24 (Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1983). When Massachusetts
ratified the Constitution in February, Adams used the language of revolution to explain to
Cranch why he now accepted it: "In our Government, opposition to the acts of a majority
of the people is rebellion to all intents and purposes." Letter from John Quincy Adams to
William Cranch (Feb 7, 1788), in Kaminski and Saladino, eds, 14 Documentary History of
the Ratification at 220.
'5 As we have suggested, Professor Amar portrays a different picture. Extrapolating
from a (very) few remarks, he seeks to supply the Federalists with powerful legal arguments for their unconventional conduct. As we will show, Amar's arguments would have
failed to convince any fair-minded court surveying the facts and law in an impartial
manner. For the moment, however, it is more important to recognize that there was no
such court in existence and that the Federalists were not particularly interested in establishing that they had the law on their side.
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break the rules and expect established institutions to accept, or
at least acquiesce, their chances of success would have been very
small if they had come out of nowhere and simply demanded
instant obedience. Unconventional adaptation requires a complex
process of interaction-one in which revolutionary institutions
gradually acquire the kind of authority that will allow them to
gain acceptance of their break with the rules. In the present case,
a group of Federalists did not just decide to come to Philadelphia
and hold a convention. Their initiative succeeded only after a
fascinating set of exchanges with established institutions that
began in 1785 and ended with the grudging acquiescence of
Rhode Island in 1790.
We call this the "bandwagon effect." At each stage in the
dynamic process of legitimation, the Federalists suffered grave
legal difficulties in advancing their constitutional initiative. At
each stage, there were some important institutions and actors
who refused to cooperate on legalistic grounds. Nonetheless, the
Federalists succeeded in gaining the acceptance of enough standing institutions to sustain their constitutional momentum. These
acts of ratification,as we will call them, made it plausible for the
unconventional Founders to embark on another illegal initiative,
which, when ratified once again by another set of standing institutions, made it plausible for them to proceed to yet another
illegal initiative in the name of We the People-and so on, until
they had earned a deep sense of constitutional authority even
though they had not played by the preestablished rules.
There is much that is puzzling about this process. Before
speculating further, it is best to review the facts.
A. The Legal Background
The effort to amend the Articles of Confederation began as
soon as they were ratified. But for a long time, the political stage
was dominated by actors who played by the rules.
The first legalistic campaign sought to grant Congress the
power to levy a 5 percent impost on foreign commerce. Proposed
by Congress in 1781, the Five Percent Impost gained the consent
of all states but Rhode Island within two years. Before Rhode
Island could be persuaded, Virginia rescinded its approval, and
Congress went back to the drawing board.3" After some pulling

' Bogin, Abraham Clark at 83 (cited in note 22). Congress, led by Hamilton, had begun preparations to persuade Rhode Island to accept the impost. Id at 82-83.
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and hauling, it responded with a series of new initiatives. The
most successful was another proposal for an impost, which
passed Congress in April of 1783.37 By 1786, only New York remained as a holdout, and even it had formally accepted the initiative-although it had coupled its acceptance with so many
conditions that Congress found it unacceptable.38 Moreover, the
Congress in August of 1786 had proposed a package of seven
amendments
to the Articles that would have further enhanced its
39
powers.

This meant that the Federalists were constantly obliged to
contend with thoughtful supporters of a strengthened Union who
believed that change might better proceed legally, step by step.
Indeed, wouldn't the Federalist bandwagon effect only derail the
legally unproblematic initiatives then underway?4 ° While it was
proving difficult to overwhelm New York's objections to an impost, why suppose that it or other states would acquiesce in a
revolutionary break into the unknown?41 Would it not have been

' The 1783 impost was to expire in twenty-five years, and states, not Congress,
would appoint the collectors. It differed in these respects from the 1781 impost. Linda G.
De Pauw, The Eleventh Pillar:New York State and the FederalConstitution 33 (Cornell,
1966).
' In response to pressure by the Continental Congress and the neighboring states of
Connecticut and New Jersey, New York reconsidered its position on the impost in February 1787 and rejected it by a two-to-one vote. E. Wilder Spaulding, His Excellency George
Clinton: Criticof the Constitution 170-71 (MacMillan, 1938); De Pauw, The Eleventh Pillar
at 49-50. There is no reason to suppose, however, that this would have been New York's
last word, since pressures from its neighbors-as well as Hamilton's political faction-remained intense. Of course, we will never know the outcome since Hamilton and
others shifted their attention to the campaign for the new Federalist Constitution.
The amendments provided for exclusive congressional authority over commerce, a
seven-member court to hear cases against federal officials, a reduction in the number of
states needed to ratify amendments pertaining to revenue (from thirteen to eleven), a modification of the seven-states quorum rule, and other measures. John C. Fitzpatrick, ed, 31
Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789 494 (US GPO, 1934).
'o For examples of such arguments, see Votes and Proceedings of the House of Delegates of the State of Maryland, 1st Sess (Mar 12, 1785) (on file at Maryland Hall of Records) ("[Tihe proposed meeting, though originating from the best intention, may tend to
delay the adoption of the [1783 impost], and the vesting that assembly with proper
powers to regulate trade, by the states who have hitherto delayed to accede to these
measures, and also that unforeseen consequences may result from such meeting, this
legislature has declined to appoint commissioners for this purpose."). Daniel Carroll,
President of the Maryland Senate, wrote that the convention had "a tendency to weaken
the authority of Congress" and may "entirely destroy" the chance of an impost.
41 For example, here is Rufus King opposing the convention (in which he later served
with distinction) on the floor of the House as late as October 1786:
If all the States could be brought into the Continental Impost, this resource indeed
might be anticipated, and the national credit strengthened in that way, but there remained two States which had not acceded to it, Pennsylvania and New York. The
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wiser to continue the campaign for the impost, preparing the way
for a consensus on more sweeping reforms, like those that Congress had proposed in 1786?42
situation of the former was known, and should that State be brought over, New York
would not dare longer to oppose the Union.
Proceedingsof Government, Boston, October 12, Worcester Mag 353 (3d week of Oct 1786);
Substance of the Communications made by Mr. Dane, Worcester Mag 410 (3d week of Nov
1786). See also Letter from John Adams to Secretary Jay (May 16, 1786), in Charles
Francis Adams, ed, 8 The Life and Works of John Adams: Second Presidentof the United
States: With a Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations391 (Little, Brown, 1853) ("New
York, I am persuaded, will not long withhold her assent, because that, in addition to all
the other arguments in favor of the measure, she will have to consider that all the blame
of consequences must now rest upon her; and she would find this, alone, a greater burden
than the impost.").
Certainly, New York was under severe pressure to agree to the impost. A congressional committee just days before the Annapolis Convention lambasted New York for its
noncompliance. Fitzpatrick, ed, 31 Journalsof the ContinentalCongress at 532-34 (cited in
note 39) (journal of Aug 22, 1786). The General Assembly of Connecticut created a committee "to draft an address to New-York, respecting her antifederal measures.... " NH
Gazette (Portsmouth) 2 (Nov 25, 1786). Jackson wrote to Henry Knox, then the Secretary
M
" Letter from Jackson to
of War- "Every liberal good man is wishing New York in Hell.
Henry Knox (Apr 23, 1786) (on file at Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston). Some
even thought civil war possible:
There is nothing but the restraining hand of Congress (weak as it is), that prevents
N. Jersey and Connecticut from entering the lists very seriously with N. York and
bloodshed would very quickly be the consiquence [sic]. [Blut however N. Jersey may
suffer by her paying taxes for N. York, her refusal to comply with the requisition is
unjustifiable, and unless she rescinds her resolution must work the end of all federal
government.
Letter from Nathaniel Grham to James Warren (Mar 6, 1786), in Edmund C. Burnett,
ed, 8 Letters of Members of the Continental Congress xxii (Carnegie, 1936) ("Letters of the
Continental Congress"). New York's February 15 rejection, according to Madison, "put a
definitive veto on the Impost." Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Feb 21,
1787), in Robert E. Rutland and William M.E. Rachal, eds, 9 The Papersof James Madison 285 (Chicago, 1975). However, he didn't explain why he believed that New York would
be amenable to more sweeping changes.
All we can say, in the final analysis, is that New York's obdurate opposition to the
impost was inspiring great passion, and that it is hard to predict how the state would
have responded over time. After all, it did finally accept the Federalist Constitution-although, as we shall see, not without much strategic manipulation and legerdemain by the Federalists. See text accompanying notes 181-90.
' Indeed, even in 1788 many still wished for an impost instead of a new Constitution. See, for example, Elliot, ed, 3 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 278 (cited
in note 16) (remarks of William Grayson at the Virginia Convention) ("I would recommend
that the present Confederation should be amended. Give Congress the regulation of
commerce."); Elliot, ed, 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 70 (cited in note 16)
(remarks of Timothy Bloodworth at the North Carolina Convention) (declaring that while
he was against the Constitution, "he was for giving power to Congress to regulate the
trade of the United States .... ."); Elliot, ed, 2 Debatesin the Several State Conventions at
80 (cited in note 16) (remarks of General Thompson at the Massachusetts Convention) ("It
is my wish she may be one of the four dissenting states; then we shall be on our old
ground, and shall not act unconstitutionally. Some people cry, It will be a great charge;
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We should keep such questions in mind if we hope to understand the many protests engendered by the revolutionary thrust
of the Federalist initiative.
B. The Mount Vernon Conference
The move toward a convention had very humble origins,
which did not immediately provoke large-scale anxieties from
legalistic opponents. Our story begins with the 1785 Mount
Vernon Conference of commissioners from Maryland and Virginia. Though their commissions were limited to the regulation of
the Potomac and Pocomoke rivers, they agreed to "sweeping, if
sensible recommendations... [that] went considerably beyond
the instructions that the respective legislatures had given to
them."' Nonetheless, both legislatures approved their proposed
interstate compact.
Madison, who was behind the initiative," then moved that
the Virginia legislature submit the agreement to the Continental
Congress in compliance with Article VI of the Articles of Confederation, which required such approval whenever "two or more
states" entered into any treaty, confederation, or alliance.' For
reasons we cannot determine, the Virginia Assembly rejected
Madison's proposal. Maryland also refused, citing the Articles as
authorizing each state to "enter into a firm league of friendship
with the other states respectively, for their mutual and general
welfare."'
The result may have provided Madison with a learning experience on three fronts. It suggested, first, that delegates to ad hoc
assemblies might move beyond their commissions and get away
with it when they returned to their state legislatures; second,
this could happen even though the "whole proceeding was distinctly unconstitutional;"' and, third, that unconventional activbut it will be a greater charge, and be more dangerous, to make a new one. Let us amend
the old Confederation. Why not give Congress power only to regulate trade?").
' Richard B. Morris, The Mount Vernon Conference: FirstStep TowardPhiladelphia,
6 This Const 38, 40 (1985). See also Nancy McManus, The Bicentennial of the Mount
Vernon Conference, 8 This Const 43 (1985).
" Broadus Mitchell, Alexander Hamilton: Youth to Maturity 1755-1788 356
(MacMillan, 1957).
' See Richard B. Bernstein, Are We to Be a Nation? The Making of the Constitution
98-99 (Harvard, 1987).
' An Act authorizing the states of Maryland and Virginia to lay out and improve a
road within the limits of this state, between the waters of the River Patowmack and of
the river Ohio, Md J 3 (Feb 21, 1786).
"' Max Farrand, The Framingof the Constitution of the United States 8 (Yale, 1913).
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ity might prove especially rewarding in a context, like Mount
Vernon, that promised plain economic benefits to the states involved.'
Madison made his next move on January 21, 1786, the last
day of Virginia's legislative session. A member of his party convinced Virginia's legislature to authorize seven commissioners
(including Madison) to invite deputies from other states to attend
a meeting at Annapolis "to consider and recommend a federal
plan for regulating commerce."49 Even at this early stage, there
is evidence that Madison was aware of the bandwagon dynamic.
He wrote to Monroe:
Will it not be best on the whole to suspend measures for a
more thorough cure of our federal system, till the partial
experiment shall have been made [to regulate commerce at
Annapolis]. If the spirit of the Conventioners should be
friendly to the Union, and their proceedings well conducted,
their return into the Councils of their respective States will
greatly facilitate any subsequent measures which may be set
on foot by Congress, or by any of the States."
Madison was already mastering the key insight into unconventional legitimation. Rather than aiming for a single grand victory, he was trying to set up a stepwise process-in which one
partial initiative built on the next in a series of sequential
ratifications:

' Morris, 6 This Const at 40 (cited in note 43) ("By its creative moves, the Mount
Vernon Conference made Annapolis inevitable, and the audacity of the nationalists turned
that subsequent ill-attended convention into a summons for Philadelphia."); Jack N.
Rakove, The Gamble at Annapolis, 12 This Const 4, 8-9 (1986) (calling the Mount Vernon
Conference a "useful precedent" for Annapolis).
"' The resolution was careful, however, explicitly to require unanimous agreement.
The commissioners were "to report to the several States, such an act relative to this
object, as, when unanimously ratified by them, will enable the United States in Congress,
effectually to provide for the same." Jensen, ed, 1 Documentary History at 180 (cited in
note 16). Meeting at Benjamin Harrison's home on February 13, a quorum of the commissioners from Virginia set a time and place-Annapolis on the first Monday in September. Mervin B. Whealy, "The Revolution is not Over": The Annapolis Convention of 1786,
81 Md Hist Mag 228, 230 (Fall 1986).
' Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (May 13, 1786), in Gaillard Hunt, ed,
2 The Writings of James Madison 242-43 (Putnam, 1901). See also Jack N. Rakove, The
Collapse of the Articles of Confederation,in J. Jackson Barlow, Leonard W. Levy, and Ken
Masugi, eds, The American Founding: Essays on the Formationof the Constitution 225,
234-35 (Greenwood, 1988) (arguing that the best chance for reform was not a complete
rejection of the Articles, but rather a "piecemeal, case-by-case" strategy).
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The efforts for bringing about a correction thro' the medium
of Congress have miscarried. Let a Convention then, be
tried. If it succeeds in the first instance, it can be repeated
as other defects force themselves on the public attention,
and as the public mind becomes prepared for further remedies. The Assembly here [in Virginia] would refer nothing to
Congress. They would have revolted equally against a plenipotentiary commission to their deputies for the Convention.
The option therefore lay between doing what was done and
doing nothing. Whether a right choice was made time only
can prove. I am not in general an advocate for temporizing
or partial remedies. But a rigor in this respect, if pushed too
far may hazard everything.5'
The bandwagon had begun to roll, but in what direction?
C. The Annapolis Convention
Despite its questionable legality under the Articles,52
Virginia's call proved surprisingly successful, leading nine states
to appoint delegates to a convention at Annapolis in September
1786. At the same time, it provoked expressions of dissent from
four states. South Carolina refused, on the ground that it had
"an appearance of either revoking or infringing on those powers"
granted to Congress that the legislature had voted when it supported the Five Percent Impost.'M The Annapolis proposal led to

" Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Mar 19, 1786), in Hunt, ed, 2 The
Writings of James Madison at 233-34 (cited in note 50). Stephen Higginson, a Massachusetts delegate to Annapolis, assessed Madison's aim: "[Wihen I consider the men who are
deputed from New-York, Pennsylvania and Virginia, and the source of whence the proposition was made, I am strongly inclined to think political Objects are intended to be
combined with commercial, if they do not principally engross their Attention.... [Flew of
them have been in the commercial line, nor is it probable they know or care much about
commercial Objects." Letter from Stephen Higginson to John Adams (July 1786), in
Thomas W. Higginson, The Life and Times ofStephen Higginson 72-73 (Houghton, Mifflin,
1907).
' "Since states were forbidden by the Articles of Confederation [Art VI] to enter into
treaties or alliances with each other without the consent of Congress, the Annapolis
Convention, called by the Virginia Assembly at Madison's suggestion, would be of questionable legality. Any action the Convention might attempt to take would be clearly
illegal. But Madison, if not yet desperate, was determined to do something." William
Peters, A More Perfect Union: The Making of the United States Constitution 9-10 (Crown,
1987).
' Georgia rejected the invitation to Annapolis, see Letter from Rufus King to Jonathan Jackson (June 11, 1786), in Burnett, ed, 8 Letters of the ContinentalCongress at 389
(cited in note 41), but we do not know why.
" Whealy, 81 Md Hist Mag at 231 (cited in note 49).
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an impasse in Connecticut, as legislators voiced a fear that it
would undermine Congress and set a precedent for other illegal
movements.5 5 Maryland's rejection was more elaborate:
[T]he meeting proposed may be misunderstood or misrepresented in Europe, give umbrage to Congress, and disquiet
the citizens of the United States, who may be thereby led
erroneously to suspect, that the great council of this country
wants either the will or wisdom to digest a proper uniform
plan for the regulation of their commerce. The power must
be given to Congress to effectuate any system which might
be adopted by the proposed meeting of commissioners.5 6
Worse yet, the meeting "may produce other meetings, which may
have consequences which cannot be foreseen. Innovations in
Government, when not absolutely necessary, are dangerous,
particularly to republics, generally too fond of novelties, and
subject to change."5" The Annapolis commissioners were left in
the embarrassing position of meeting in a state that had formally
denounced them as dangerous revolutionaries." Moreover, the
early turnout was disappointing, considering that nine states had
formally appointed delegates. 9 When only twelve delegates from

Connecticut had undergone a series of popular conventions in 1783 and 1784,
which had convinced its leadership of the perils involved in illegal departures from
established procedures. Rakove, 12 This Const at 9 (cited in note 48). Madison explained
in 1786 that "Connecticut declined not from a dislike to the object, but to the idea of a
Convention, which it seems has been rendered obnoxious by some internal Conventions,
which embarrassed the Legislative Authority." Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Aug 12, 1786), in Hunt, ed, 2 The Writings of James Madison at 262 (cited in
note 50).
' Votes and Proceedings of the Senate of the State of Maryland, 1st Sess 84-85 (Mar
8, 1785) (on file at Maryland Hall of Records).
57

Id.

Randolph lamented, "But what a dreadful chasm will the refusal of Maryland
create? A chasm more injurious to us, than any other of the delegates." Letter from
Edmund Randolph to James Madison (June 12, 1786), in Rutland and Rachal, eds, 9 The
Papersof James Madison at 75 (cited in note 41).
' New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and North Carolina had elected
delegates, but they had not arrived. On September 8, Madison wrote in despair "I came to
this place a day or two ago, where I found two [commissioners] only. A few more have
since come in, but the prospect of a sufficient [number] to make the meeting respectable is
not flattering." Letter from James Madison to Ambrose Madison (Sept 8, 1786), in Hunt,
ed, 2 The Writings of James Madison at 269 (cited in note 50). The next day, a delegate,
in what could have been a reference to the Articles' requirement of seven states to form a
quorum, wrote that "[w]e walt with impatience for the more distant states, as without a
deputation from seven, at least, it seems improper to enter on the main business of our
mission." Extract of a letter from a gentleman, now attending the meeting of a convention
on the subject of the regulation of trade, at Annapolis, dated September 9, 1786, NJ Ga'
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five states had arrived,"0 the Federalists desperately sought to
sustain institutional momentum. Before disbanding, the commissioners accepted Hamilton's proposal to issue a call for another
convention-this time to meet in Philadelphia.
According to the commissioners, this new convention should
not be limited to "commercial regulation" but should consider a
broader range of deficiencies in the existing system: "defects,
[which] upon a closer examination, may be found greater and
more numerous." In calling for a radical expansion of the
convention's mandate, the group recognized a need to justify
itself. Who, after all, had given these commercial commissioners
the authority to issue such a call? The report answered:
If in expressing this wish or in intimating any other sentiment, Your Commissioners should seem to exceed the strict
bounds of their appointment, they entertain a full confidence, that a conduct, dictated by an anxiety for the welfare,
of the United States, will not fail to receive an indulgent
construction.6
The upshot was a striking combination of hubris and humility.'
zette 3 (Sept 18, 1786).
' The twelve delegates who finally made it to Annapolis were Alexander Hamilton
and Egbert Benson from New York; Abraham Clarke, William C. Houston, and James
Schureman from New Jersey;, Tench Coxe from Pennsylvania; George Read, John
Dickinson, and Richard Bassett from Delaware; and Edmund Randolph, James.Madison,
and St. George Tucker from Virginia.
61 The entire text of the Annapolis report is reproduced in Jensen, ed, 1 Documentary
History at 182-85 (cited in note 16). The report was in Hamilton's handwriting, Kaminski
and Saladino, eds, 13 Documentary History of the Ratification at 34 (cited in note 34), and
Madison later confirmed Hamilton's authorship. Hunt, ed, 7 The Writings of James Madison 164-65 (cited in note 50), quoting letter dated Oct 12, 1804.
There are, however, problems with the modem reprinting of this document. Almost
all reprints italicize the words "other important matters," which are underlined in the
original. But they omit the emphasis placed on other words. For the most part, these
phrases emphasize the importance that Annapolis placed on unanimous consent. Consider
the phrases that Hamilton chose to underline: "by the other states in the union," "to
report to the several States," and most importantly, "when unanimously ratified by them."
The only underlined phrases not speaking to unanimity are the ones attempting to
enlarge the scope of the Philadelphia Convention: "other important matters" and "for the
exigencies of the Union." See Bernstein, Are We to Be a Nation? at 104 (cited in note 45)
(photocopy of original Annapolis resolution). This modem failure can be traced back to the
standard reference work, Tansill, ed, Documents Illustrativeof the Formationof the Union
(cited in note 17), though Tansill does note the italics for "other important matters," id at
40-43.
' Some believed that Hamilton, Madison, and others had conspired to end the
Annapolis conference quickly in order to plant the Philadelphia idea. This conspiracy
theory was industriously propagated by Louis Otto, the French charg6 d'affaires, Letter
from Louis Otto to Vergennes (Oct 10, 1786), in George Bancroft, 2 History of the Forma.
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The commissioners had taken upon themselves the right to propose a fundamental change in constitutional law. While Article
XIII had confided exclusive authority in Congress to propose
amendments, Annapolis was making an end run around the
existing institution by calling for a second body, the convention,
unknown to the Confederacy's higher lawmaking system.
Having taken this revolutionary step, the commissioners
then covered their tracks to gain the cooperation of existing institutions.' First, they were careful to specify that any constitutional proposals emerging from Philadelphia should be approved
by Congress and all thirteen legislatures in exact conformity with
the Articles of Confederation. This was, of course, precisely what
did not happen. Moreover, given the willingness of the Annapolis
commissioners to go beyond their mandate, how seriously could
one take their assurances about the future convention?'
Nonetheless, the commissioners' stipulation softened the challenge to existing authorities implicit in the call for a new institution that, once convened, might serve as a formidable rival.
Second, the commissioners did not take decisive action unilaterally. They merely called upon Congress and the thirteen
state legislatures to issue such calls. Surely there was little harm
in that? If existing institutions refused to respond favorably, the
Annapolis initiative would be quickly forgotten.
If, however, Annapolis struck a responsive chord, its
hubristic aspect would reassert itself once again. While the commissioners were clear that any proposals made by the convention
should gain the assent of Congress and all thirteen legislatures,
they were entirely silent when it came to the rules for calling the
Philadelphia Convention in the first place. Did its initiative re-

tion of the Constitution of the United States of America 399-401 (Rothman, 1983), and
later picked up by the prominent pamphleteer, the Federal Farmer, Kaminski and
Saladino, eds, 14 Documentary History of the Ratification at 22-23 (cited in note 34). See
also Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution at 9 (cited in note 47); Fred Barbash, The
Founding: A Dramatic Account of the Writing of the Constitution 39-40 (Simon &
Schuster, 1987). Our review of the Maryland archives and other original sources has
uncovered no hard evidence of such a conspiracy.
' Unfortunately, we have been no more successful than others in uncovering evidence that would reveal the course of the commissioners' discussions. Our analysis is
based simply on the text of Hamilton's report.
" Rakove, 12 This Const at 4 (cited in note 48) ("[Tihe initiative taken by the Annapolis commissioners set an important precedent for the delegates at Philadelphia, who
also ignored their nominal duty to revise the existing Articles of Confederation and
instead chose to frame a radically new constitution. One risky gamble thus led to another,
for far greater stakes.").

The University of Chicago Law Review

[62:475

quire the assent of all the existing institutions? If not, how much
support was enough?
Rather than setting up a clear rule in advance, the commissioners were content to precipitate an institutional bandwagon;
as more and more existing institutions recognized the need for
changing the rules, would the dynamic of institutional consent
create its own kind of legitimation?
D. The Impact of Shays's Rebellion
Some have characterized Hamilton's dramatic call at Annapols as a response to news of the Massachusetts uprising we
know as Shays's Rebellion.65 Our comprehensive study of original sources gives no support to this claim. However, news of
Shays's Rebellion rapidly overtook reports about Annapolis and
profoundly affected its public reception.
But in a complicated way. Traditional accounts, relying on
Beardian understandings, stress the way in which Shays's Rebellion generated class anxieties amongst the revolutionary elite,
leading them to embrace strong measures like the Constitutional
Convention. This is undoubtedly part of the story," but there is
another part as well. Shays's Rebellion was only the most dramatic example of agrarian uprisings that swept through Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, as well as Massachusetts, in
the mid-1780s. Throughout western New England, farmers were
not only closing down courts and refusing to pay debts. They
were engaging in more constructive forms of politics, meeting in
illegal county conventions, and making extraordinary demands
for fundamental change. 7

' See Walter B. Mead, The United States Constitution:Personalities,Principles, and
Issues 18 (South Carolina, 1987); Mitchell, Alexander Hamilton at 366 (cited in note 44).
' This debate has been covered well by others. For the view that Shays's Rebellion
had nothing to do with the Constitution, see Robert A. Feer, Shays's Rebellion and the
Constitution, 42 New Eng Q 388, 393-94 (1969) (arguing that "[there is no evidence that
state legislatures moved one whit faster to choose delegates to the Philadelphia Convention because of Shays's Rebellion."). On the other hand, David Szatmary argues that
"domestic unrest helped to ensure in certain quarters a favorable reaction toward the
meeting [of the Philadelphia Convention]. Developing at a critical juncture in time, the
rebellion convinced the elites of sovereign states that the proposed gathering at Philadelphia must take place." David P. Szatmary, Shays' Rebellion: The Making of an Agrarian
Insurrection 127 (Massachusetts, 1980).
7 For a discussion of such activity in Connecticut, see note 55. New Hampshire had
had so many popular conventions that by the middle of 1786, assemblies "were held in
most of the towns of this state, appointing members to meet in convention" to "reliev[e]
the alarming distresses of the people at large.! Mass Gazette (Aug 14, 1786). Opponents
of conventions once again raised concerns of illegality. See, for example, General
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This predictably led opponents to assault the farmers' use of
illegal conventions. In Massachusetts particularly, the newspapers were full of fascinating debates that wrestled with the conditions under which a break with the rules was appropriate."
Pamphleteers, like An Other Citizen, distinguished sharply between the use of illegal conventions during the American Revolution, and their use in the present dispute. When the colonists
were fighting the British, they had no alternative but to break
the law and meet in convention. But the situation had changed
radically in 1780, when the people of Massachusetts solemnly
approved a Constitution. Since that time, no group of men could
properly meet in convention and "dare, with impunity, to lay the
foundations of a CIVIL WAR in the state, or to molest that Govermnent in the execution of its constitutional powers. " " An address to Governor Bowdoin of Massachusetts elaborated the
point:
In the same compact, the people solemnly agreed to support
the Constitution for the space of fifteen years, and made
ample provision for the revision of it at the end of that period, if it should then be thought necessary.-There is no
officer, either high or low, within the commonwealth, who

Sullivan's Address to the Freemen of the State of New Hampshire, Worcester Mag 339 (2d
week of Oct 1786) (Conventions "have by experience, been found in this and in one of the
neighbouring states, to have a tendency to overturn and destroy all constitutional authority and government."). Vermont had conventions similar to the ones in Massachusetts,
both in Rutland on August 15, 1786, and in Middletown on September 26, 1786. Ga St
Gazette 1 (Jan 27, 1787), quoting a newspaper from Bennington, Vt (Nov 20, 1786). The
protests for independence in Vermont were similar to those in Massachusetts. Conn J 2
(Aug 30, 1786). Rhode Island farmers likewise set up conventions in Scituate and East
Greenwich in August 1786. Szatmary, Shays's Rebellion at 39 (cited in note 66).
' See, for example, Address of James Sullivan, Charles Jarvis, Stephen Higginson,
Edward Paine,Jonathan Jackson, and JonathanAustin to the Governor James Bowdoin,
September 14, 1786, Worcester Mag 298 (3d week of Sept 1786) (arguing that the commotions "are equally repugnant to the constitution, as they are destructive of the peace and
order of society"); and Govenor Bowdoin's reply, id at 299 (referring to "the illegal measures"); Monitor, Worcester Mag 371 (lst week of Nov 1786) ("Open your eyes to the pit of
destruction which gapes before you! - See the fair, and once firm fabrick of the Constitution, 'which your own hands have framed,' now falling to pieces! - See these Conventions
and their consequences, these insurrections, these intestine discords, these 'worms in the
bowels,' see them, and be convinced they portend the dissolution of all free government in
America!-); Petition from the Town of Holden to GovernorBowdoin, Worcester Mag 507
(3d week of Jan 1787) ("We view with grief and disapprobation, when other means more
regular and constitutional might have been taken for a redress of grievances .... ").
' An Other Citizen, On Conventions,Worcester Mag 273 (1st week of Sept 1786). For
similar attacks, see An Old Republican, Strictures upon County Conventions in General,
and upon the Late Meeting Holden atHatfield in Particular,Worcester Mag 295 (3d week
of Sept 1786).
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does not derive his whole authority from the people, and
who is not amenable to a proper and adequate tribunal for
his conduct.
If the citizens of the State labour under grievances
which can be redressed by the acts of the legislature, we
conceive that their privileges in this case can never be enlarged, for the General Court are chosen annually by the
people; and though in one year our complaints are not attended to, yet we can in the next election place men in power who will answer our reasonable expectations; and, we are
constrained to say, that we are ignorant of the time when
the representatives of the people in this state have not duly
attended to the Instructions of their constituents.
Fellow-citizens, we now entreat you, by the sacred compact which holds us in one society-by the blood of our
brethren shed to obtain our freedom-by the tender regard
we feel for our rising offspring, claiming freedom from our
hands, as their inheritance by the grant of heaven-to use
your endeavours that redress of grievances be fought for in a
constitutionaland orderly way only ... .'o
Given these broad statements of principle, it was going to be
tough for Shaysite opponents in New England legislatures to
embrace the Annapolis call for a Philadelphia Convention. Was
this call for a convention no less revolutionary, and no less illegitimate, than that of the rebel farmers?7 1

Address, Worcester Mag at 300-02 (cited in note 68).
The dilemma confronting New England legalists was generally appreciated
throughout the country. As late as the state ratifying convention in Virginia, one can hear
William Grayson remarking70

"

When this state proposed that the general government should be improved, Massachusetts was just recovered from a rebellion which had brought the republic to the
brink of destruction-from a rebellion which was crushed by that federal government
which is now so much condemned and abhorred: a vote of that august body for fifteen
hundred men, aided by the exertions of the state, silenced all opposition, and shortly
restored the public tranquillity. Massachusetts was satisfied that these internal commotions were so happily settled, and was unwilling to risk any similar distresses by
theoretic experiments. Were the Eastern States willing to enter into this measure?
Were they willing to accede to the proposal of Virginia? In what manner was it received? Connecticut revolted at the idea. The Eastern States, sir, were unwilling to
recommend a meeting of a convention. They were well aware of the dangers of revolutions and changes. Why was every effort used, and such uncommon pains taken, to
bring it about? This would have been unnecessary, had it been approved of by the
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It was not long before this question was raised in the Massachusetts legislature. Both Rufus King and Nathan Dane opposed
the Annapolis report's call to Philadelphia as unconstitutional. As
King explained:
The Confederation was the act of the people. No part could
be altered but by consent of Congress and confirmation of
the several Legislatures. Congress therefore ought to make
the examination first, because, if it was done by a convention, no Legislature could have a right to confirm it ....
Besides, if Congress should not agree upon a report of a
convention, the most fatal consequences might follow. Congress therefore were the proper body to propose alterations ...

72

King and Dane would become important figures. A few months
later, they would be the authors of the congressional resolution
calling upon the states to send delegates to Philadelphia. During
the fall of 1786, however, they seemed preoccupied with the similarities between the Annapolis Convention and the County Conventions of the Shaysites. Rather than serving as a Beardian
prod to the upper classes, Shays served as an example of the ease
with which illegality could spiral out of control.73

people. Was Pennsylvania disposed for the reception of this project of reformation?
No, sir. She was even unwilling to amend her revenue laws, so as to make the five
per centum operative. She was satisfied with things as they were. There was no complaint, that ever I heard of, from any other part of the Union, except Virginia.
Elliot, ed, 3 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 274-75 (cited in note 16).
'2 Proceedingsof Government, Worcester Mag at 353 (cited in note 41). A month later,
Nathan Dane reinforced these concerns:
[A] question arises as to the best mode of obtaining these alterations, whether by the
means of a convention, or by the constitutional mode pointed out in the 13th article
of the confederation. In favour of a convention, it is said, that the States will probably place more confidence in their doings' and that the alterations there may be
better adjusted, than in Congress. It is asked, what reason there can be for supporting this, as several of the States consider such a convention highly inexpedient, and
some States unconstitutional, and not all the States are agreed even in the propriety
of a commercial convention?
Proceedingsof Government, Newport Mercury 1 (Nov 17, 1786) (speech of Nathan Dane to
Massachusetts House of Representatives).
In their speeches, both King and Dane emphasized their anxieties about Shays's
Rebellion and the imprudence of destabilizing Congress at a time when federal troops
might be required to assist the Massachusetts authorities. This supports the suggestion of
Robert Feer, 42 New Eng Q at 393-94 (cited in note 66), that Shays's Rebellion had an adverse impact upon the prospects of the Philadelphia Convention.
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Given these anxieties, it should be no surprise that New
York and New England were slow to respond to Annapolis's call
to Philadelphia.74 Nonetheless, Federalists further south were
successful in winning a number of favorable responses to Annapolis,75 maintaining momentum through the winter of 1786 until
the bandwagon effect could be renewed by another round of ratification.
E. The Continental Congress Gets on the Bandwagon
Congress received the Annapolis proceedings on September
20 and referred them to a special three-man committee. It took
no action for months. By early February, Madison and Hamilton
came to Congress to campaign for endorsement, but
others-including future Publian John Jay-continued to be
impressed by the illegality of it all. Richard Henry Lee, a member of the special congressional committee, surveyed the scene:
With difficulty the friends to the system adopted by the
convention [at Annapolis] induced Congress to commit your
report, altho' all were truly sensible of the respect manifested by the convention to this body, and all zealous to accomplish the objects proposed by the authors of the commercial
convention. Indeed their conviction of the inadequacy of the
present federal government render them particularly zealous
to amend and strengthen it. But different opinions prevail as
to the mode; some think with the Annapolis meeting, others
consider Congress not only the constitutional but the most
eligible body to originate and propose necessary amendments to the confederation, and others prefer State conventions for the express purpose, and a congress of deputys,
appointed
by these conventions with plenipotentiary pow76
ers.

7 See text accompanying note 71. Of the northern states, only Massachusetts approved Philadelphia before Congress acted, and it made its earlier resolution less restrictive on March 3 in response to Congress's February decision. The other northern states
acted later: New York (Mar 6); Connecticut (May 17); New Hampshire (June 27); and
Rhode Island, of course, not at all. See text accompanying notes 84-85.
"' States to the south of New York tended to act earlier: New Jersey (Nov 23); Virginia (Nov 23); Pennsylvania (Dec 30); North Carolina (Jan 6); Delaware (Feb 3); Georgia
(Feb 10); South Carolina (Mar 8); and Maryland (May 26). See text accompanying note 19.
76 Letter from Henry Lee to Henry St. George Tucker (Oct 20 1786), in Burnett, ed, 8
Letters of the Continental Congress at 489-90 (cited in note 41). James Madison's notes say
that "[tihe objections which seemed to prevail against the recommendation of the convention by Congress, were with some: (1) that it tended to weaken the federal authority by
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Despite these hesitations, ratification by Congress was imperative if Philadelphia were to become a credible reality. Many
states, especially in the North, seemed quite unprepared to send
delegates to an unconstitutional convention unless Congress
expressly approved."
Within this context, the forces for the convention were reinforced from a surprising direction; the very same King and Dane
who had opposed Philadelphia in Massachusetts now came to its
defense as congressional delegates. After some preliminary sparring in mid-February, the two Massachusetts delegates wrote the
resolution that gained congressional approval on February 21,
1787.78 What accounted for the shift?
We have King's word, in a letter to Elbridge Gerry of February 11, that it was not any change of mind concerning the legality of the initiative:79
For a number of reasons, although my sentiments are the
same as to the legality of this measure, I think we ought not
to oppose, but to coincide with this project....
Events are hurrying to a crisis; prudent and sagacious
men should be ready to seize the most favourable circumstances to establish a more permanent and vigorous government."

lending its sanction to an extra-constitutional mode of proceeding-with others (2) that
the interposition of Congress would be considered by the jealous as betraying an ambitious wish to get power into their hands by any plan whatever that might present itself."
Madison's notes of the debates in Congress on February 21, 1787, in Jensen, ed, 1 Documentary History at 188 (cited in note 16). Madison also notes that New Englanders were
less enthusiastic about plans for a stronger Union, attributing it in part to "the effect of
their late confusions," for example, Shays's Rebellion. Id at 189.
' Madison wrote to Randolph,
A great disagreement of opinion exists as to the expediency of a recommendation
from Congiresis to the backward States in favor of the meeting. It would seem as if
some of the States disliked it because it is an extraconstitutional measure, and that
their dislike would be removed or lessened by a sanction from Cong[res]s to it. On
the other hand it is suggested that some would dislike it the more if Cong[res]s
should appear to interest themselves in it.
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Feb 18, 1787), in Burnett, ed, 8 Letters
of the Continental Congressat xxxix (cited in note 41).
Jensen, ed, 1 Documentary History at 187 (cited in note 16).
We have Madison's words as well, noting that Dane, King's associate, who "was at
bottom unfriendly to the plan of a convention, and had dissuaded his state from coming
into it, brought forward a proposition .... " Id at 189.
' Letter from Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry (Feb 11, 1787), in King, ed, The Life and
Correspondenceof Rufus King at 201-02 (cited in note 33).
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Close observers had little difficulty explaining this conversion to
the path of revolution. By this point, Massachusetts was effectively crushing Shays's Rebellion."' Stephen Higginson, who had
been appointed a Massachusetts delegate to the Annapolis Convention, drolly observed that King and Dane "will not now think
there is so great a resemblance between our County Conventions... and that proposed to be held in Philadelphia in May, as
they then thought, nor will they now imagine the same danger
can result to the Union from the latter, as our experience has
proved was justly apprehended from the former to this Commonwealth."82
Despite the acknowledgment of formal illegality by its draftsmen, the resolution sufficed to propel the institutional bandwagon forward. Instead of stressing the revolutionary character of its
enterprise, the resolution outwardly proclaimed continuity with
the Articles, beginning with the words "Whereas there is provision in the Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union for
making alterations therein by the assent of a Congress of the
United States and of the legislatures of the several
states ...." With Shays's Rebellion now under control, the
northern states joined southern laggards in responding affirmatively to the congressional invitation to Philadelphia.'

81

On February 4, General Lincoln's army took the Shaysites by surprise in

Petersham. This was a major turning point in the battle. On the same day, the Massachusetts General Court declared a state of rebellion, which gave Governor Bowdoin close to
unlimited powers. He used them to raise 2,600 new troops. Twelve days later, Massachusetts passed an act disqualifying Shaysites from voting, serving as jurors, or holding
public office. All this ended the threat of major organized Shaysite assaults. Szatmary,
Shays'Rebellion at 105-06 (cited in note 66).
' Letter from Stephen Higginson to General Knox (Feb 8, 1787), in Higginson,
Steven Higginson at 113 (cited in note 51). This letter also may contain the first suggestion that the convention might appropriately break with the unanimity rule of the Articles
and call for nine states to breathe life into a new Constitution. Id at 114.
King himself was more anxious about the effects of his conversion: "I will not venture a conjecture relative to the policy of this measure in Mass[achusetts]. The thing is so
problematical, that I confess I am at some loss. I am rather inclined to the measure from
an Idea of prudence, or for the purpose of watching, than from an expectation that much
Good will come from it." Letter from Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry (Feb 18, 1787), in
King, ed, The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King at 202 (cited in note 33).
Jensen, ed, 1 DocumentaryHistory at 187 (cited in note 16).
Indeed, fresh from its victories over the Shaysites, the Massachusetts legislature
voted to support the convention even before it received word of Congress's favorable
recommendation. Once this had been received, however, it significantly expanded the
commissions given to its delegation, expressly citing the congressional action. Of the five
other states (New York, South Carolina, Maryland, Connecticut, and New Hampshire)
that acted late, only one, Maryland, did not base its appointment on the congressional
resolution (which chose instead to track the language of the original Annapolis Conven-
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With one exception.
F. Rhode Island's Protest
"Permit the legislature of this State to address you," Governor Collins of Rhode Island wrote to the President of the Continental Congress in explanation of its rejection of an invitation to
send delegates to Philadelphia:
[A]s a Legislative Body, we could not appoint delegates to do
that which only the people at large are entitled to do. By a
law of our State, the delegates in Congress are chosen by the
suffrages of all the freemen therein, and are appointed to
represent them in Congress; and for the Legislative Body to
have appointed delegates to represent them in convention,
when they cannot appoint delegates in Congress (unless
upon their death or other incidental matter,) must be absurd, as that delegation in convention is for the express
purpose of altering a constitution, which the people at large
are only capable of appointing the members.'
Collins's objection to the convention was by no means unique.
Others, including John Jay, were troubled by the fact that the
Philadelphia Convention was a creature of state legislatures, and
so could not claim a sufficiently direct connection to "the People."' After challenging the legitimacy of the convention, Collins
quoted the final Article of Confederation verbatim, emphasizing
Rhode Island's "diffiden[ce] of power and apprehension of dissolving a compact which was framed by the wisdom of men who
gloried in being instrumental in preserving the religious and civil
rights of a multitude of people..., and fearing, when the compact7should once be broken, we must all be lost in a common ru8
in."
The letter was dated September 15, 1787, and arrived in
New York just as the Philadelphia Convention was winding up
its own anxious deliberations about the wisdom of a revolutionary break with legality.

tion). Kaminski and Saladino, eds, 13 Documentary History of the Ratification at 38 (cited

in note 34). See also text accompanying notes 20-21.
8
Letter from John Collins, Governor of Rhode Island, to the President of Congress
(Sept 15, 1787), in William R.Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress 575-76
(Providence, 1870).
See text accompanying note 33.
Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental Congress at 576.
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G. Legality in Philadelphia
Illegality was a leitmotif at the convention from its first days
to its last.' The theme's repeated recurrence was in part a mat-

ter of strategy. The Federalists' opponents constantly used legal
arguments to discredit their rivals' efforts to gain support for a
national government with unprecedented powers. But there was

something more than rhetoric involved. Rather than responding
to legalistic critique with legalistic defense, leading Federalists
regularly proclaimed the revolutionary character of their enterprise.
The paucity of legalistic defenses might strike moderns as
surprising. This was not, however, the first time that Washington
and the rest had defied the law in the name of a mobilized People. If revolutionary action was justified against King George HI,

The problem burst onto center stage from the very first as the Virginia delegation
sought to dominate the agenda with its fifteen-point Plan. The first point considered was
Virginia's nationalistic contention that "a union of the states, merely federal, will not
accomplish the objects proposed by the articles of the confederation." Farrand, ed, 1
Records of the FederalConvention at 39 (cited in note 15). Pinckney of South Carolina objected "that if the convention agreed to it, it appeared to him that their business was at
an end," since the delegates only had been given power to revise the Articles and not junk
them entirely. Id. Similarly, Gerry of Massachusetts rose to warn the delegates that it is
"questionable not only whether this convention can propose a[ ] government totally different or whether Congress itself would have a right to pass such a resolution as that before
the house. The commission from Massachusetts empowers the deputies to proceed
agreeably to the recommendation of Congress. This the foundation of the convention. If we
have a right to pass this resolution we have a right to annihilate the confederation." Id at
42-43.
Men like Gerry and Pinckney were crucial for the Virginians. Rather than trying to
force the question to a vote, they quickly deferred further discussion--only to encounter
more legalistic resistance in response to their second resolve, demanding a break with the
Confederation's "one state-one vote" system in Congress:
Mr. Reed [of Delaware] moved that the whole clause relating to the point of Representation be postponed; reminding the Com[mittee] that the deputies from Delaware
were restrained by their commission from assenting to any change of the rule of
suffirage, and in case such a change should be fixed on, it might become their duty to
retire from the Convention.
Mr. Gvr. Morris observed that the valuable assistance of those members could
not be lost without real concern, and that so early a proof of discord in the convention as a secession of a State, would add much to the regret; that the change proposed was however so fundamental an article in a national Govt. that it could not be
dispensed with.
Id at 37. Once again, however, the Federalists rapidly retreated. At the time of these debates in late May, representatives from only eight states had appeared in Philadelphia. A
legalistic walkout by Delaware could have readily pushed the convention down the road to
Annapolis. By mid-June the debate on legality reasserted itself in earnest in the proceedings analyzed in the text.
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was it not justified to consolidate the constitutional achievement
of the Revolutionary generation?
Given their experience of successful revolution, it was no
disgrace for these men to confess illegality-and disdain the rare
and ingenious effort to construct a legalistic fig leaf for their
initiatives. Instead, the challenge was to keep the dangers of a
revolutionary breach with legality under control by designing
another round of unconventional activities that involved the
cooperation of established authorities in their own constitutional
reorganization.8 9
The ongoing discussion of illegality proceeded in two waves.
The first was provoked by the bitter debate between nationalists
and decentralizers that dominated the first six weeks of the convention. The nationalizers seized the agenda with their fifteenpoint Virginia Plan, which contemplated a powerful national
government with legislative, executive, and judicial institutions
operating independently of the states. The decentralizers responded with the New Jersey Plan, which enhanced the powers
of the existing Congress without challenging basic premises-especially the principle that gave each state equal voting
power in the Continental Congress.
The decentralizers repeatedly wrapped themselves in a cloak
of legality. Here is Paterson's speech introducing the New Jersey
Plan:
The Convention he said was formed in pursuance of an Act
of Congs. that this act was recited in several of the Commissions, particularly that of Massts. which he required to be
read: That the amendment of the confederacy was the object
of all the laws and commissions on the subject; that the articles of the confederation were therefore the proper basis of
all the proceedings of the Convention. We ought to keep
within its limits, or we should be charged by our constituents with usurpation. [T]hat the people of America were
sharpsighted and not to be deceived. But the Commissions
under which we acted were not only the measure of our
power. [Tihey denoted also the sentiments of the States on
the subject of our deliberation. The idea of a national Govt.
as contradistinguished from a federal one, never entered into

Forty-four of the fifty-five delegates were or had been delegates to the Continental
Congress. James H. Charleston, et al, eds, Framersof the Constitution 29 (Guelier Educational, 1986).
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the mind of any of them, and to the public mind we must
accommodate ourselves.... We must follow the people; the
people will not follow us.' °
Recall that Massachusetts was a key state that had expressly
instructed its delegates to follow Congress's insistence that the
convention meet "for the sole and express purpose of revising the
Articles." 9' On Paterson's widely shared view,92 it was only a
moderate plan, like New Jersey's, that qualified as a revision.
Nationalist proposals championed by Madison, Wilson, and Hamilton were simply beyond the convention's authority: "If the confederacy was radically wrong, let us return to our States, and
obtain larger powers, not assume them of ourselves." 3
Especially problematic was the nationalists' insistence on
depriving the small states of the equal voting power guaranteed
them by the Articles: "He reads the 5th. art: of Confederation
giving each State a vote-& the 13th. declaring that no alteration
shall be made without unanimous consent. This is the nature of
all treaties. What is unanimously done, must be unanimously
undone."' Throughout these bitter weeks, Paterson's legalistic
concerns were reinforced by his allies.95
The nationalists, in contrast, were strikingly unconcerned
with legal technicalities. Edmund Randolph, who had presented
the Virginia Plan, responded to Paterson's recurring legalisms by
explaining that he "was not scrupulous on the point of power.
When the salvation of the Republic was at stake, it would be
treason to our trust, not to propose what we found necessary."'
Broadly speaking, this was the dominant sentiment, with nationalist delegates repeatedly claiming that the danger of disunion

Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention at 177-78 (cited in note 15).
See text accompanying note 17 (emphasis added).
Even Hamilton admitted at one point that the plans of the nationalizers "are very
remote from the idea of the people. Perhaps the Jersey plan is nearest their expectation.
But the people are gradually ripening... ." Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the FederalConvention at 301 (cited in note 15).
Curiously, many intelligent commentators seem blind to the problem of legal authority. For example, Fred Barbash asserts that the defenders of the New Jersey Plan could
not come up with a positive argument for their plan; their best defense of it was that it
was less radical and therefore more in touch with what the people wanted-as if legality
were not a "positive argument!" Barbash, The Founding at 87 (cited in note 62).
' Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention at 250 (cited in note 15) (remarks
of Paterson).
"
'l

'4

Id.

Id at 336 (Lansing); id at 469 (Ellsworth); id at 531 (Bedford).
Id at 255.
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justified the embrace of illegality.97 This was sometimes buttressed by appeals to popular sovereignty, as with James
Wilson's: "We have powers to conclude nothing-we have power
to propose anything-we expect the Approbation of Cong. we
hope for that of the Legis. of the several States perhaps it will
not be inconsistent w[i]th Revolution principles, to promise ourselves the Assent of the People provided a more regular establishment cannot be obtained &c &c." 5
Only Madison seemed interested in exploring the possibility
of a legalistic defense for the convention's break with the Articles. In an important speech, he asserted that the nationalists'
plan could legally count as an appropriate "revision" of the Articles within the terms of Congress's resolution. After all, the resolution told the delegates to "render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the
Union." He also disputed Paterson's claim that the Articles could
not be legally dissolved without the unanimous consent of all
thirteen states. On his view, there might be occasions where the
breach of the Articles by some states allowed others to declare
them void.
We will be discussing Madison's legal views more elaborately
at a later point. For present purposes, it is enough to note how
little influence they had on the debate. While others did pick up
a bit on Madison's broad interpretation of the congressional call,
Madison himself reports that even a strong nationalist like Hamilton proclaimed himself "not yet prepared to admit the doctrine
that the Confederacy, could be dissolved by partial infractions of
it."' On the following day, Ellsworth rose to attack the basic
premises of Madison's argument:

See, for example, id at 283, 338 (remarks of Hamilton and Mason).
Id at 266 (as reported by King). Madison's report of the same remarks does not
contain as explicit a reference to "revolution principles": "With regard to the power of the
Convention, he conceived himself authorized to conclude nothing, but to be at liberty to
propose any thing." Id at 253. Wilson had already confessed his secessionist intentions:
'8

Mr. Wilson took this occasion to lead the Committee by a train of observations to the
idea of not suffering a disposition in the plurality of States to confederate anew on
better principles, to be defeated by the inconsiderate or selfish opposition of a few
<States>. He hoped the provision for ratifying would be put on such a footing as to
admit of such a partial union, with a door open for the accession of the rest.
Id at 123 (brackets in original). As we shall see, Wilson's revolutionary realpolitik only
became more emphatic as the convention's deliberations progressed. See text accompanying note 114.
' Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention at 324-25 (cited in note 15).
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He could not admit the doctrine that a breach of <any of>
the federal articles could dissolve the whole. It would be
highly dangerous not to consider the Confederation as still
subsisting. He wished also the plan of the Convention to go
forth as an amendment to the articles of Confederation,
since under this idea the authority of the Legislatures could
ratify it. If they are unwilling, the people will be so too. If
the plan goes forth to the people for ratification several succeeding Conventions within the States would be unavoidable. He did not like these conventions. They were better
fitted to pull down than to build up Constitutions."°
Despite these clear challenges, Madison's notes do not record
a single person rising to support his position. While the air was
full of talk about the dangers of secession and the need to take
revolutionary steps to consolidate the Union, nobody else suggested that the Union could legally be dissolved. The question instead was whether the legalist conservatives were right to limit
themselves to some set of modest amendments that had a reasonable chance of universal acceptance, or whether the nationalist
revolutionaries were right to condemn these as inadequate to
save the Union.
This debate ended in July with the Great Compromise-in
which the convention (by a very narrow margin) accepted much
of the centralizing thrust of the Virginia Plan and mollified the
decentralizers by giving an equal vote to all states in the Senate.
Shortly before, New Yorkers Yates and Lansing had walked out,
denouncing the illegalities contemplated by the runaway convention.''
10 Id at 335 (footnotes omitted) (brackets in original).

...As delegates Robert Yates and John Lansing explained to Governor Clinton:
The limited and well-defined powers under which we acted, and which could not, on
any possible construction, embrace an idea of such magnitude as to assent to a general Constitution, in subversion of that of the state.
From these expressions, we were led to believe that a system of consolidated government could not, in the remotest degree, have been in contemplation of the legislature of this state; for that so important a trust, as the adopting measures which

tended to deprive the state government of its most essential rights of sovereignty,
and to place it in a dependent situation, could not have been confided by implication;
and the circumstance, that the acts of the Convention were to receive a state approbation in the last resort, forcibly corroborated the opinion that our powers could not
involve the subversion of a Constitution which, being immediately derived from the
people, could only be abolished by their express consent, and not by a legislature
possessing authority vested in them for its preservation. Nor could we suppose that if
it had been the intention of the legislature to abrogate the existing Confederation,
they would, in such pointed terms, have directed the attention of their delegates to
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But those who remained had not yet finished with the problem. Although they were now moving in the direction of a revolutionary proposal, they had not squarely confronted Article XIII of
the Confederacy: Were they prepared, in the end, to accept a
humble role and submit their recommendations for the approval
of Congress and all thirteen state legislatures, or were they going
to break with the Articles utterly and completely?
The second wave of discussions dealt with this question in a
variety of contexts. After some inconclusive sparring, the subject
could no longer be evaded when the provision on ratification
came to the floor in late August: "Mr. Sherman doubted the propriety of authorizing less than all the States to execute the Constitution, considering the nature of the existing Confederation.
Perhaps all the States may concur, and on that supposition it is
needless to hold out a breach of faith." 2 Morris then attacked
a second aspect of the proposal, moving to "leav[e] the States to
pursue their own modes of ratification." 3 This immediately led
Carroll of Maryland to open the hornets' nest of state constitutional law: "Mr. Carrol [sic] mentioned the mode of altering the
Constitution of Maryland pointed out therein, and that no other
mode could be pursued in that State." °'4
This led Madison to reassure the delegates:
The difficulty in Maryland was no greater than in other
States, where no mode of change was pointed out by the
Constitution, and all officers were under oath to support it.
The people were in fact, the fountain of all power, and by
resorting to them, all difficulties were got over. They could
alter constitutions as they pleased. It was a principle in the
Bills of rights, that first principles might be resorted to.'
The Marylanders were not impressed, McHenry noting "that the
officers of Govt. in Maryland were under oath to support the
mode of alteration prescribed by the Constitution." ° King
the revision and amendment of it, in total exclusion of every other idea.
Letter from Robert Yates and John Lansing to the Governor of New York, in Elliot, ed, 1
Debates in the Several State Conventions at 480-81 (cited in note 16)
" Farrand, ed, 2 Records of the FederalConvention at 475 (cited in note 15).
103 Id.
104 Id. The 1776 Maryland Constitution declared that no changes could occur "unless a
bill so to alter, change or abolish the same shall pass the General Assembly, and be published at least three months before a new election." Jameson, American Constitutional
Law § 224 at 214 (cited in note 29).
100 Farrand, ed, 2 Records of the Federal Convention at 476 (cited in note 15).
'o Id. Luther Martin also "repeated the peculiarity in the Maryland Constitution." Id
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chimed in to recall that the Constitution of Massachusetts, which
did have an explicit procedure "1for calling conventions, "was made
unalterable till the year 1790.

07

He reassured his fellows, however, that "this was no difficulty with him. The State must have contemplated a recurrence to
first principles before they sent deputies to this Convention --a remarkable statement from a man who had repeatedly confessed the illegality of the enterprise at earlier stages of
the process. Previously, however, he had made clear the grounds
for his insistence:
Mr. King thought that striking out "Conventions" [I as the
requisite mode was equivalent to giving up the business
altogether. Conventions alone, which will avoid all the obstacles from the complicated formation of the Legislatures, will
succeed, and if not positively required by the plan, its enemies will oppose that mode. °9
As we shall see, King's predictions would be fulfilled during the
struggle for ratification. The Constitution could never have succeeded without the convention's revolutionary breach with Article
XIII. This was probably why the debate was so brief, with no one
other than Madison trying to answer the dissenters' legalistic
doubts. The Federalists had the votes, and that was that. The
convention majority then made it plain that it would not formally
ask Congress for its approval, leaving Elbridge Gerry unanswered when he "dwelt on the impropriety of destroying the existing Confederation, without the unanimous Consent of the
parties to it.... .""o
The die had been cast; but then, at the last moment, there
was a surprising effort to provoke reconsideration. At one of the
convention's final working meetings, Alexander Hamilton insisted
that "the approbation of Congress [was] ...a necessary ingredi-

ent in the transaction," and denounced the decision to "allow nine
states.., to institute a new Government on the ruins of the
existing one.""' He moved "that the foregoing plan of a Constitution be transmitted to the U.S. in Congress assembled, in order
(Madison reporting).
7 Id at 476-77. Actually, it was 1795. See text accompanying note 28. Madison might
have misheard or King might have misspoke.
'08Id at 477.

"9 Id at 476.
10 Id at 478-79.

...Id at 560.
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that if the same shall be agreed to by them, it may be communicated to the Legislatures of the several States .... " After strictly
complying with the Articles, his motion went on to "recommend"

that each state consider whether it might voluntarily change its
ratification practices. Hamilton suggested that legislatures refrain from considering the Constitution itself and instead call a
special constitutional convention. He was even more tentative in
confronting the Articles' insistence on unanimous approval, proposing a "recommendation" to each legislature that was doubly
conditional. It did not suggest a break with the unanimity rule,
but simply urged each of them to authorize its state convention
to make the break "if" the convention "should be of the opinion"
that nine states were enough to bring the Constitution into
112
life.
Hamilton's caution was undoubtedly based on the legalistic
denunciations that Yates and Lansing were already publishing in
New York. Even at this late moment, his pleas were joined by
dissenting legalists like Elbridge Gerry, who then refused to sign:
"If nine out of thirteen can dissolve the compact, Six out of nine
will be just as able to dissolve the new one hereafter.""3
As was typical, this last legalistic plea was not countered by
a legalistic defense, but with some cold truths from James Wilson:
He expressed in strong terms his disapprobation..., particularly the suspending the plan of the Convention on the
approbation of Congress. He declared it to be worse than folly to rely on the concurrence of the Rhode Island members of
Congs. in the plan. Maryland had voted on this floor; for
requiring the unanimous assent of the 13 States to the proposed change in the federal System. N-York has not been
represented for a long time past in the Convention. Many
individual deputies from other States have spoken much
against the plan. Under these circumstances [clan it be safe
to make the assent of Congress necessary. After spending
four or five months in the laborious & arduous task of forming a Government for our Country, we are ourselves at the
close 1 14throwing insuperable obstacles in the way of its success.

12

Id at 562.

1

Id at 561.

114

Id at 562.
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Hamilton's legalistic hesitations were swept aside by a vote of
ten states to one," 5 but Wilson's vivid description made it clear
how vulnerable the convention's proposals would be in the
months ahead. Out of fifty-five delegates, only thirty-nine had
signed the final proposal. Luther Martin and John Francis Mercer of Maryland had recently followed Yates and Lansing of New
York in a loud and public walkout from the convention.
Would the reputation of George Washington and a few other
famous names be enough to sustain the institutional bandwagon?
JI1. THE UNCONVENTIONAL STRUGGLE FOR RATIFICATION
Consider how many times we have seen the unconventional
movement back and forth from legal authority to illegal assemblies before the day that the convention finally proclaimed a
change in the rules of the game. To summarize the pattern of
interaction, we have italicized the roles of legal bodies in the ongoing sequence, using boldface when it comes to irregular assemblies:
From the authorization of commercial delegates by Virginia
and Maryland to the Mount Vernon Conference to its ratification by the two states and Virginia's call for Annapolis.
To the ratification by nine states of the Annapolis meeting
over the legalistic dissent of four others to the call at Annapolis
for a convention at Philadelphia and its ratification by some
of the southern states while the northern ones remained in legalistic indecision.
To the congressional recommendation of Philadelphia and
its ratification by New York and New England over the legalistic
dissent of Rhode Island.
To the decision by the convention to change the rules of the
game.
And we have only told half the story. It was one thing for the
convention to break the rules; quite another to win agreement
from existing institutions that these new rules were appropriate.
This agreement did not come easily, and might not have come at
all without the strategic use of violence. Given the Constitution's
status as Holy Writ, the discovery of even a little bit of violence
at the Creation may be unsettling. But for more realistic types,

" Id at 563. After Lansing and Yates left the convention, Hamilton was no longer
allowed to cast New Yortes vote since he could not represent the majority of the state's

delegation. The single vote cast in favor of Hamilton's motion was that of Connecticut.

Our Unconventional Founding

1995]

the challenge is to explain why the violence was so limited, given
the Federalists' revolutionary assault on the legal order. A key to
the answer, we suggest once again, is the Founders' unconventional behavior-the way they continued to adapt existing institutions to new roles, rather than eliminating them entirely from
the legitimation process.
An important focus of the Federalist effort was the Continental Congress, which was very much alive throughout the period.
While many scholars have overlooked Congress's role during this
delicate phase, the Federalists could not afford to ignore it.
A. Congress Supports the Convention
On the same day it approved the Constitution, the convention also "RESOLVED, That the preceding Constitution be laid
before the United States in Congress assembled," without conceding the right to veto or revise the final product." 6
This was a dangerous game: once Congress seized hold of the
instrument, would it use the occasion to change the rules once
more by altering the proposed constitution? Once the convention
dissolved in Philadelphia, how could it respond to a congressional
counterassertion of authority?
These were not idle questions, as events proved. When Congress took up the convention's proposal nine days later on September 26, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia led the critics. Recall
that Lee had served on the congressional committee that considered the Annapolis report, and had refused to serve at Philadelphia on the ground that he would have to review the final product when it returned to Congress:
Strangest doctrine he ever heard, that [in] referring a matter of report, that no alterations should be made.... The
states and Congress, he thinks, had the idea that Congress
was to amend if they thought proper. He wishes to give it a
candid inquiry, and proposes such alterations as are neces-

116

Jensen, ed, 1 Documentary History at 317 (cited in note 16). The resolution contin-

ues:
and that it is the Opinion of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the People thereof,
under the Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent and Ratification; and
that each Convention assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof to the United States in Congress assembled.
...

Id at 317-18.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[62:475

sary.... To insist that it should go as it is without amendments is like presenting a hungry man 50 dishes and insisting he should eat all or none."
Having returned to his seat in Congress," 8 Madison dealt
with Lee's challenge in a revealing way. As we have seen, Madison was the only man at the convention who played with the idea
that the Articles might have lost their legal force. However, he
now played a different tune, expressly conceding congressional
authority over the convention's work product." 9 Rather than
raising legal objections, he sought to preserve the convention's
revolutionary legitimacy, urging his fellow congressmen to stay
their legalistic hand:
that as the Act of the Convention, when altered would instantly become the mere act of Congress, and must be proposed by them as such, and of course be addressed to the
Legislatures, not conventions of the States, and require the
ratification of thirteen instead of nine States, and as the
unaltered act would go forth to the States directDO from the
Convention under the auspices of that Body ....
Going beyond the convention's plan to "lafy the Constitution]
before Congress," Madison continued his unconventional strategy
by calling for explicit approval of revolutionary rule breaking.
In contrast, Lee emphasized the radical character of the
convention's break:
Resolved, That Congress after due attention to the Constitution under which this body exists and acts find that the said
Constitution in the thirteenth article thereof limits the power of Congress to the amendment of the present Confederacy
of thirteen states, but does not extend it to the creation of a

Id at 336, quoting Melancton Smith's notes for September 27, 1787.
Lees earlier remarks had provoked Federalists to call upon Madison to return
quickly to Congress. See Letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison, New York
(Sept 23, 1787), in Jensen, ed, 1 Documentary History at 326 (cited in note 16).
1
Madison did not deny "the right of Congress" to propose amendments, but argued
that it would be "inexpedien[t]." Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Sept
30, 1787), in Burnett, ed, 8 Letters of the Continental Congressat 650-51 (cited in note 41).
12 Id. Madison described claims made by Lee and Dane this way- "as the new Constitution was more than an alteration of the articles of Confederation... and even subverted those Articles altogether there was a constitutional impropriety in their taking any
positive agency in the work." He parried these legalisms by denying their ultimate cogency: "if beyond those powers, the same necessity which justified the Convention would
11
'

justify Congress ... ." Id.
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new confederacy of nine states; and the late Convention
having been constituted under the authority of twelve states
in this Union it is deemed respectful to transmit, and it is
accordingly ordered, that the plan of a new Federal Constitution laid before Congress by the said Convention be sent to
the executive of every state in this Union to be laid before
their respective legislatures."2
Madison's response: "Can't accede to it.... If this House can't
approve [the Constitution], it says the crisis is not yet arrived
and implies disapp[robation]."2 At the end of the debate, Madison had to settle for something less than explicit approval, but
something more than Lee's emphasis on the convention's illegality. On September 28, Congress resolved simply that the "said report... be transmitted to the several legislatures in order to be
submitted to a convention of delegates chosen in each state by
the people thereof in conformity to the resolves of the Convention .....
While Congress refrained from passing on the merits of the Constitution, this simple resolution reinforced the
convention's legitimacy at a time when it was very vulnerable."M
B. Violence in Philadelphia
The importance of this decision is suggested by developments
in Pennsylvania. Even before they received word of Congress's
resolution, the Federalists had sought to maintain momentum by
pressing ahead in the Pennsylvania Assembly, demanding an
immediate call for a state ratifying convention.' A substantial
minority of assemblymen were unimpressed. They pointed out
that Pennsylvania's own Constitution required a six-month pause
between the time amendments were proposed and the time a
convention would be elected." Since the federal Constitution
1
2

Jensen, ed, 1 Documentary History at 329-30 (cited in note 16).
Id at 332.

Id at 340.
Even the existence of the debate was unknown. We owe our knowledge of it to
Julius Goebel, Jr., who found the manuscript in the archives of Melancton Smith and
published it as Julius Goebel, Jr., Melancton Smith's Minutes of Debates on the New
Constitution, 64 Colum L Rev 26 (1964). A comprehensive collection of the relevant
sources is to be found in Jensen, ed, 1 Documentary History at 322-42 (cited in note 16).
'
Matthew J. Herrington, PopularSovereignty in Pennsylvania 1776-1791, 67 Temple L Rev 575, 602.03 (1994).
' Pa Const of 1776, § 47, in Thorpe, ed, 5 The Federal and State Constitutions at
3092 (cited in note 24).
12
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amounted to a massive amendment of Pennsylvania's, should not
the Assembly wait at least six months? Surely the People should
be given a chance to digest the proposal before electing delegates
to such an important convention?
The Federalist majority in the state House ignored these
very reasonable complaints, and pushed forward with a plan to
hold an election within nine days! The dissenters described their
reaction in a joint letter to their constituents:
In these circumstances we had no alternative; we were under a necessity of either returning to the House, and by our
presence, enabling them to call a convention before our constituents could have the means of information or time to
deliberate on the subject, or by absenting ourselves from the
House, prevent the measure taking place. Our regard for you
induced us to prefer the latter and we determined not to
attend in the afternoon.... [W]e determined the next morning again to absent ourselves from the House, when James
M'Calmont, Esquire, a member from Franklin, and Jacob
Miley, Esquire, a member from Dauphin, were seized by a
number of citizens of Philadelphia, who had collected together for that purpose; their lodgings were violently broken
open, their clothes torn, and after much abuse and insult,
they were forcibly dragged through the streets of Philadelphia to the State House, and there detained by force, and in
the presence of the majority... treated with the most insulting language; while the House so formed proceeded to
finish their resolutions, which they mean to offer to you as
the doings of the legislature of Pennsylvania. 27
Note the menace of the final line. Had the House lost its status
as "the legislature of Pennsylvania" by procuring its quorum
through such blatant acts of coercion? If so, how should the dissenters respond? Should they urge a boycott of the elections for
delegates to the convention?
News of the Federalist mob, and its coercive return of two
dissenting members to the House, was published throughout the

' Jensen, ed, 2 Documentary History at 113-14 (cited in note 16), reprinting the
address of the seceding assemblymen. The "seceding assemblymen7 took some consolation
in their success in inducing the majority to allow a six week campaign period before the

decisive election for convention delegates-rather than the nine-day period the Federalist
majority had planned before the need to mollify their opponents became apparent. Id at
114.
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nation. 8 The threads of political legitimacy were visibly beginning to unravel-a process more easily started than stopped.
On the same day that the fracas was erupting in the Assembly Hall, however, Philadelphia received word of Congress's ratification of the call for state conventions. 9 Would the unravelling have spun out of control were it not for this move reinforcing
the federal convention's legitimacy? Without Congress's explicit
ratification of Philadelphia's call for state conventions, would the
entire process have degenerated into a series of mob scenes and
legislative manipulations that discredited the entire initiative?
C. Congress's Stabilizing Role
Unanswerable questions. Nonetheless, they should lead us to
appreciate the subtle ways in which Americans sustained a sense
of institutional continuity at the very time that they were challenging some of their most fundamental rules. For this reason,
we emphasize the continuing role of the Continental Congress in
providing institutional structure during the ratification struggle.
This point was not lost upon the congressmen themselves.
Consider, for example, the anxieties of Nathan Dane. Dane had
refused to serve as one of his state's delegates at Philadelphia,
since he assumed that the convention would follow its instructions and report back to Congress. As rumors to the contrary
circulated, he wrote to Framer and fellow congressman Nathaniel
Gorham:
I wish the officers of Congress and members not engaged in
the Convention would return to New York. I do not know
how it may be in the Southern States, but, I assure you, the
present State of Congress has a very disagreeable effect in
the Eastern States. The people hear of a convention in Philadelphia, and that Congress is done sitting, etc. Many of
them are told, it seems, that Congress will never meet again
probably. Dr. H[olten] says he saw several sober men who
had got an idea that the people were to be called upon to
take arms to carry into effect immediately the report of the
See id at 128. The Federalists' effort to establish a quorum was illegal as well as
coercive. The rules of the Assembly only permitted it to fine absent members, not to compel their attendance. After the mob forced Antifederalist James McCalmont into the
chamber, he "slapped his five shilings on the speaker's table and attempted to leave the
chamber, but such procedural niceties were not the order of the day." Herrington, 67
Temple L Rev at 603 (cited in note 125) (footnote omitted).
' Herrington, 67 Temple L Rev at 602-03 (cited in note 125).
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Convention, etc.... It appears to me that Congress, at this
time especially, ought to be together and doing business as
usual and if we mean to avoid convulsions those appearances which to the unthinking look so much like abandoning
the established
Government ought not to be suffered to take
130
place.
These anxieties were hardly the monopoly of a few members of a
dying institution who were unwilling to give up the ghost. Instead of disintegrating, Congress was reinvigorated. All thirteen
states sent delegates to Congress throughout 1788. Indeed, this
was the only time in the entire history of the Confederacy that
all thirteen states were represented (seven states constituted a
quorum).'' What is more, many states named delegates to a

1789 session of the Continental Congress.3 2
' Letter from Nathan Dane to Nathaniel Gorham (June 22, 1787), in Burnett, ed, 8
Letters of the Continental Congress at 613 (cited in note 41). Secretary of Congress
Charles Thomson voiced similar concerns: "Were I to hazard an Opinion it would be that
the peace of the union and the happy termination of the Measures of the Convention
depend on the Meeting and continuance of Congress and keeping up the form of government until the New plan is ready for Adoption." Letter from Charles Thomson to William
Bingham (June 25, 1787), in Burnett, ed, 8 Letters of the Continental Congress at 614
(cited in note 41). For other statements emphasizing Congress's role, see Letter from
Nicholas Gilman to the President of New Hampshire (Oct 31, 1787), in Burnett, ed, 8 Letters of the Continental Congress at 670 (cited in note 41) ("[Ilt was not my intention to
have taken a seat in Congress this year but as it was conceived important to have a full
House on the Subject of the new plan of Government I was induced to take a seat....");
Letter from Benjamin Hawkins to the Governor of North Carolina (Aug 14, 1787), in
Burnett, ed, 8 Letters of the Continental Congress at 639 (cited in note 41) ("It is of the
first importance that our State be represented when the Convention make their report to
Congress."); Letter from Samuel A. Otis to James Warren (Nov 27, 1787), in Burnett, ed,
8 Letters of the Continental Congress at 683-84 (cited in note 41) (expressing similar
sentiments); Letter from William Blount to the Governor of North Carolina (July 10,
1787), in Burnett, ed, 8 Letters of the Continental Congress at 618 (cited in note 41)
(referring to Thompson's letter stating that "a Congress was absolutely necessary for the
great purposes of the Union"); Letter from Benjamin Hawkins to the Governor of North
Carolina (July 10, 1787), in Burnett, ed, 8 Letters of the ContinentalCongress at 618 (cited
in note 41) ("It being of great importance to the Union at this time particularly, that Congress should be and continue in session.").
...PrefatoryNote, in Roscoe R. Hill, ed, 34 Journalsof the Continental Congress17741789 v (US GPO, 1937).
" Rhode Island appointed John Gardner as a delegate to Congress "agreeably to the
Articles of Confederation" on May 12, 1788. Id at 614. On September 3, 1788, the General
Court of Massachusetts appointed Samuel Otis for a term ending in November of 1789. Id
at 612. On October 21, Governor Pinckney of South Carolina extended Nicholas Eveleigh's
commission as delegate to the Congress of the United States until November of 1789. Id
at 610-11. North Carolina appointed Hugh Williamson a delegate to the Congress on
October 23, 1788, for a one-year term. Id at 609. On January 15, 1789, Maryland appointed Joshua Seney, Benjamin Contee, and David Ross delegates until December 1789. Id at
613-14.
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Nor was this continuing representation a mere formality.
Congress was active throughout 1788, meeting on 132
days-more than some previous years.' 3 It examined the prospect of new Dutch loans, continued the Spanish negotiations,
negotiated with the Indians, and pursued other diplomatic issues."8 On the home front, it considered a new requisition," 5
devised new procedures for the survey and distribution of western lands,' and dispatched federal troops to quell disturbances
in Pennsylvania."'
The continuing flow of ordinary decision making helped sustain a sense of institutional order in the midst of a break with

Some states took the new Constitution into account when commissioning delegates.
On October 31, 1788, Virginia's General Assembly elected Cyrus Griffin as a delegate
"from the first Monday in November 1788 'til the first Wednesday in March next." Id at
609-10. On November 25, the General Assembly of New Jersey appointed Abraham Clark,
Jonathan Elmer, and Jonathan Dayton delegates "until the first Wednesday in March
next." Id at 611. New York on January 30, 1789, appointed Abraham Yates, Jr., David
Gelston, Philip Pell, John Hathom, and Samuel Jones "to represent our said State in the
United States in Congress assembled from the said day of their appointment, for the
present Year, or until the Congress of the United States under the New constitution
adopted by the late convention of this State shall commence their proceedings." Id at 61415.
"'
Id at v. In 1783-84, there were 113 days with a quorum; in 1784-85, there were
218; in 1785-86 there were 209; and in 1786-87 there were 112. Id at vii.
'L In the first two days of its session, the 1788 Congress received letters dealing with
the Spanish negotiations over the Mississippi, the appointment of ministers in Lisbon,
critical changes in European politics, and sundry other matters. Id at 21-23 (journal of
Feb 1, 1788). The Dutch loans were discussed in id at 185 journal of May 28, 1788). For
discussions of negotiations with Native Americans, see Instructions from the Secretary of
Congress to Governor St. Clair (Oct 26, 1787), in Clarence Edwin Carter, ed, 2 Territorial
Papers of the United States 78-79 (US GPO, 1934); Letter from Governor St. Clair to the
Secretary at War (Jan 27, 1788), in Carter, ed, 2 TerritorialPapersat 89.
1"
Hill, ed, 34 Journalsof the Continental Congressat 389 (cited in note 131) (journal
of Aug 4, 1788).
1" In March, Congress began considering Amendments to the 1785 Land Ordinance to
Distribute Western Lands. A Committee consisting of Madison, Dane, Clark, William
Irvine, and Jeremiah Wadsworth recommended selling certain portions of the lands and
changing the procedures for surveying and distributing the western lands. Id at 95-100
(journal of Mar 19, 1788). It passed on July 9. Id at 305-10.
' See Letter from the Pennsylvania Delegates to the President of Pennsylvania (July
28, 1788), in Burnett, ed, 8 Letters of the Continental Congress at 770 (cited in note 41)
(describing request for federal troops from the Pennsylvania Supreme Executive Council);
Letter from William Irvine to William Alexander (July 28, 1788), in Burnett, ed, 8 Letters
of the Continental Congress at 771 (cited in note 41) ("Congress have granted the aid of
the Union to [Pennsylvania] in her [endeavor] to [suppress] the Wyoming [insurgents] so
far as 100 men for two weeks will do it.....") (brackets are originally blank spaces filled
in by Burnett); Letter from the South Carolina Delegates to Thomas Pinckney (Aug 16,
1788), in Burnett, ed, 8 Letters of the Continental Congress at 782 (cited in note 41)
(describing how Congress diverted troops to march to Luzerne County but there was no
longer need for them).
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the rules. If Congress had dissolved, how would the Dutch be
convinced to float a loan for continued payment of interest on the
national debt? Who would conduct diplomacy with foreign powers? Who would deal with Native Americans? On a more humdrum but hardly unimportant level, who would run the
Confederacy's postal service?
Congressional dissolution would not only have generated
shock waves nationally and internationally. It would have called
into question other basic agreements as well. Would the British
be free to denounce the Treaty of Peace now that the Confederacy
had dissolved?. 8 How to disentangle the conflicting claims to
the vast territories that the Confederacy had acquired from the
states?. 9
The resulting sense of institutional chaos would have vastly
destabilized a legal situation already destabilized by the Federalist breach of the rules. Within this disintegrating institutional
climate, events like those in Pennsylvania could have easily
sparked a more general conflagration.
D. Congress as an Unconventional Actor
But Congress did more than handle the normal problems of
government. It also provided a continuing forum for an unconventional technique that should, by now, be familiar. As they had
done so often in the past, the Federalists tried to use a perfectly
legal body-in this case, the Continental Congress-to ratify
their illegal actions.
A crucial moment came on July 2, 1788, when Congress
learned that New Hampshire was the ninth state to ratify. At
this point, it had a choice: either to insist on the Articles' demand
for the unanimous consent of all thirteen states, or to assist in
the organization of the new Constitution. It chose the latter
course, immediately establishing a committee to place "the said
constitution into operation in pursuance of the resolutions of the
late federal Convention. 4 °
This was a sharp change from preceding practice. Consider
Congress's treatment of Kentucky's ongoing effort to gain admission as an independent state of the Union. Virginia had reached

' Even James Wilson expressed such concerns at the Constitutional Convention.
Farrand, ed, 2 Records of the Federal Convention at 47 (cited in note 15).
' Land policy had been important since the formation of the Articles; indeed Mary-

land did not sign the Articles until Virginia ceded disputed territories. See note 8.
140 Hill, ed, 34 Journals of the ContinentalCongress at 281 (cited in note 131).
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a compact with the Kentuckians, and both sides had submitted
the agreement to Congress. On June 2, Congress submitted the
agreement to a special committee to consider admitting Kentucky
"into the Union as a member thereof, in mode conformable to the
Articles of Confederation."41 Then came July 2 and the news
about New Hampshire. John Brown of Virginia reacted to this
news in a surprising way. Rather than declaring the Articles a legal nullity, he moved that Congress immediately "ratify and
confirm the compact entered into between the state of Virginia
and the district of Kentucky.... 142
Only at this point were doubts expressed by Nathan Dane of
Massachusetts and Thomas Tucker of South Carolina. Noting
that Virginia had approved the new Constitution on June 25,
these delegates moved that "as the constitution of the United
States is now ratified, Congress think it unadvis[ ]able to adopt
any further measures for admitting the district of Kentucky... under the Articles of Confederation and perpetual
Union...

."1

Rather than proceeding further, the Dane-Tuck-

er motion suggested to Kentucky that it prepare itself for admission to the new Union. Over the objection of the Virginia delegation, Congress ceased further action on the Kentucky matter.'
There are three important things about this episode. First,
the quick response time shows how closely Congress was following the progress of ratification. Second, Congress did not respond
to the new situation by declaring itself legally incompetent, but
simply found further action inexpedient. Third, this was done
over the opposition of the Virginia delegation-which wanted a
formal confirmation of its compact with Kentucky-even though
Virginia had already ratified the new Constitution. Rather than
supposing that their state's recent ratification was tantamount to
a renunciation of the Articles, the Virginians protested when
their fellow congressmen found it "inexpedient" to push forward
on so delicate a matter!
Five days later, on July 8, the committee examining the
Constitution made a remarkable recommendation: the Congress
should itself take the lead in organizing the new government. It
proposed that Electors be appointed in the states that had rati141 Id at 194 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The words "conformable to the
Articles of Confederation" replaced "consistent with the Articles of Confederation" in the
original draft. Id at 194 n 4.
1
Id at 288 (journal of July 3, 1788).
1'' Id at 293-94.

14 Id at 290-91.
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fled the Constitution by the first Wednesday in December, and
that on the first Wednesday in January the Electors would
"[aissemble in their respective States and Vote for a President,
and that the first Wednesday in February next be the time, and
the place for Commencing proceedings under the said Constitution."4 5
Throughout the summer, there was a fierce struggle to fill in
the blank with the name of the nation's next capitol-an issue
that was finally resolved in favor of New York on September 13.
For much of this time, all thirteen states voted-including North
Carolina, Rhode Island, and New York-although they had not
yet ratified the new Constitution. Federalists were often busy
lobbying these nonratifying states in order to win the capitol for
their favorite city. As always, the Federalists were eager to use
the old regime to legitimize their revolutionary transition. 46
Indeed, the unconventional character of this activity became
the subject of self-conscious consideration. On August 4, Thomas
Tucker proposed a resolution: "whereas the ratifications of the
several States are to be considered as containing virtual authority and Instructions to their Delegates in Congress to make the
preparatory Arrangements recommended by the said Convention
to be made by Congress.... .1 4 7 Nonratifying North Carolina
objected, however, by proposing to strike the words "and instructions to their delegates in Congress," substituting "to the United
States in Congress assembled."' The result was an impasse,
with nothing coming up for a vote.
Two days later, a similar scenario: Alexander Hamilton proposed that the votes by delegates from nonratifying states shall
not be "construed directly or indirectly to imply either on their
part or on the part of the states which they represent an approbation of the constitution aforesaid or of any part thereof or any
145 Id at 304 (journal of July 8, 1788).
14

For examples of nonratifying states voting on matters pertaining to the organiza-

tion of the new government, see id at 317-18 (journal of July 14, 1788) (New York and
North Carolina); id at 359 (journal of July 28, 1788) (North Carolina); id at 367-68 (journal of July 30, 1788) (North Carolina); id at 383-84 (journal of Aug 4, 1788) (North Carolina and Rhode Island); id at 394 (journal of Aug 5, 1788) (same); id at 395-402 (journal of
Aug 6, 1788) (same). Even Alexander Hamilton went out of his way to reassure Rhode
Islanders: "A doubt might perhaps be raised about your right to a vote under the present
circumstances. There is not a member of Congress but one who has even pretended to call
your right in question." Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Jeremiah Olney (Aug 12,
1788), in Harold C. Synett and Jacob E. Cook, eds, 5 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton
199-200 (Columbia, 1962).
...Hill, ed, 34 Journals of the Continental Congress at 387 (cited in note 131).
14 Id at 392 (journal of Aug 5, 1788).
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manner or kind of obligation on the part of any such
state .... .149 The original resolution noted that "the Delegates
of [North Carolina and Rhode Island] have thought fit to vote
upon the said ordinance in virtue of the right of suffrage vested
in them by the Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union. . . ."'.

This resolution

also

failed

to come

to

a

vote-though it shows how High Federalists like Hamilton were
eagerly and self-consciously engaging in the strategy of unconventional adaptation that had served them so well throughout.
E. The Bandwagon in the States
While all this unconventional activity on the national level
stabilized public order, it should not be confused with the main
event: in each state, Federalists attempted to induce the legislatures to ignore the legalistic quibblings of their opponents and
get on the institutional bandwagon by calling ratifying conventions. They could then use these legislative anchors to respond to
charges of illegality down the road as they mobilized their forces
in the electoral contests for convention delegates.' 5 '
As we have seen, the effort to gain legislative support did not
get off to an auspicious start in Pennsylvania. But the violent
violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution did allow the Federalists to catch their opponents by surprise in a brief six-week election campaign,'52 ending in a two-to-one victory at the Pennsylvania Convention. At about the same time, they were winning
four small states that depended on a strong central government

149 Id at 403-04 (Aug 7, 1788).

"0 Id at 403 n 2.
...For example, at the North Carolina Convention, Mr. Spaight argued:
The gentleman says, we exceeded our powers. I deny the charge.... The proposing a
new system, to be established by the assent and ratification of nine states, arose
from the necessity of the case. It was thought extremely hard that one state, or even
three or four states, should be able to prevent necessary alterations.... It was,
therefore, thought by the Convention, that if so great a majority as nine states
should adopt it, it would be right to establish it. It was recommended by Congress to
the state legislatures to refer it to the people of their different states. Our Assembly
has confirmed what they have done, by proposing it to the consideration of the people.
It was there, and not here, that the objection should have been made.
Elliot, ed, 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 206-07 (cited in note 16). See also
id at 16 (remarks of Mr. Davie at the North Carolina Convention) (providing similar response).
" See text accompanying notes 126-27. This contrasts with the six-month pause mandated by the Pennsylvania Constitution. See text accompanying note 126.
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for their economic survival.15 By January 9, 1788, the Federalists had once again established institutional momentum.
But nobody could be optimistic about the next round of
ratifications. On February 13, 1788, the New Hampshire Federalists found themselves outnumbered at their convention by more
than a two-to-one margin. Foreseeing disaster if they pushed
forward, they successfully postponed their meetings for three
months in the hope that the closely divided Massachusetts Convention would ratify in the interim.
Things were going no better in North Carolina. There is
evidence of "heated debates" in the legislature prior to the calling
of a state ratifying convention.'" When elections were held on
March 28, the Antifederalists won a landslide victory of 184 to
84-made even more impressive by the fact that Federalists had
twice precipitated riots at polling places, allowing them to run off
with some ballot boxes. 5 The convention was to meet in July,
but only a fool would be optimistic.
The news was no more auspicious from New York.'56 On
January 31, Cornelius Schoonmaker generated a bitter debate in
the General Assembly when he proposed to amend the resolution
calling for a ratifying convention by declaring that the Philadelphia Convention had exceeded its powers and that its proposal
would "materially alter" New York's Constitution "and greatly
affect the rights and privileges" of New York residents.'5 7 The

" Delaware, New Jersey, Georgia, and Connecticut ratified the Constitution within
the first seventeen weeks. The convention vote in all these cases, with the exception of
Connecticut, was unanimous; in Connecticut's case, it was three to one. In Georgia's case,

the overwhelming support was not only a function of economic dependence but sheer
physical survival. As a state bordering Spanish territory and powerful Indian tribes, it
was especially dependent upon military support from the center.
'

"Thomas Person... tried unsuccessfully to prevent the call of a convention ...."

Hugh Tallmage Lefler and Albert Ray Newsome, The History of a Southern State: North
Carolina267 (North Carolina, rev ed 1963). Senate journals confirm that on December 5,
"Mr. Person having on this occasion spoken as often as the rules of the House would
permit," was unable to block the final vote. Walter Clark, ed, 20 State Records of North
Carolina369-70 (Nash, 1902). There appears to be no record of the substance of Person's
remarks.
'
Robert J. Dinkin, Voting in Revolutionary America: A Study of Elections in the
OriginalThirteen States, 1776-1789 127 (Greenwood, 1982).
' Knowledgeable political observers, like Albany attorney Richard Sill, reported that
it was "doubted by the best friends to the New Government whether we shall have a
Convention called by a Legislative Act, the opposition are determined to make their first
stand here." John P. Kaminski, New York: The Reluctant Pillar,in Stephen L. Schechter,
ed, The Reluctant Pillar48, 73 (Russell Sage, 1985), quoting letter from Richard Sill to

Jeremiah Wadsworth (Jan 12, 1788).

" NY Daily Advertiser (Feb 12, 1788).
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Schoonmaker amendment was voted down twenty-seven to twenty-five after it was discovered that the parchment on which it
was written contained scratched-out writing hostile to the Constitution. In the Senate, Robert Yates, who had earlier walked out
of Philadelphia, proposed a resolution denouncing the convention
for going "beyond their powers" and asserting that "they have not
amended, but made a new system."' This motion was rejected
by twelve to seven, and the Senate voted eleven to eight to accept
the Assembly's call for a June 17 convention, with balloting for
delegates on April 29.1"
The election resulted in an Antifederalist landslide. They
elected forty-six delegates, compared to the Federalists' nineteen."o The June convention threatened to be a disaster.
And then there was Rhode Island. At its February session,
the legislature simply refused to call a convention, putting the
Constitution to the people in a special referendum:
[We] cannot make any innovation in a Constitution which
has been agreed upon, and the compact settled between the
governors and governed, without the express consent of the
freemen at large, by their own voices individually taken in
town meetings assembled.' 6 '
The result was an overwhelming defeat of the Constitution: 2,708
to 237, although an indeterminate number of Federalists boycotted the election.'62 In a letter written on April 5 to the Conti-

NY Daily Advertiser (Feb 8, 1788).
i' This late date was the result of a strategic compromise between Federalists and
Antifederalists. The Federalists hoped that nine states would ratify before April 29 (and
believed that an earlier rejection from New York would cripple the conventions in other
states), while Antifederalists hoped that by that late date, a large state such as Virginia
would reject the Constitution, making it easier for New York to do so. Kaminski, New
York at 76 (cited in note 156).
"0 Id at 79.

John R. Bartlett, ed, 10 Records of the State of Rhode Island and Providence
Plantation in New England 272 (Providence, 1865) ("Records of Rhode Island"); Providence Gazette (Mar I and Mar 8, 1788).
162 A Federalist writer, calling himself "A Freeman," denounced the referendum as a
"novel mode" in the Providence Gazette (Mar 15, 1788): "If the freemen.., should unanimously vote for the Constitution, it cannot be considered a valid ratification... for the
Constitution itself provides only for a ratification by State Conventions." A similar position was advanced by the Town Meeting of Providence in its petition of March 26 to the
General Assembly, reported in the Providence Gazette (Apr 12, 1788). Since Rhode Island
was still operating under a slightly modified version of its colonial charter, there was in
fact no textual procedure regulating constitutional amendments. It would seem, then, that
the legislature was well within its constitutional rights to call a referendum, especially
since bills had often been referred to town meetings for instructions. The particular form
161
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nental Congress, Governor Collins reported the result and defended the procedure:
Although this state has been singular from her sister states
in the mode of collecting the sentiments of the people upon
the Constitution, it was not done with the least design to
give any offence to the respectable body who composed the
convention, or a disregard to the recommendation of Congress, but upon pure republican principles, founded upon
that basis of all governments originally deriving from the
body of the people at large."
We can begin to appreciate the supreme importance of the
Philadelphia Convention's decision to take the law into its own
hands and break with the unanimity rule established by the
Articles of Confederation. With four states pointing decisively in
a negative direction by spring, the Constitution was a dead letter
under the old rules.
Especially when opponents could cloak their opposition with
attractive rhetoric. Rather than opposing the Federalist proposal
outright, they could propose a middle road: Why not condition
ratification upon the acceptance of perfecting amendments like
the Bill of Rights? To rebut such arguments, Federalists found it
necessary to reemphasize their revolutionary challenge to the
legal status quo. They argued that it would be counterproductive
to insist on preratification amendments since these would be
governed by the unanimity rule laid down by Article XIII of the
Confederation. If opponents were interested in effective revision,
they should ratify first and then take advantage of Article V's
more relaxed approach to amendment. This was a plausible counterthrust, but it explicitly conceded the legal vitality of the Articles and thereby reinforced the Federalists' revolutionary stance.'

in which the referral took place does seem to have been an "'innovation' on all previous
customs." William R. Staples, Rhode Island in the Constitutional Congress 589 (Providence, 1870).
"3
Bartlett, ed, 10 Records ofRhode Island at 291 (cited in note 161).
'
See, for example, Elliot, ed, 2 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 116-17
(cited in note 16) (remarks of Mr. Jarvis at the Massachusetts Convention) ("[We shall
have in this article [V] an adequate provision for all the purposes of political reformation .... Should it be rejected, I beg gentlemen would observe, that a concurrence of all
the states must be had before a new convention can be called to form another Constitution; but the present article provides, upon nine states' concurring in any alteration or
amendment to be proposed either by Congress or any future convention, that this alteration shall be a part of the Constitution .... ); Elliot, ed, 3 Debates in the Several State
Conventions at 636-37 (cited in note 16) (remarks of Mr. Innes at the Virginia Convention)
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But it would take more than clever rhetoric to gain success.
Even with the nine-state rule, the Federalists barely squeaked
through. A crucial turning point came in Massachusetts. Federalists were outnumbered by opponents at the convention, which
began on January 9.165 As a consequence, they focused their en-

ergies on John Hancock, who "had it in his power to throw the
convention's vote either way."" The vain Hancock was given
Federalist assurances that he would be the Vice President or
even the President if Virginia did not ratify the Constitution in
time to put forth Washington. As Forrest McDonald says,
"[nlothing could have appealed to Hancock more, and he gave his
support to ratification."" 7 After five hard weeks, the Federalists
gained a narrow majority by supporting a "conciliatory proposition" that the new government propose a series of amendments
as soon as possible after its establishment.'68 The vote was 187
to 168, with 9 abstentions.

("IT]he mode pointed out in the Constitution is much better; for, according to their mode
[of proposing previous amendments], the Union would never be complete till the thirteen
states had acceded to it, and eight states must rescind and revoke what they have done.
By the paper before you, if two thirds of the states think amendments necessary, Congress are obliged to call a convention .... Now, is there not a greater probability of
obtaining the one than the other? Will not nine states more probably agree to any amendment than thirteen?"). Similarly, Ames:
Why shall we reject the Constitution, then, for the sole purpose of obtaining that
unanimous vote of thirteen states, which, it is confidently said, it is impossible we
ever shall obtain from nine only? An object which is impossible is out of the question.
The arguments that the amendment will not prevail, is not only without force, but
directly against those who use it, unless they admit that we have no need of a government, or assert that, by ripping up the foundations of the compact, upon which we
now stand, and setting the whole Constitution afloat, and introducing an infinity of
new subjects of controversy, we pursue the best method to secure the entire unanimity of thirteen states.
Elliot, ed, 2 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 158 (cited in note 16) (remarks of
Mr. Ames at the Massachusetts Convention).
"6 See Samuel B. Harding, The Contest Over the Ratificationof the FederalConstitution in Massachusetts 67 (Longmans, Green, 1896) ("Had a vote been taken on the adoption of the Constitution as soon as the convention assembled, there can be no question but
that it would have been overwhelmingly against the proposed plan."); Charles A. Beard,
An Economic Interpretationof the Constitutionof the United States 227 (MacMillan, 1937);
Forrest McDonald, We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution 183 (Chicago,
1962) ("It seems likely, however, that a clear majority of the 355 delegates, perhaps as
many as 200, were opposed to ratification.") (footnote omitted).
16

McDonald, We the People at 184.

Id at 185.
" Three of Massachusetts's nine proposals became part of the Bill of Rights. See
Elliot, ed, 2 Debatesin the Several State Conventions at 177 (cited in note 16) (reprinting
Massachusetts's nine proposed amendments).
7
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Then two more states came through. The Federalists won
Maryland rather easily, despite the powerful, and often legalistic,
denunciations of Luther Martin and others.' Victory in South
Carolina, however, owed itself entirely to a remarkable gerrymander that transformed the Federalists' 40 percent of the popular vote into 60 percent of the convention delegates. 70
The South Carolina victory made eight, and permitted the
Federalists to squeeze the two major states, Virginia and New
York, that remained outstanding. Consider Virginia first. Here it
was the Antifederalists who were better at strategic manipulation. Although the polls returned eighty-five Federalists and only
sixty-six Antifederalists, the Antis managed to convert a substantial number of delegates at the convention itself. The twelve
members from the district of Kentucky yielded especially good
pickings for the Antifederalist cause, and so the convention's
outcome was extremely uncertain. 17'
The Virginia Convention opened with Patrick Henry demanding that the relevant legal papers-from the Annapolis
report onward-be read to the convention with the aim of establishing the illegality of the initiative. The Federalist Pendleton
responded, characteristically, by urging his fellow delegates "not
to consider whether the federal Convention exceeded their powers. It strikes my mind that this ought not to influence our deliberations."' 72 While Henry withdrew his motion, his speeches
were full of legalistic attacks upon "a proposal that goes to the
utter annihilation of the most solemn engagements of the
states-a proposal of establishing nine states into a confederacy,
to the eventual exclusion of four states.... The people gave them
no power to use their name. That they exceeded their power is
perfectly clear."'73

169 Letter from Luther Martin to the Maryland legislature (Jan 27, 1988), in Elliot, ed,

1 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 386-88 (cited in note 16).
170 Coastal areas of South Carolina overwhelmingly favored the Constitution, while

the upcountry opposed it no less strongly. The Federalists owed their victory to the fact
that the less populated coast had 151 delegates compared to the upcountry's 86. The key
was Charleston, which had 46 percent of all convention delegates but contained 11.3 percent of the nonslave population. The Federalists swept Charleston. See Charles W. Roll,
Jr., We, Some of the People:Apportionment in the Thirteen State Conventions Ratifying the
Constitution,56 J Am Hist 21, 30-31 & n 15 (1969).
171 The Antifederalists converted ten Kentuckians, three Federalists, and one of the
undecideds at the convention. McDonald, We the People at 259 (cited in note 165).
172 Elliot, ed, 3 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 6 (cited in note 16).
173 Id at 21-23. See also id at 277 (remarks of Mr. Grayson at the Virginia Convention).
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Note the terms in which influential leaders like Governor
Randolph, who had been a delegate to the convention, responded:
[Henry] objects because nine states are sufficient to put the
government in motion. What number of states ought we to
have said? Ought we to have required the concurrence of all
the thirteen? Rhode Island-in rebellion against integrity-Rhode Island plundered all the world by her paper money; and, notorious for her uniform opposition to every federal
duty, would then have it in her power to defeat the Union .... Therefore, to have required the ratification of all
the thirteen states would have been tantamount to returning
without having done any thing. What other number would
have been proper? Twelve? The same spirit that has actuated me in the whole progress of the business, would have
prevented me from leaving it in the power of any one state
to dissolve the Union; for would it not be lamentable that
nothing could be done, for the defection of one state? A majority of the whole would have been too few. Nine states
therefore seem to be a most proper number.' 4
This is the voice of the assertive revolutionary, defending the
convention's decision by an unmediated appeal to necessity and
the public good. There is no hint of legalism in such responses.
Rather than apologizing for their revolutionary nine-state rule,
the Federalists were constantly threatening the delegates with
the secessionist consequences that would follow if Virginia rejected the
Constitution and another state supplied the missing
175
vote.
This approach forced Antifederalists onto the defensive.
Grayson found himself responding to fears that Pennsylvania and
Id at 28 (remarks of Governor Randolph at the Virginia Convention).
See, for example, id at 187 (remarks of Governor Randolph at the Virginia Convention) ("I have shown the principles which actuated the general Convention; and attempted
to prove that, after the ratification of the proposed system by so many states, the preservation of the Union depended on its adoption by us."); id at 454 (remarks of Mr. Madison
at the Virginia Convention) ("Great as the evil [of slavery] is, a dismemberment of the
Union would be worse."); id at 594 (remarks of Mr. Henry at the Virginia Convention) ("A
great deal is said about disunion, and consequent dangers."); id at 603 (remarks of Governor Randolph at the Virginia Convention) ("If we declare that these amendments ... must be incorporated into the Constitution before we assent to it, I ask you
whether you may not bid a long farewell to the Union? It will produce that deplorable
thing-the dissolution of the Union-which no man yet has dared openly to advocate."); id
at 642 (remarks of Mr. Stephen at the Virginia Convention) (discussing "the unhappy
situation of the country, and the absolute necessity of preventing a dismemberment of the
confederacy").
17

175

532
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Maryland would invade Virginia if it did not ratify: "Have they
not agreed, by the old Confederation, that the Union shall be
perpetual, and that no alteration should take place without the
consent of Congress, and the confirmation of the legislatures of
every state? I cannot think that there is such depravity in mankind as that, after violating public faith so flagrantly, they should
76
make war upon us, also, for not following their example."
And Patrick Henry, responding to such Federalist charges, argued that the convention should not suppose that the Constitution could survive Virginia's rejection:
They would intimidate you into an inconsiderate adoption,
and frighten you with ideal evils, and that the Union shall
be dissolved. 'Tis a bugbear, sir: the fact is, sir, that the
eight adopting states can hardly stand on their own legs.
Public fame tells us that the adopting states have already
heart-burnings and animosity, and repent their precipitate
hurry: this, sir, may occasion exceeding great mischief.
When I reflect on these and many other circumstances, I
must think those states will be found to be in confederacy
with us. If we pay our quota of money annually, and furnish
our ratable number of men, when necessary, I can see no
danger from a rejection. 7
"Bugbear" or no, the final words voiced in the convention
suggest how large the nine-state rule played in the outcome. As
we have seen, Randolph had defended the convention's revolutionary break with Article XIII, but his general position on the
Constitution was more complex. As a delegate in Philadelphia, he
had refused to sign the proposal, and as the present governor of
Virginia, his vote was influential with many other fence sitters. 7 8 Here is how he justified his affirmative decision:
Mr. Chairman, one parting word I humbly supplicate.

176 Id at 277 (remarks of Mr. Grayson at the Virginia Convention).
'7
178

Id at 62 (remarks of Mr. Henry at the Virginia Convention).
Randolph had devoted considerable time to organizing the Virginia delegation to

Annapolis, and had played a vital role in persuading the Annapolis Convention to call another convention on general matters. John J. Reardon, Edmund Randolph:A Biography

82-84 (MacMillan, 1974). At the convention, he played a leading role, introducing the
Virginia Plan. Id at 98-105. His refusal to sign seems to have been a response to the
extensive compromises demanded by the smaller states. Id at 115-19. By the time the
Virginia Convention met, however, Randolph had become convinced that the Union was in
danger if Virginia failed to ratify. Id at 142-47.
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The suffrage which I shall give in favor of the Constitution will be ascribed, by malice, to motives unknown to my
breast. But, although for every other act of my life I shall
seek refuge in the mercy of God, for this I request his justice
only. Lest, however, some future annalist should, in the
spirit of party vengeance, deign to mention my name, let
him recite these truths-that I went to the federal Convention with the strongest affection for the Union; that I acted
there in full conformity with this affection; that I refused to
subscribe, because I had, as I still have, objections to the
Constitution, and wished a free inquiry into its merits; and
that the accession of eight states reduced our deliberations
to the single question of Union or no Union.'79
The final vote was eighty-nine to seventy-nine.'
The effect of the nine-state rule was even greater in New
York.'' Facing a forty-six to nineteen majority against them,
friends of the Constitution played a waiting game when the convention began on June 17.182 With both the New Hampshire
and Virginia conventions deliberating, Federalists moved that the
convention debate the Constitution clause by clause-stalling for
time until one or the other of these states made the ninth vote
necessary for secession from the Confederacy."s
The gambit worked. News that New Hampshire had ratified
seems to have reached the convention on June 24."8 Its first

1

Elliot, ed, 3 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 652 (cited in note 16) (re-

marks of Governor Randolph at the Virginia Convention).
180

Id at 654.

Russell Hardin has put New York's dilemma in modern terms: "[A] constitution is
clearly like a convention in the strategic sense: it may not give you the best of all results,
but it gives you the best you can expect given that almost everyone else is following it."
Russell Hardin, Why a Constitution?,in Bernard Grofinan and Donald Wittman, eds, The
FederalistPapersand the New Institutionalism100, 109 (Agathon, 1989). See also Robert
A. McGuire and Robert L. Ohsfeldt, Public Choice Analysis and the Ratification of the
Constitution, in Bernard Grofinan and Donald Wittman, eds, The FederalistPapers and
the New Institutionalism175, 185 (Agathon, 1989) (arguing that the nine-state ratification
rule meant that "the outcome in a particular ratifying assembly often affected the vote in
subsequent assemblies").
18
Kaminski, New York at 100 (cited in note 156).
18 Federalists supported the clause-by-clause motion (proposed by Livingston) because
the delay permitted them to hear the news from New Hampshire. Antifederalists, wanting
to appear fair, agreed to the motion; moreover, they had just received word from Patrick
Henry and other Virginians asking New Yorkers to send copies of their proposed amendments, which a clause-by-clause debate facilitated. Id at 101-02.
1
In December of 1787, Federalist President John Sullivan of New Hampshire called
for a special session of the legislature for the purpose of calling a ratifying convention,
even though the regular legislature was to meet a month later. The special session agreed
181
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mention occurred the next day:
Mr. Chancellor LIVINGSTON observed, that it would not,
perhaps, be altogether impertinent to remind the committee,
that, since the intelligence of yesterday, it had become evident that the circumstances of the country were greatly
altered, and the ground of the present debate changed. The
Confederation, he said, was now dissolved. The question
before the committee was now a question of policy and expediency. He presumed the convention would consider the
situation of their country. He supposed, however, that some

might contemplate disunion without pain. They might flatter
themselves that some of the Southern States would form a
league with us; but he could not look without horror at the
dangers to which any such confederacy would expose the
state of New York. He said, it might be political cowardice in
him, but he had felt since yesterday an alteration of circumstances,
which had made a most solemn impression on his
85

mind.

Notice that Livingston did not suggest that the nine seceding
states had any legal right to leave the Confederacy. On pain of

charges of "political cowardice," he simply urged the delegates to

to hold a convention in mid-February. However, the special session itself lacked a quorum: "Since the convention was called by a session of the legislature in which there was
no quorum, neither was actually a legal body and thus, technically speaking, New Hampshire has never yet ratified the Constitution." McDonald, We the People at 237 (cited in
note 165).
The convention met in February, where a "clear majority" opposed ratification. Id at
235-36. See also Beard, Economic Interpretationof the Constitution at 225-26 (cited in
note 165). An intense lobbying effort at the convention ensued, leading some delegates to
switch to the Federalist position. Because these delegates considered themselves bound by
instructions to oppose ratification, they proposed that the convention adjourn to permit
consultation with their towns. This delay also allowed the convention to hear the result
from Massachusetts, its powerful neighbor to the south. See Roll, 56 J Am Hist at 29-30
(cited in note 170) ("Finding themselves outnumbered by opponents of the new Constitution, Massachusetts Federalists thought it necessary to make a 'conciliatory
proposition'-to propose that the new government, as soon as possible after its establishment, consider and adopt a number of amendments ....The importance of the Massachusetts decision cannot be exaggerated. During the five weeks that the Massachusetts
convention was in session, the New Hampshire convention met. The pro-Constitution
delegates, finding themselves outnumbered ... were able to effect a postponement to
await the outcome in neighboring Massachusetts.").
The convention adjourned for four months, and in the interim the Federalists used
the time to their advantage. On June 22, the convention ratified the Constitution by a
vote of fifty-seven to forty-seven. McDonald, We the People at 239 (cited in note 165).
'8 Elliot, ed, 2 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 322 (cited in note 16) (remarks of Mr. Livingston at the New York Convention).
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face the facts. This proved difficult for Governor Clinton, the
leading opponent of the Constitution. While he tried to remain
186 his troops remained uncertain as to their next
steadfast,
187
step.

Hamilton, still feeling desperate, wrote to Madison on June
25 that "[olur chance of success here is infinitely slender, and
none at all if you go wrong"; and, two days later, that "our only
chance of success depends on you.""s Even after news of
Virginia's ratification arrived, Hamilton was still writing to Madison that "[olur arguments confound, but do not convince. Some
of the leaders however appear to me to be convinced by circumstances .... "89 Only on July 26 did the New York Convention
approve the Constitution by a vote of thirty to twenty-seven with
eight abstentions. To make their unhappiness clear, the delegates
sent a circular letter to all governors:
We, the members of the Convention of this state, have deliberately and maturely considered the Constitution proposed
for the United States. Several articles in it appear so exceptionable to a majority of us, that nothing but the fullest
confidence of obtaining a revision of them by a general convention, and an invincible reluctance to separating from our
sister states, could have prevailed upon a sufficient number

Clinton "was the recognized leader of the Antifederalist majority in the convention," and had been elected President of the New York Convention. Spaulding, His Excellency George Clinton at 179 (cited in note 38). His "leadership was not entirely to blame
for the defeat of the Antifederalists. It was expediency and not conviction that finally
persuaded New York .... The principal consideration in bringing New York
Antifederalists to terms was the fact that ratification by New Hampshire and Virginia,
while the Poughkeepsie Convention was sitting, made the Union a certainty. Rejection by
New York would mean isolation." Id at 181-82.
' Melancton Smith, for example, began formulating a plan under which the convention would agree to the Constitution without amendments, but with the stipulation that
New York would withdraw from the Union if a second convention was not called within
two years. See Kaminski, New York at 106 (cited in note 156).
18 Rutland and Rachal, eds, 11 The Papers of James Madison at 179, 183 (cited in
note 41).
1
Id at 185. See also Kaminski, New York at 115 (cited in note 156) ("The single most
important factor in obtaining ratification, however, was simply the course of events taking
place throughout America.... New York could not kill the Constitution by itself. The new
government was going into effect with or without New York... By staying out of the
Union, New York would lose the federal capital and most of the benefit of its lucrative
state impost. Furthermore, the threat of civil war within New York or among the states or
the secession of the southern district from the state were real and serious concerns to
New Yorkers. Finally, the all-important task of amending the Constitution seemed most
obtainable if New York, within the Union, cooperated with other like-minded
Antifederalists.").
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to ratify it, without stipulating for previous amendments.
We all unite in opinion, that such a revision will be necessary to recommend it to the approbation and support of a
numerous body of our constituents. 9 '
This theme dominated the entire letter, which emphasized that
"[o]ur attachment to our sister states, and the confidence we
repose in them, cannot be more forcibly demonstrated than by
acceding to a government which many of us think very imperfect"
and urged the governors of other states to ask their legislatures
to call a second convention. 191
All this not only emphasizes the key role of the Philadelphia
Convention's illegal decision to break with the unanimity rule of
the Articles, but also suggests the crucial reinforcement provided
by the Continental Congress when it declared on July 3 that the
new Constitution had been ratified by the requisite number of
states.
To see our point, suppose that Congress had responded to
New Hampshire's ratification by proclaiming that the Articles
insisted on unanimous consent and denouncing the secession of
nine states as positively illegal. Under this scenario, we have no
doubt whatsoever that Governor Clinton and his very powerful
political allies would have held the line against the Constitution.
Instead of allowing Livingston, a Federalist, to go unchallenged
when he urged his fellow delegates to face the fact that "the
Confederation,... was now dissolved," Clinton would have rallied his Antifederalist majority to the banner held aloft by the
Congress.
The First Congress would then have begun with only ten
states in attendance-with New York joining North Carolina and
Rhode Island as holdouts, condemning the illegality of their seceding brethren's departure from the Confederation. This would
have had a very substantial impact on the bandwagon effect that
190 Elliot, ed, 2 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 413-14 (cited in note 16)
(reprinting the New York circular letter). The nine-state rule clearly influenced (though
did not persuade) the North Carolina Convention of July 1788. Governor Johnston framed
the issue on the convention's second full day: "We are not to form a constitution, but to
say whether we shall adopt a Constitution to which ten states have already acceded."
Elliot, ed, 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 15 (cited in note 16). Despite an
immediate protest by Rutherford, who declared that he was "unhappy to hear gentlemen
of learning and integrity preach up the doctrine of adoption by ten states," id, the numbers gambit was used over and over, particularly by James Iredell. See note 204 and
accompanying text.
191 Elliot, ed, 2 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 414 (cited in note 16) (reprinting the New York circular letter).
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ultimately propelled the country to accept the legitimacy of the
Union despite the very narrow Federalist victory. It is impossible

to guess how, and whether, the new Constitution would have
survived.'92 But the thought-experiment emphasizes the role of
the old Congress in the birth of the new regime.
F. Diehards
And yet, for all this, the First Congress began as a secession-

ist body with two defiant states remaining outside. The large
Antifederalist majority of North Carolina's Convention did not
crumble upon hearing the news that Virginia and New York had
joined. After eleven days of debate rehearsing familiar charges of
illegality,'9 3 Antifederalist leader Willie Jones carried a resolution, 184 to 84, neither rejecting nor ratifying the Constitution,
but taking up New York's call for a second federal convention.
Urging this convention to consider a twenty-item Bill of Rights
and twenty-six other amendments prior to ratification, the
Antifederalists adjourned their meeting on August 2."9
But their triumph was short lived. The Federalists waged an
energetic campaign for a new convention, which North Carolina's

" Surely the movement, in New York and other states, for a second Constitutional
Convention would have been greatly advanced. See Linda Grant De Pauw, The Anticlimax
of Antifederalism: The Abortive Second Convention Movement, 1788-89, 2 Prologue 98
(1970).
193 William Lancaster clearly made the point in the North Carolina Convention:
We find that the ratification of nine states shall be sufficient for its establishment between the states so ratifying the same. This, as has been already taken notice of, is a
violation of the Confederation. We find that, by that system, no alteration was to
take place, except it was ratified by every state in the Union. Now, by comparing this
last article of the Constitution to that part of the Confederation, we find a most flagrant violation. The Articles of Confederation were sent out with all solemnity on so
solemn an occasion, and were to be always binding on the state; but, to our astonishment, we see that nine states may do away the force of the whole.
Elliot, ed, 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 212-13 (cited in note 16). See also
id at 24 (statement of Joseph Taylor at the North Carolina Convention); id at 25
(statement of James Galloway at the North Carolina Convention); id at 201 (statement of
William Lenoir at the North Carolina Convention); id at 203-04 (same) ("The Confederation was binding on all the states. It could not be destroyed but with the consent of all the
states. There was an express article to that purpose. The men who were deputed to the
Convention, instead of amending the old, as they were solely empowered and directed to
do, proposed a new system. If the best characters departed so far from their authority,
what may not be apprehended from others, who may be agents in the new government?... The states are all bound together by the Confederation, and the rest cannot
break from us without violating the most solemn compact. If they break that, they will
this.").
"9 Id at 243-52.
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newly elected legislature granted in November of 1788. When
elections were finally held in August 1789, they revealed a sea
change in public opinion: the second North Carolina Convention
ratified in November by 195 to 77.
Rhode Island was a tougher nut to crack. Despite the disastrous referendum, Federalists continued to campaign for a convention, and in January 1790 persuaded the legislature to reconsider. When a legislator's departure for church deadlocked the
General Assembly, Governor Collins cast the tie-breaking vote,
citing "the extreme Distress we were reduced to by being disconnected with the other States."'9 5 But Rhode Islanders were unimpressed. The Antifederalists won a slim majority at the convention, and they adjourned the convention after four days of
desultory debate."
Meanwhile, Congress was beginning to play tough. In May,
1790, the Senate approved the Rhode Island Trade Bill, which
embargoed all trade and demanded immediate payment in hard
currency of all the state's debts to the United States. 9 7 Unfortunately, the Senate's debates were not then published, but we
do have the notes of Senator Maclay of Pennsylvania, which
explain the grounds for his protest. Maclay called the action
"premature" and distinguished between imposing sanctions as "a
punishment [ ] for rejection" of the Constitution, and acting on
the basis of a "[s]upposition [t]hat they would ruin our
[rievenue." The latter might be legitimate if the facts could be
established, and this is apparently why he judged the statute
"premature." But at the present time, "the bill could not be
justfyed on the Principles of freedom law the Constitution or any
other Mode Whatever."'9 8
Pierce Butler of South Carolina rose to defend the bill: "It is
no infringement of Her Sovereignty to withdraw Your
Trade... Granted-Mr Izard says their little State is brought

196 Providence Gazette (Jan 23, 1790). If he presented any more affirmative arguments, we have been unable to find them in the sources.
6 Robert C. Cotner, ed, Theodore Foster's Minutes of the Convention Held at South
Kingstown, Rhode Island, in March 1790, Which Failed to Adopt the Constitution of the
United States 21 (Books for Libraries, 1929); Account of the Convention Proceedings,
Providence Gazette (Mar 6 and Mar 13, 1790).
' Joseph Gales, ed, 2 The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United
States with an Appendix containingImportant State Papers and Public Documents and
All the Laws of a Public Nature 1638 (Gales and Seaton, 1834) ('Annals of Congress").
1"
Kenneth R. Bowling and Helen E. Veit, eds, 9 Documentary History of the First
FederalCongress of the United States of America 260, 263-64, 268 (Johns Hopkins, 1988).
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into Compact with the other States." 9 9 Despite the legal compunctions of Izard and Maclay, the Senate passed the bill by a
vote of thirteen to eight, and sent it to the House.
Meanwhile, with a renewed Antifederalist majority in the
Rhode Island General Assembly, the Antifederalist delegates to
the convention reassembled, and once again moved for adjournment. But this time they were defeated. While a majority of the
delegates had explicit instructions from their towns to reject the
Constitution, the trading centers of Providence and Newport
threatened secession if the Constitution were to fail again.2
Finally, on May 29, two Antifederalist delegates defied their
instructions, and the Constitution was ratified by a vote of thirtyfour to thirty-two. They were just in time: the House of Representatives had already considered the Rhode Island bill briefly, but
dropped it upon learning of the news of ratification on June 3,
1790.201

The bandwagon had finally lurched to its ultimate destination.
IV. THE LEGALISTIC FOUNDERS?
It is against this background that we invite you to assess
Professor Amar's very different picture of the Founding. Amar
does not deny that the Federalists ignored the Articles' insistence
on explicit approval by Congress and all thirteen legislatures. He
assures us, though, that "inconsistency is not illegality."20 2 In
his view, the Articles had become voidable by any state that
chose to renounce them. Despite its pledge of "perpetual union,"
the Articles were no more than a treaty; and under the law of
treaties then prevailing, the many breaches of the Articles authorized any of the contracting parties to renounce them if they so
chose. According to Amar, then, the Framers were on solid legal
ground in treating the Articles as dead and buried.
Even if we granted all of Amar's premises, his legal conclusions do not follow. 2 3 But it is more important to challenge his
premises. First, is there any evidence that Americans took
Amar's argument seriously as they considered the Federalists'
end run around the Articles?

199 Id at 458.
201

2

Staples, Rhode Islandin the Continental Congressat 666 (cited in note 85).
Gales, ed, 2 Annals of Congress at 1686 (cited at note 197).
Amar, 94 Colum L Rev at 465 (cited in note 1).
See text accompanying notes 234-47.
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After all, from Maryland's repudiation of the Annapolis Convention through Rhode Island's resistance to the new Union, we
have amassed an enormous body of evidence expressing legalistic
objections to the Federalists' unconventional activities. We have
also seen that the Founders' violation of the final Article of Confederation was not a detail, but absolutely essential for the success of their enterprise. The Federalists were well aware of this.
Rather than ignoring the question, Federalists repeatedly responded by making the revolutionary assertion that the times required breaking the rules laid down by Article XIII. Despite his
deserved reputation for industry, Professor Amar has uncovered
virtually nothing that suggests that Federalists seriously presented his breached-treaty argument, much less that they gave
great weight to it, much less that Americans in general were impressed with it.2"'

Apart from the remarks analyzed in the text, Amar has found remarkably little
support for his view. In urging the Connecticut legislature to send delegates to the convention, General Jedidiah Huntington asserted:
The compact between the several states has not any penalty annexed to it for the
breach of its conditions .... Whenever therefore any state refuses a compliance with
a requisition made agreeably to the confederation, all obligation on the part of the
other states is dissolved.
Conn Courant 2 (May 21, 1787). The General's statement is brief and, as we will see, does
not do justice to the legal complexities. But the most important thing about it is its
uniqueness: This obscure remark in the Connecticut legislature simply does not weigh in
the balance against the mass of evidence we have accumulated.
Turning to the ratification period, Amar relies on James Iredell's remarks. The time
was June 1788, and ten states had already ratified before Iredell spoke to the North Carolina Convention:
It is suggested, indeed, that, though ten states have adopted this new Constitution,
yet, as they had no right to dissolve the old Articles of Confederation, these still subsist, and the old Union remains, of which we are a part. The truth of that suggestion
may well be doubted, on this ground: when the principles of a constitution are violated, the constitution itself is dissolved, or may be dissolved at the pleasure of the parties to it .... Perhaps every state has committed repeated violations of the demands
of Congress .... The consequence is that, upon the principle I have mentioned, (and
in which I believe all writers agree,) the Articles of Confederation are no longer binding.
Elliot, ed, 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 230 (cited in note 16). But notice
that Iredell did not describe the Articles as a treaty, but called them a "constitution." It is
hard to see this as supporting Amar's "breached treaty" theory. Instead, the passage
seems to be endorsing an idiosyncratic view of the right of secession. Moreover, Amar
omits reference to other remarks by Iredell at the convention that embrace, in typically
Federalist fashion, the right of revolution:
It is true that, by the Articles of Confederation, the consent of each state was necessary for any alteration. It is also true that the consent of nine states renders the
Constitution binding on them. The unhappy consequences of that unfortunate article
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To overwhelm the sound of silence, Professor Amar transforms James Madison into his spokesman-in-chief-trying to
convince us that at least this great man authoritatively defended
the legality of the Federalists' breach with the Articles. But Madison was no less a revolutionary than any of his fellow Federalists. While he did play with Amar's breached-treaty argument, he
did not embrace it. Amar evades this hard truth by focusing on a
few of Madison's many remarks on the subject.
Begin with Madison's most considered discussion of the issue
at the Constitutional Convention.2 5 When introducing the New

in this Confederation produced the necessity of this article in the Constitution. Every
body knows that, through the peculiar obstinacy of Rhode Island, many great advantages were lost....
It will often happen, in the course of human affairs, that the policy which is
proper on common occasions fails, and that laws which do very well in the regular
administration of a government cannot stand when every thing is going into confusion. In such a case, the safety of the community must supersede every other consideration, and every subsisting regulation which interferes with that must be departed
from, rather than that the people should be ruined. The Convention, therefore, with a
degree of manliness which I admire, dispensed with a unanimous consent for the
present change, and at the same time provided a permanent remedy for this evil, not
barely by dispensing with the consent of one member in future alterations, but by
making the consent of nine sufficient for the whole, if the rest did not agree, considering that the consent of so large a number ought in reason to govern the whole ....
Id at at 228-29 (remarks of Iredell to the North Carolina Convention). See also id at 230
(same) ("I have stated the reasons for departing from the rigid article in the Confederation requiring a unanimous consent. We were compelled to do this, or see our country ruined. In the manner of the dispensation, the Convention, however, appear to have acted
with great prudence, in copying the example of the Confederation in all other particulars
of the greatest moment, by authorizing nine states to bind the whole."). On other occasions, Iredell repeatedly stressed the need to face the fact that ten states had already
ratified the Constitution, leaving North Carolina out in the cold. See, for example, id at 14
("Is there any gentleman so indifferent to a union with our sister states, as to hazard
disunion rashly, without considering the consequences?"); id at 232 ("But we ought to
consider whether ten states can do longer without one, or one without ten."). All things
considered, the balance of the evidence weighs against Professor Amar's claim that Iredell
should be counted as a legalistic partisan of the breached-treaty position. Apart from one
idiosyncratic remark (that doesn't use the word "treaty"), he appears to be a typical Federalist revolutionary.
'" Madison raised the breached-treaty argument three other times at the Philadelphia Convention. On June 5, he noted: "[Als far as the articles of Union were to be considered as a Treaty only of a particular sort, among the Governments of Independent States,
the doctrine might be set up that a breach of any one article, by any of the parties,
absolved the other parties from <the whole> obligation. For these <reasons as well as
others> he thought it indispensable that the new Constitution should be ratified in the
most unexceptionable form... ." Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the FederalConvention at 12223 (cited in note 15) (emphasis added) (brackets in original). Madison's use of the word
"might" suggests that he did not actually make the argument, much less place great
weight on it.
Madison raised the argument another time on June 30:
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Jersey Plan, Paterson had insisted that the Articles could only be
amended unanimously: "This is the nature of all treaties. What is
unanimously done, must be unanimously undone.' 2°s
Madison responded with a speculative disquisition, not a
dogmatic lecture. He recognized (as Amar does not) that it is
controversial to treat the Articles as if they were merely a treaty
to be assessed under the law of nations. Indeed, he began his
discussion on a very different premise, considering "the federal

In reply to the appeal of Mr. E[llsworth] to the faith plighted in the existing federal
compact, he remarked that the party claiming from others an adherence to a common
engagement ought at least to be guiltless itself of a violation. Of all the States however Connecticut was perhaps least able to urge this plea. Besides the various omissions to perform the stipulated acts from which no State was free, the Legislature of
that State had by a pretty recent vote positively refused to pass a law for complying
with the Requisitions of Cong[resls.
Id at 485-86. Madison did not deny that the other states might raise Ellsworth's argument. He said that Connecticut "was perhaps least able" to raise it. Moreover, Madison's
attack was parried by Ellsworth, who argued that the state's financial crisis justified its
lower payments and "deffied] any gentleman to shew that we ever refused a federal requisition." Id at 497. This response appears in Yates's notes; Madison fails to mention it in
his own. See id at 487.
Madison's final words on the subject were on July 23:
[It would be a novel & dangerous doctrine that a Legislature could change the constitution under which it held its existence. There might indeed be some Constitutions
within the Union, which had given, a power to the Legislature to concur in alterations of the federal Compact. But there were certainly some which had not; and in
the case of these, a ratification must of necessity be obtained from the people. He
considered the difference between a system founded on the Legislatures only, and
one founded on the people, to be the true difference between a league or treaty, and a
Constitution. The former in point of moral obligation might be as inviolable as the
latter. In point of political operation, there were two important distinctions in favor
of the latter. 1. A law violating a treaty ratified by a preexisting law, might be respected by the Judges as a law, though an unwise or perfidious one. A law violating a
constitution established by the people themselves, would be considered by the Judges
as null & void. 2. The doctrine laid down by the law of Nations in the case of treaties
is that a breach of any one article by any of the parties frees the other parties from
their engagements. In the case of a union of people under one Constitution, the nature of the pact has always been understood to exclude such an interpretation.
Farrand, ed, 2 Records of the Federal Convention at 92-93 (cited in note 15). Madison here
is not making a final judgment about the present legal status of the Articles, but is addressing the future and arguing that ratification of the new Constitution by state conventions has the advantage of being more durable than a "league."
These three quotations, which all come from Madison's notes, do not begin to answer
the intricacies of the breached-treaty argument. For starters, they do not establish that
the Articles were "breached" by all sides. They do not show that those previous breaches
could be raised several years later, and by parties who are themselves guilty. They do not
take into account the multilateral nature of the Confederation. They do not come to grips
with the fact that everyone, including Madison, kept referring to the "existing" Articles of
Confederation. See text accompanying notes 244-47.
2" See Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention at 250 (cited in note 15).
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union as anal[olgous to the fundamental compact by which individuals compose one Society, and which must in its theoretic origin at least, have been the unanimous act of the component
members .... .20 7 Madison took this interpretation seriously,
and argued that it supported the Virginia Plan.2" 8
Only then did he adopt an Amarian interpretation of the
Articles, considering it as a treaty:
Clearly, according to the Expositors of the law of Nations,
that a breach of any one article, by any one party, leaves all
the other parties at liberty, to consider the whole convention
as dissolved, unless they choose rather to compel the delinquent part to repairthe breach. In some treaties indeed it is
expressly stipulated that a violation of particular articles
shall not have this consequence, and even that particular
articles shall remain in force during war, which in general is
understood to dissolve all su[ ]bsisting Treaties. But are
there any exceptions of this sort to the Articles of confederation?"°
Note Madison's careful qualifications. Even if the Articles were a
treaty rather than part of the social compact, he did not assert
that breaches made the "treaty" void. At most they gave innocent
parties an option to terminate if they did not choose to compel
the delinquents to repair the breach. Nor was this rule of
voidability absolutely binding. It was merely suppletive, and the
parties were free to change it to one that made treaties more
durable. While Madison denied that the Articles contained a
provision changing the voidability rule, his comments failed to
confront the text's explicit pledge of "perpetual Union."
Perhaps this is the reason that his minilecture went over
like a lead balloon. Even Federalists like Hamilton and Ellsworth
took the floor to declare themselves unconvinced, while Madison's
notes do not cite any supporters.2 1 Not that Madison seemed
very upset. Even he "did not wish to draw any rigid inferences
from these observations."2 1' Thus it is not surprising that MadiId at 314.
Id at 315. Madison believed that there may well be a term "implied in the [social]
compact itself" that barred dissolution even if there were a breach by some members. Id
at 314. This implied term would give a majority of the nation the right to form a new
constitution over the dissent of a minority.
Id at 315 (emphasis added).
210 See their emphatic rejections of Madison's views at text accompanying notes 99100.
211 Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention at 315 (cited in note 15). The
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son failed to renew his legalistic arguments at the crucial moments when the convention was debating whether to break with
the Articles' insistence on congressional consent and unanimous

state approval-leaving it to fire-eaters like Wilson to console the
fainthearted: "The House on fire must21be
extinguished, without a
2
rights."
ordinary
to
regard
scrupulous
Because the convention's deliberations were secret, perhaps
Amar can rehabilitate his image of the legalistic Madison by
emphasizing his public pronouncements. But this will not work,
for the simple reason that Madison's published writings reveal
him to be an emphatic revolutionary. Turning to the Federalist,
two papers are relevant: Forty and Forty-three. Unfortunately,
Amar paints his picture of a legalistic Madison by quoting a
fragment from Forty-three, and consigning Forty to a dismissive
footnote. 2" But when Amar's quotations are supplemented, the
revolutionary Madison reemerges.
We begin with Forty, since it devotes itself entirely to the
question of legality: "whether the Convention were authorised to
frame and propose this mixed Constitution."2 14 Madison's answer distinguished between the authority of the convention to
make its sweeping proposal and its authority to change the rules
of ratification set down by Article XIII. On the first question, he
treats his audience to a complex, if strained, legal argument.
When it comes to the second subject his tone shifts radically:

tentative character of Madison's remarks is also evident in his "Vices of the Political
System of the United States," an unpublished memorandum prepared before the convention. Here he describes the Articles as no "more than a treaty of amity of commerce and of
alliance ... ," but it is quite plain that this is not intended as a lawyerly characterization.
To the contrary, he recognizes that the Articles possess "the form of... a Constitution,"
but discounts this point given his ambition-which is to describe the "vital principles of a
Political Cons[tiltution." From this vantage point, Madison denies that a text that fails to
grant a full panoply of coercive powers to the Congress can qualify as a "vital" constitution. While this may well be true as a matter of political statecraft, Madison is cagey
about its legal implications. He conditions his later discussion of international law with
the telltale caveats that "[a]s far as the Union of the States is to be regarded as a league
of sovereign powers, and not as a political Constitution .... so far it seems to follow from
the doctrine of compacts, that a breach of any of the articles of the confederation by any
parties to it, absolves the other parties from their respective obligations, and gives them a
right, if they chuse to exert it, of dissolving the Union altogether." Rutland and Rachal,
eds, 9 The Papers of James Madison at 345, 351-53 (cited in note 41). As at the convention, Madison makes his remarks conditionally, and is attentive to the distinction between
void and voidable treaties.
22 Farrand, ed, 2 Records of the FederalConvention at 469 (cited in note 15).
213 Amar, 94 Colum L Rev at 497 n 157 (cited in note 1).
214 Federalist 40 (Madison), in Jacob E. Cooke, ed, The FederalistPapers258 (Wesleyan, 1961) (footnote omitted).
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In one particular it is admitted that the Convention have
departed from the tenor of their commission. Instead of
reporting a plan requiring the confirmation of the Legislatures of all the States, they have reported a plan which is to
be confirmed by the people, and may be carried into effect by
nine States only. It is worthy of remark, that this objection,
though the most plausible, has been the least urged in the
publications which have swarmed against the Convention.
The forbearance can only have proceeded from an irresistible
conviction of the absurdity of subjecting the fate of 12
States, to the perverseness or corruption of a thirteenth;
from the example of inflexible opposition given by a majority
of 1-60th of the people of America, to a measure approved
and called for by the voice of twelve States comprising 5960ths of the people; an example still fresh in the memory
and indignation of every citizen who has felt for the wounded honor and prosperity of his country. As this objection,
therefore, has been in a manner waved by those who have
criticised the powers of the Convention, I dismiss it without
further observation.215
Three things make this paragraph remarkable. First, it is remarkably frank. No fig leaf of legality is offered up, no dismissive
talk of the Articles as a breached treaty that has lost its legal
force. In case the point was missed, the rest of the paper devotes
itself to the question of "how far considerations of duty arising
out of the case itself, could have supplied any defect of regular
authority."216 This discussion reveals Madison as an all-out revolutionary insisting that "in all great changes of established governments, forms ought to give way to substance; that a rigid
adherence in such cases to the former, would render nominal and
nugatory, the transcendent and precious right of the people to
abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their safety and happiness .... 217 Surely if
Madison were confident about his breached-treaty argument, all
this revolutionary talk would have been unnecessary.
Second, Madison is remarkably nationalistic: We cannot
allow little Rhode Island to veto an initiative undertaken by "5960ths of the people." This calculation presupposed that We the

216

Id at 263.
Id.

21

Id at 265. See also Ackerman, 1 We the People: Foundationsat 175-79 (cited in note

215

The University of Chicago Law Review

[62:475

People of the United States already existed, and could not allow
their voice to be strangled by a small minority in the name of
states' rights. This Madisonian line is completely inconsistent
with the thrust of Amar's interpretation. If Madison had opted
for the breached-treaty argument, he would not have condemned
Rhode Island for frustrating the (incipient) national will. He
would have emphasized her breaches of the Articles-since, for
an Amarian Madison, it is these breaches that authorized her
sister states to exercise their sovereign right to renounce the
treaty and go their own way. But the Madison who wrote Federalist Forty was not a legalistic defender of states' rights. He was
a revolutionary defender of the national right of self-determination.
The third remarkable thing is Madison's chutzpah: he blandly announces that his opponents have "wa[ilved" their powerful
legal objection, and "dismiss[es] it from further consideration."
Madison published these words on January 18 in New York's
newspapers. This was two weeks before Cornelius Schoonmaker's
resolution denouncing the convention for its illegality would lose
in New York's General Assembly by a vote of twenty-seven to
twenty-five, and a similar motion by Robert Yates would lose in
the Senate by twelve to seven.218 Doubtless these Antifederalists would have been surprised to learn about their waiver-as
would those in the many other states whose repeated protests we
have rehearsed.
Indeed, even Madison's castigation of Rhode Island was misleading. While Rhode Island vetoed the 1781 proposal for a five
percent impost, it was New York that remained the only naysayer to the impost at the time that Madison was writing. Since
Madison was writing in New York newspapers, he was perfectly
aware of how little his readers had "waived" their legalistic objections to the Federalists' end run around the unanimity rule.
Professor Amar ignores all this when he dismisses Forty in a
conclusory footnote2 19 and urges us to focus on Madison's remarks in Forty-three. Here Publius once again explains that a
decision to follow the Articles "would have subjected the essential
interests of the whole to the caprice or corruption of a single
member."" ° Failing to change the rules "would have marked a
want of foresight in the Convention, which our own experience
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See text accompanying notes 157-59.
See Amar, 94 Colum L Rev at 497 n 157 (cited in note 1).
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Federalist 43 (Madison), in Cooke, The FederalistPapers at 297 (cited in note 214).
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would have rendered inexcusable.""' Having confessed that the
Federalists were fated to lose under the old rules, Madison then
turns to a question of "a very delicate nature .... On what principle the confederation, which stands in the solemn form of a
compact among the States, can be superceded without the unanimous consent of the parties to it?":
[This] question is answered at once by recurring to the
absolute necessity of the case; to the great principle of selfpreservation; to the transcendent law of nature and of
nature's God, which declares that the safety and happiness
of society are the objects at which all political institutions
aim, and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed.
PERHAPS also an answer may be found without searching
beyond the principles of the compact itself... A compact

between independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts of
legislative authority, can pretend to no higher validity than
a league or treaty between the parties. It is an established
doctrine on the subject of treaties, that all the articles are
mutually conditions of each other; that a breach of any one
article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach
committed by either of the parties absolves the others; and
authorizes them, if they please, to pronounce the treaty
violated and void. Should it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate truths for a justification for dispensing
with the consent of particular States to a dissolution of the
federal pact, will not the complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer the MULTIPLIED and IMPORTANT
infractions with which they may be confronted? The time
has been when it was incumbent on us all to veil the ideas
which this paragraph exhibits. The scene is now changed,
and with it, the part which the same motives dictate."
Professor Amar only quotes the Madisonian speculations that
immediately follow "PERHAPS."' The fuller version, however,
makes it clear that Madison had not changed his mind radically
in the five days since he published Forty. Like Forty, Forty-three
did not rest the case for the convention's end run around the
Articles on legalistic grounds. Instead, it defended the convention
by continuing Forty's revolutionary appeal to "the absolute neces221

Id.

2

Id at 297-98.
Amar, 94 Colum L Rev at 467 (cited in note 1).
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sity of the case.., the great principle of self-preservation... the
transcendent law of nature and of nature's God," and so forth.
The breached-treaty claim merely appears as a speculative
add-on, and is, moreover, completely consistent with the frank
confession of illegality in the preceding discussions. To see why,
consider that Forty did not speculate about the future legality of
the Articles but contented itself with confessing that the Articles
were illegally breached by the convention. In contrast, the
Amarian passage in Forty-three looks to the future: PERHAPS it
might be lawful for a state to renounce the Articles if it could
establish that other states had breached. Madison did not even
take the trouble to demonstrate that such breaches had occurred
on a state-by-state basis. Nor did he suggest that any state had
in fact exercised its putative right to denounce the treaty. He was
merely sketching a possible strategy for future use, creating
options that might prove useful given the gloomy prospects for
ratification at the time he wrote Federalist Forty-three.
January 1788 was an especially dark month in the ratification struggle. Not only was New York dominated by the fierce
opposition of the Clinton faction,224 but Antifederalists were in
the ascendancy in many other states. They had already won
elections in New Hampshire and Massachusetts, while Rhode
Island remained defiant. As a southerner, Madison was perfectly
aware of the hard struggle that loomed ahead in Maryland,
North Carolina, and his own state. This dark scene would not
brighten until the Federalists' February surprise in snatching
victory from the jaws of defeat at the Massachusetts Convention.
Within this context, it is entirely understandable that Madison
was speculating that PERHAPS a renunciation of the Articles
might be necessary sometime in the future as part of a desperate
effort to rebuild the Union.
Unfortunately, Professor Amar does not follow Madison after
January to consider whether his PERHAPS became more than a
MIGHT HAVE BEEN during the long months ahead. The moment of truth came in June at Virginia's ratifying convention. As
we have seen, eight states had ratified by this point, and the
legalistic denunciation of the nine-state rule by Patrick Henry
and others was especially hot and heavy. Madison was among
the most talkative members of the convention. This would have
been the perfect moment to explain to the legalists that Virginia
was perfectly within its rights to renounce the Articles as a
22

See note 186 and accompanying text.
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breached treaty and join the eight secessionist states in
breathing life into a more perfect Union under the nine-state
rule.
But nothing like this happened. Here is how Madison responded to Henry's legalistic complaint:
Could any thing in theory be more perniciously improvident
and injudicious than this submission of the will of the majority to the trifling minority? Have not experience and practice
actually manifested this theoretical inconvenience to be
extremely impolitic? Let me mention one fact, which I conceive must carry conviction to the mind of any one: the
smallest state in the Union has obstructed every attempt to
reform the government .... Twelve states had agreed to
certain improvements which were proposed, being thought
absolutely necessary to preserve the existence of the general
government; but as these improvements, though really indispensable, could not, by the Confederation, be introduced into
it without the consent of every state, the refractory dissent
of that little state prevented their adoption. The inconveniences resulting from this requisition, of unanimous concurrence in alterations in the Confederation, must be known to
every member in this Convention; it is therefore needless to
remind them of them. Is it not self-evident that a trifling
minority ought not to bind the majority? Would not foreign
influence be exerted with facility over a small minority?
Would the honorable gentleman [Henry] agree to continue
the most radical defects in the old system, because the petty
state of Rhode Island would not agree to remove them? 5
We have heard all this before. Madison is recapitulating the
revolutionary themes of Federalist Forty, where he also pointed
to Rhode Island's rejection of the impost as establishing the "absurdity" of Article xmIrs demand for unanimity. With Henry
staring him in the face, he could not pretend that the opposition
had "waived" the legalistic objection that Forty had admitted was
the "most plausible." Rather than responding with a legalistic critique of the Amarian type, Madison condemned compliance with
Article XIII as "extremely impolitic." Rather than asserting the
right of each state to renounce the Articles as a breached treaty,
Madison returned to the revolutionary nationalism of The Feder-

SElliot,

ed, 3 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 88-89 (cited in note 16).
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alist Papers-proclaiming the "self-evident" right of a national
majority to rule over a "trifling minority." Throughout his repeated and lengthy lectures to the convention, he never breathed an
Amarian word about breached treaties.2 Instead he appears in
June as he appeared in January: a revolutionary Federalist,
answering his opponents' legalisms with a nationalistic appeal to
"self-evident" truths about democracy.
Indeed, Professor Amar's search through the records of the
ratification period has been rewarded by the discovery of a single

public remark, by Charles Pinckney at the South Carolina Convention, that unconditionally endorses his breached-treaty argument, and this remark provoked an immediate counterattack. 7
Since we have seen Antifederalists repeatedly raise legalistic
protests under very dramatic conditions, the silence on the other
2' At one point he does ask (rhetorically): "What is the situation of this country at
this moment? Is it not rapidly approaching to anarchy? Are not the bands of the Union so
absolutely relaxed as almost to amount to a dissolution?" Id at 399 (remarks of James
Madison to the Virginia Convention). Even this passage does not assert that the "bands of
the Union" have been dissolved. Nor is there anything here that resembles a rigorous
argument from the law of treaties.
7 Elliot, ed, 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 308 (cited in note 16). Like
Madison's remarks at the Philadelphia Convention, Pinckney's comments at the South
Carolina Convention immediately provoked a sharp challenge. The very next delegate,
Rawlins Lowndes, responded:
For his part, he did not think matters had come to such a crisis; rather let us comply
with our federal connection, which, not yet being broken, admits of being strengthened. A gentleman had instanced Vattel in support of his argument, and laid down,
from that author, an opinion that where parties engaged in the performance of an
obligation, should any one of them fly off from his agreement, the original was null
and void. He had ingeniously applied this to our present Continental situation, and
contended, as some of the states acted in a refractory manner towards the Continental Union, and obstinately refused a compliance, on their parts, with solemn obligations, that of course the Confederation was virtually dissolved. But Vattel merely
recited such a case as where only a part of a confederation was broken; whereas ours
was totally different, every state of the Union having been uniform in refusing a
compliance with the requisitions of Congress.
Id at 310. Lowndes seems to be referring to the doctrine of "clean hands" that treatise
writers typically imposed on states that sought to nullify treaties. See text accompanying
note 240.
Our view of the record, then, is very different from Professor Amar's. He claims that
"not a single Anti-Federalist, to my knowledge, contradicted" Pinckney or Madison, and
that "when pressed to put up or shut up, [the Antifederalists] shut up." Amar, 94 Colum L
Rev at 468-69 (cited in note 1). The truth is that just as Pinckney's claims were immediately contradicted at the South Carolina Convention, so too were Madison's at Philadelphia. See text accompanying notes 210-11. The "breached treaty" argument was rarely
refuted because it was rarely made.
As the final witness on his behalf, Professor Amar summons James Iredell. But we
have already explained why we believe that Iredell was a garden-variety Federalist revolutionary, rather than an Amarian legalist.
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side really is quite deafening, and deserves further attention in
its own right: Why were the Federalists so shy about Amar's
legalistic argument?
A. Treaty or Constitution?
As Madison himself suggested at the convention,"2 the very
idea that the Articles were merely a "treaty" was not obvious to
most Americans. Treaty language was almost never used to describe the existing arrangement. Two other words predominated.
The Articles were often described as a "compact"-usually modified with adjectives like "solemn" or "fundamental" to indicate its
very special status. Or they were simply called a "constitution."
For example, Madison's own state of Virginia authorized its delegation to Philadelphia to "devis[e] and discuss[ I all such alterations and further provisions, as may be necessary to render the
Federal Constitution adequate."229 And Amar's favorite, James
Wilson, repeatedly equated the Articles and the Constitution as
establishing a "confederate republick."20 The debates at the
state ratifying conventions are full of similar references. Thus,
when Antifederalists denounced the "open and avowed violation
m 1 their charges resonated in
of a sacred federal constitution,""
2
the common understanding.
See text accompanying note 207.
See text accompanying note 20 (emphasis added).
See, for example, Robert G. McCloskey, ed, 1 Works of James Wilson 262-63
(Belknap, 1967) ("[The United States have been formed into one confederate republick;
first under the articles of confederation; afterwards, under our present national government."); McCloskey, ed, 2 Works of James Wilson at 764 (describing the Constitution as "a
plan of a confederate republick'); id at 767 (same); id at 768 (arguing that in "confederate
republicks," states "retain the free and generous exercise of all their other faculties as
states, so far as it is compatible with the welfare of the general and superintending confederacy.").
"3 Vox Populi, Essays by Vox Populi: Massachusetts Gazette October-November 1787,
in Herbert J. Storing, ed, 4 The Complete Anti-Federalist41, 44 (Chicago, 1981).
As if anticipating Professor Amar, one Antifederalist quoted the text of Article XI
and remarked:
"o

Here is a System of Government as sacred as the nature of the thing will admit
of... is it within the compass of human ideas to imagine that a System of Government so formed can be torn up by the roots.... that if the majority are in favour of
such a measure, they may do it?-I answer no, by no means: Where a Government is
instituted upon the idea of a majority, there a majority have undoubtedly a right to
make such an alteration as they think proper: But the case is widely different where
a System of Government is formed on ideas of unanimity, and where it is expressly
stipulated, that it shall receive no alterations but such as are unanimously agreed to.
It is a maxim in law, founded on the eternal principles of reason and the fitness of
things,-"That no act shall be revoked but with the same solemnity with which it
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Indeed, when John Adams described the Continental Congress as a "diplomatic assembly" in his important A Defence of
the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America
in 1787, the response was quite revealing. Upon receiving and
reading this long book, Thomas Jefferson wrote Adams immediately to pinpoint this single claim for critique:
There is one opinion in it however, which I will ask you to
reconsider, because it appears to me not entirely accurate,
and not likely to do good. Pa[gel 362. "Congress is not a
legislative, but a diplomatic assembly." Separating into parts
the whole sovereignty of our states, some of these parts are
yeilded [sic] to Congress. Upon these I should think them
both legislative and executive; and that they would have
been judiciary also, had not the Confederation required them
for certain purposes to appoint a judiciary. It has accordingly
been the decision of our courts that the Confederation is a
part of the law of the land, and superior in authority to the
ordinary laws, because it cannot be altered by the legislature
of any one state. I doubt whether they are at all a diplomatic
assembly.1

In describing the Congress as a "diplomatic assembly," Adams is
far more cautious than Amar. One could only imagine Jefferson's
reaction, as Ambassador to France, to the Amarian suggestion
that his government had dissolved without giving him notice.

was first enacted"...
Supposing nine States should ratify and confirm the proposed Federal Govern-

ment, and four States should reject the same-would not those four States, still adhering to the articles of Confederation, have an undoubted right, both in the sight of
God and man, to accuse the nine approbating States with the most unequivocal
breach of public faith, point-blank national infidelity, and I will add, of open REBELLION against the national Constitution?-And what confidence could they, or any
foreign power ever place in those nine States, thus confederated into a Government,
the very basis of which is laid in the violation of public faith, and whose existence, as
a State, sprang out of a revolt from their own established Government.
Portius, US Chronicle: Political, Commercial & Historical, RI 1 (Nov 29, 1787) (reprinted
from American Herald, Mass).
"' Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Feb 23, 1787), in Lester J. Cappon,
ed, 1 The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams 174-75 (North Carolina, 1988).
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B. The Law of Treaties
In avoiding treaty talk, Americans showed sound legal instincts. Not only had the law of treaties been developed in corrupt and monarchical Europe, but the paradigm case for the
classical law of treaties was a bilateral agreement restricted to a
small number of issues-most often, war or peace or commerce.
The Articles of Confederation were multilateral and envisioned
an ongoing collaboration over a multiplicity of projects. Americans were alive to this distinction, repeatedly insisting that the
Confederacy could not be dissolved without the unanimous consent of all thirteen parties. 4
Insofar as European precedents were applicable, 5 they did
not suggest that renunciation was the appropriate legal response
for every breach. Especially in multilateral agreements, leading
authors recognized that a breach by one party could disrupt ongoing arrangements between other parties who were all complying

' This point was repeatedly made at the North Carolina Convention, which met after
eleven states had already ratified. Samuel Spencer, for example, emphasized that North
Carolina had not taken any steps to renounce the treaty:
Mhey were before confederated with the other states by a solemn compact, which
was not to be dissolved without the consent of every state in the Union. North Carolina had not assented to its dissolution. If it was dissolved, it was not their fault, but
that of the adopting states. It was a maxim of law that the same solemnities were
necessary to destroy, which were necessary to create, a deed or contract. He was of
opinion that, if they should be out of the Union by proposing previous amendments,
they were as much so now.
Elliot, ed, 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 228 (cited in note 16). Timothy
Bloodworth also rebutted the charge that North Carolina's violations dissolved the Articles, arguing that "[tihe compact between the states was violated by the other states,
and not by North Carolina. Would the violating party blame the upright party?" Id at 236.
See also Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention 250 (cited in note 15) (remarks
of William Paterson) ("If the Confederacy was radically wrong, let us return to our states
and obtain larger powers, not assume them of ourselves. I came here not to speak my own
sentiments, but <the sentiments of> those who sent me .... If we argue the matter on the
supposition that no Confederacy at present exists, it can not be denied that all the States
stand on the footing of equal sovereignty... If we argue on the fact that a federal compact actually exists... the 13th. delar[es] that no alteration shall be made without
unanimous consent. This is the nature of all treaties. What is unanimously done, must be
unanimously undone.") (footnote noting that "supposition" was crossed out and replaced
with "fact" has been omitted) (brackets in original).
' The closest cases were leagues, but even these weren't that close. Moreover, since
there were fewer cases, the doctrine was less considered and developed. See Arnold D.
McNair, The Functions and Differing Legal Characterof Treaties, 2 Brit YB Intl L 100,
106 (1930) ("[The seed-bed of the traditional rules as to the ... discharge of treaties
which swell the bulk of our text-books... was sown at a time when the old conception of
the treaty as a compact, a bargain, a Vertrag, was exclusively predominant and the dawn
of the new multilateral treaty had not begun.").
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with their- obligations. In such cases, treatise writers did not
recognize the right of country A to renounce its obligations to B
because C had breached the treaty. Vattel, for example, confronts
the problem raised in a multilateral alliance when some of the
parties remain faithful to their engagements. He concludes that,6

as to these parties, "the treaty subsists in full force .... .23

Other important writers recognized that multifaceted agreements
presented different problems than ones focusing on a single problem. Christian Wolff, for example, considered a case in which a
treaty concerned "different matters, the one of which depends in
no way upon the other," and denied that a breach of one term by
one party allowed the other "to withdraw from the entire treaty .... ."23 The extent to which Wolff's doctrine applied to the
Articles was, of course, debatable, but if Americans had been
interested in the law of treaties, we would have heard them debating it.
Putting all problems of multiple purpose and multilateralism
to one side, classical doctrine still contained many important restraints on treaty renunciation. First, the principles it announced
were merely suppletive, applying only if the parties had failed to
stipulate otherwiseY 8 This meant that any fair-minded lawyer
would have had to think long and hard about the final Article's
pledge that "the Union shall be perpetual." As Pufendorf explained, "[JT]he most binding species of treaties are produced by
those which concern some perpetual union of several states." 9

' Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations 451 (T.& J.W. Johnson, 1863) (Joseph
Chitty, trans) (originally published 1758). See also Samuel Pufendorf, 2 De Jure Naturae
Et Gentium Libri Octo 1044-51 (Yale, 1934) (C.H. Oldfather and WA. Oldfather, trans)
(originally published 1688).
' Christian Wolff, 2 Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum227 (Clarendon,
1934) (Joseph H. Drake, trans) (originally published 1764). See also Johann Wolfgang
Textor, 2 Synopsis of the Law of Nations 267 (Carnegie, 1916) (John Pawley Bate, trans)
(originally published 1680).
2
Alberico Gentili, 2 De lure Belli Libri Tres 83 (Oxford, 1933) (John C. Rolfe, trans)
(originally published 1612); Vattel, The Law of Nations at 214, 449; Hugo Grotius, The
Rights of War and Peace 396 (Universal Classics Library, 1901); J.J. Burlamaqui, 2 The
Principlesof Natural and Politic Law 222-23 (Cambridge, 5th ed 1807) (Thomas Nugent,
trans). Nineteenth-century treatise writers agreed. See, for example, Henry Wheaton,
Elements of InternationalLaw 374 (Carey, Lea & Blanchard, 1863); J.T. Abdy, ed, Kent's
Commentary on InternationalLaw 392-93 (Deighton, Bell, 2d ed 1877).
"' Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae at 1336 (added by Barbeyrac from Samuel Pufendorf,
De Officio Hominis et Civis). The contemporary Johann Textor agreed:
[Ain alliance may be dissolved, even without any reason, by the common consent of
the confederated members ....
This is subject to the proviso that, when there are several federated members,
they all assent, the matter being one of those where the special rights of each indi-
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Was it not a bit too soon to decide, after six years, that international law allowed parties to renounce a treaty, if it was a treaty?
PERHAPS one or another state was within its rights to advise the others that it would consider abrogation if they did not
cure one or another breach considered fundamental. But even
here, international law limited this right to states that could
plausibly claim to have "clean hands."' 4 As applied to the Articles, this insistence on clean hands would serve as a serious
constraint. Thus, when Charles Pinckney actually raised Amar's
breached-treaty argument in the South Carolina Convention,
Rowlan Lowndes immediately argued against voiding the treaty:
"[L]et us comply with our federal connection, which, not yet being
broken, admits of being strengthened." 1
There is a final problem. As Madison repeatedly emphasized,
international law made breached treaties voidable, but not void.
This distinction is of fundamental importance. It deprives private
parties of their authority to ignore a treaty because they believe
that one or another state has breached its terms. It was one
thing for Charles Pinckney to proclaim at the South Carolina
Convention that the Articles were merely a treaty that had been
irreparably breached-quite another for the State of South Carolina to take a similar position. It was the state, after all, that had
entered the treaty in the first place. And if anybody could renounce it, it was only after a considered debate and a somber
collective decision-recognizing that international law did not
give sovereigns the authority to ignore any treaty they disliked,
vidual are taken into account. And so a vote of the majority to retire from the alliance does not bind the minority, or even a single member who prefers to abide by the
alliance. So the unanimous consent of the federated members is required, and this by
mere Law, even if there is no clause in the document such as: "This alliance is not
dissoluble, save by common consent."
Textor, The Law of Nations at 266-67 (cited in note 237).
'o This point was recognized by one of Professor Amar's favorites, James Iredell, just
a few years later: "It is a part of the law of nations, that if a treaty be violated by one
party, it is at the option of the other party, if innocent, to declare, in consequence of the
breach, that the treaty is void." Ware v Hylton, 3 US (3 Dall) 199, 261 (1796) (Iredell
seriatim) (emphasis added). For a historical and contemporary discussion of this principle,
see Bhek P. Sinha, UnilateralDenunciation of Treaty Because of Prior Violations of
Obligationsby Other Party 83 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1966) ("[Ilt is a well-established principle
of international law that it is only an innocent party that possesses the right to denounce
or abandon a treaty because of breaches by [the] other party or parties."); id at 59 ("[A]
number of major municipal legal systems contain norms which are essentially analogous
to the often-asserted concept or rule that an innocent party to a violated treaty has the
right to abandon its obligations."); id at 67 (noting that under American contract law "[a]
breach merely endows an innocent party with certain rights of action").
241 See note 227.
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especially a multipurpose and multilateral arrangement that
pledged perpetuity. 2
This is where practice speaks louder than words. Rather
than renouncing the "treaty," all the states went out of their way
to reaffirm its vitality not only during the Philadelphia Convention but after. At the very time the convention was meeting,
Congress was voting on one of the greatest legal acts of American
history-the Northwest Ordinance.' This act stipulated that
"[tihe said territory, and the States which may be formed therein,
shall forever remain a part of this Confederacy of the United
States of America, subject to the Articles of Confederation, and to
such alterationstherein as shall be constitutionally made; and to
all the Acts and Ordinances of the United States in Congress
Once the convention went
Assembled, conformable thereto."

'
According to treatise writers of the time, a declaration was necessary to abrogate a
treaty. Vattel, The Law of Nations at 177 (cited in note 236); Grotius, The Rights of War
and Peace at 816 (cited in note 238); Gentili, 2 De lure Belli Libri Tres at 427-28 (cited in
note 238). It was also confirmed by Justice Iredell in Ware, 3 US at 261 (Iredell seriatim)
("If congress, therefore, (who, I conceive, alone have such authority under our government), shall make such a declaration [that the treaty is void] ...I shall deem it my duty
to regard the treaty as void ....But the same Law of nations tells me, that until that
declaration be made, I must regard it (in the language of the law) valid and obligatory.").
' The Ordinance contained a precursor to the Bill of Rights-providing, among other
rights, freedom of religion, trial by jury, and the writ of habeas corpus. It was, in short, a
blueprint for the future expansion and progress of the nation. The magnitude of this provision led Daniel Webster to doubt "whether one single law of any lawgiver, ancient or
modern, has produced effects of a more distinct, marked, and lasting character than the
Ordinance of 1787." Harold M. Hyman, American Singularity:The Northwest Ordinance,
the 1862 Homestead and Morrill Acts, and the 1944 G.1. Bill 19 (Georgia, 1986), quoting
Daniel Webster.
2
Ordinance of 1787, July 13, 1787, reprinted in Carter, ed, 2 TerritorialPapersat
39, 46 (cited in note 134) (emphasis added). Nor were these words treated dismissively by
the Federalists who confronted them at the First Congress held under the new Constitution. These gentlemen were obliged to deal with the fact that the Ordinance's arrangements for the management of the territories were premised on the continued existence of
the Articles and required modification if they were to sustain themselves under the new
Constitution. This inconsistency would not have been a problem if the Federalist Congress
had considered the Confederacy Congress a legally defunct entity operating under a
lapsed treaty. On this premise, the Federalist Congress would have simply ignored the
Ordinance, enacting a new one that might-or might not-have borrowed from the old
Congress as the new one deemed appropriate.
This is not, however, the way the first Congress viewed the situation: "Whereas, in
order that the ordinance of the United States in Congress assembled, for the government
of the territory north-west of the river Ohio may continue to have full effect, it is requisite
that certain provisions should be made, so as to adapt the same to the present Constitution .... " Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of the Ohio
River, 1 Stat 50, 50-53 (1789). As the text makes plain, the Federalist Congress explicitly
recognized that the Confederation Congress validly enacted the Ordinance under the
Articles. It aimed simply to assure that the Ordinance "may continue to have full effect."
So far as we can tell, the First Congress's view was hardly idiosyncratic. We have found
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public in September, Congress continued to remain a vital force.
We have heard Madison himself recognize its legal authority to
modify the convention's constitutional text.
Perhaps the most telling response to the breached-treaty
argument, however, is the behavior of the states after New
Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify the Constitution in
June of 1787. Rather than closing up shop, all thirteen states
continued to be active in Congress. This means that the seceding
states were acting in just the opposite way that an Amarian
would have expected. Rather than following international law
and formally declaring the Articles void, 5 all eleven ratifying
states sent delegates to Congress where Rhode Island and North
Carolina continued to exercise the suffrage guaranteed by the
Articles. This is curious behavior for states who were allegedly
treating the Articles as nullities. As Chief Justice Marshall put
the point in 1820:
Both Governments could not be understood to exist at the
same time. The new Government did not commence, until
the old Government expired. It is apparent, that the Government did not commence on the Constitution being ratified by
the ninth State; for these ratifications were to be reported to
congress, whose continuing existence was recognised by the
Convention, and who were requested to continue to exercise
their powers, for the purpose of bringing the new government into operation. In fact, congress did continue to act as
a government, until it dissolved on the first of November, by
the successive disappearance of its members. It existed potentially, until the 2d of March, the day preceding that on

no evidence that the Confederacy's competence to enact the Ordinance was challenged by
anybody at the time.
243 This need for a formal act of renunciation is a fixture of Madisonian thought. Thus,
in a much-cited letter of 1791 to Pendleton, Madison explained that the Treaty of Peace
with Britain remained in force despite the fact that England had breached its provisions:
That a breach on one side (even of a single article, each being considered as a condition of every other article) discharges the other, is as little questionable; but with
this reservation, that the other side is at liberty to take advantage or not of the
breach, as dissolving the Treaty. Hence I infer that the Treaty with [Great Britain],
which has not been annulled by mutual consent, must be regarded as in full force, by
all on whom its execution in the [United States] depends, until it shall be declared by
the party to whom a right has accrued by the breach of the other party to declare,
that advantage is taken of the breach, [and] the Treaty is annulled accordingly.
Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Jan 2, 1791), in Charles F. Hobson
and Robert A. Rutland, eds, 13 The PapersofJames Madison 342, 343-44 (Virginia, 1981).
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which the members of the new congress were directed to
assemble. 6
We would go even further than Marshall. The final important act
of the Confederacy was not in November, but in January-when
its governor for the Northwest Territory, Arthur St. Clair, negotiated a treaty with the Wyandot. 7
Amar's claim, then, fails within its own terms. A voidable
treaty that has never been renounced remains legally binding.
The Federalists were not disturbed by this point because they
were revolutionaries, and so failed to exploit the legalistic opportunities that Professor Amar has creatively elaborated two centuries later.
C. Unconventionality
The founders were revolutionaries of a special sort, however,
and it is here where Amar's description becomes positively misleading. By seeking to legalize the Federalists, he disguises the
unconventional ways in which they induced established authorities to recognize that the revolutionary break with the rules was
appropriate. This meant that the process of public deliberation
could proceed in a relatively orderly (if not legal) manner, and
that many of the old institutions-in this case, the state legislatures-could retain a redefined, but important, role in the new
order.
This unconventional effort on both national and state levels
played a crucial role in the Federalists' success. As we have seen,
the Federalists only won by a hair even after their redefinition of
the rules. Without gaining the support of established institutions
at crucial junctures, their effort to speak for the People would
have degenerated into more and more violent mob scenes of the
sort presaged at the Pennsylvania General Assembly. Even if
their state ratifying conventions had met without violence, the
Federalists would have failed to gain the consent of nine conven' Owings v Speed, 18 US (5 Wheat) 420, 422 (1820). Justice Curtis agreed, arguing
that the Articles were "in existence when the Constitution was framed and proposed for
adoption....'"Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 US (19 How) 393, 572 (1857) (Curtis dissenting).
2" Treaty of Fort Harmar, January 9, 1789, reprinted in Carter, ed, 2 TerritorialPa.
pers at 174 (cited in note 134). The Senate ratified this treaty on September 22, 1789.
Linda G. De Pauw, Charlene B. Bickford, and LaVonne Marleve Siegal, eds, 2 Documentary History of the FirstFederal Congress:Senate Executive Journaland Related Documents
43 (Johns Hopkins, 1974). However, a companion treaty to the Treaty of Fort Harmar,
made with six nations, was not ratified. Carter, ed, 2 TerritorialPapersat 183 n 84 (cited
in note 134).
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tions amidst a battery of legalistic denunciations by state legislatures and the Continental Congress. At best, their bandwagon
would have stalled permanently after their first five victories.
And even if nine consents had been miraculously achieved, would
the nine seceding states have successfully induced the other four
to enter? It was one thing to prevail over little Rhode Island; it
was a very different matter to threaten a whole series of legalistic naysayers with economic sanctions.
Professor Amar's legalisms, then, serve only to obscure a
genuinely remarkable feature of the Founding that helps to account for its success.
V. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CONVENTION
We have been looking at the Founding from the vantage
point of preexisting institutions. Time and again, these institutions were faced with a choice: should they stand on their legal
rights and refuse to cooperate with the new initiative, or should
they cooperate with an initiative that could well lead to a diminution in, or elimination of, their own authority?
While the adaptive response of most, if not all, elements of
the old order was crucial, it nevertheless remains mysterious.
Existing institutions do not normally take challenges to their
authority easily-self-aggrandizement, not self-abnegation, is
their leading theme. Why, then, did they respond so submissively
and join the Federalists' bandwagon?
The place to begin is with the curious institution that the
Federalists brought to center stage. In English constitutional
law, the word "convention" described a legally defective Parliament, most notably the one presiding over the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Before slipping out of London in that fateful year,
King James II tried to make it legally impossible for his foes to
organize a legal Parliament that might effectively act against
him. James cancelled the writs of election he had issued, and
dropped the Great Seal in the Thames, explaining: "A 'meeting of
a parliament cannot be authorized without writs under the great
seal.'"2
In response, the king's enemies constructed an ersatz process. Members of earlier Houses of Commons met in Westminster

' King James II, as quoted in Lois Schwoerer, The Declarationof Rights, 1689 126
(Johns Hopkins, 1981). Chapter Six of Schwoerer's book contains a fine analysis of the
political balance that made the calling of a convention seem the most plausible constitutional response to James's actions.
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as an ad hoc body and issued a "circular letter" that might substitute for legal writs of election. Acting under these letters, officials conducted something that looked very much like a traditional election. Members of this unconventional House joined (some)
Lords to meet as a "Convention." Even this ersatz Commons plus
Lords was not enough for a Parliament under English law-since
the presence of the king was required, and James was all too
absent. 49 Despite the evident break with the legal rules, the
procedure had been designed to establish as much institutional
continuity with the old regime as was plausible under the circumstances.
In the eyes of the victors of the American Revolution, the
Convention of 1688 was responsible for some of the greatest
achievements in English constitutional history-the promulgation
of a Bill of Right and the replacement of a tyrant king with a
constitutional monarch. This great precedent provided the Federalists with a language that permitted them to present their rulebreaking initiative in a way that allowed them to fall short of
total revolution. As in the English case, the Federalist break with
the legal rules did not mark an utter and complete repudiation of
the institutional past. The Federalist conventions of 1787-88, like
the English Convention a century earlier, had made a credible
effort to link their pedigree with institutional elements of the
preexisting constitution. While this mix of institutional continuity and rule violation still seems remarkable two centuries later,
the Federalists were not required to make up an alien language
to explain what they were doing. In calling for conventions, they
could adapt an older vocabulary which already had roots in the
living political culture.
Modern English has evolved to the point where the
Federalists' use of the word "convention" is anything but conventional. To mark its historical roots, we have been using the word
"unconventional" to describe this ongoing Federalist effort to
break the rules without doing unnecessary damage to the underlying institutional practice. This is a sharp verbal change, to be
sure, but the Federalists also made great changes in received
linguistic practice. Consider that the Federalist conventions were
different beasts from their great English predecessor. For one
thing, they claimed greater authority. The English Convention

'

See John Miller, The GloriousRevolution: 'Contract'and "Abdication'Reconsidered,

25 Hist J 541 (1982); Thomas P. Slaughter, 'Abdicate'and 'Contract'in the Glorious Revolution, 24 Hist J 323 (1981).
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was profoundly embarrassed by its defective legality. As soon as
William and Mary were comfortably seated on the throne, the
convention declared itself a proper Parliament, and passed a
statute retroactively legalizing the anomalous acts of its legally
defective predecessor." ° In contrast, the Federalist conventions
were unembarrassed by their defective legality. They claimed to
speak for the People better than the established Congress and
state legislatures. 1 While these legally established bodies were
asked to cooperate in the process of higher lawmaking, they were
assigned the inferior status of helpers. In a remarkable inversion,
the legally defective character of the conventions was taken as a
sign of their superior capacity to speak for the People.
Once again, in making this move, the Federalists were not
acting entirely without precedent. A few years earlier, the town
meetings of both New Hampshire and Massachusetts had refused
to approve constitutions proposed by their state legislatures,
insisting on special conventionsY 2 This resistance proved successful. In both states, legislatures responded to defeats by calling conventions that successfully gained the assent of the town
meetings to their constitutions. Thus, in asserting the superiority
of the convention over normal legislatures, the Federalists were
nationalizing a precedent that had already gained a foothold on
the local level. At the same time they gave these precedents a
crucial spin. While the town meetings of New Hampshire and
Massachusetts had insisted upon state conventions to propose
constitutions, they saw no need to demand special ratifying conventions. Instead, the town meetings reserved the right to ratify
the proposals themselves."3
'
The Parliament of 1690 quickly promulgated An act for recognizing King William
and Queen Mary, and for avoiding all questions touching the acts made in the parliament

assembled at Westminster, the thirteenth day of February, one thousand six hundred
eighty eight, which declared "[tihat all and singular the acts made and enacted in said
parliament were and are laws and statutes of this kingdom, and such as ought to be
reputed, taken and obeyed by all the people of this kingdom." E. Neville Williams, The
Eighteenth-Century Constitution, 1688-1815: Documents and Commentary 46-47

(Cambridge, 1960). J.P. Kenyon treats the entire affair with great subtlety in his Revolution Principles:The Politics of Parties,1689-1720 37-41 (Cambridge, 1977).
21 See text accompanying notes 88-98.
Wood, Creationof the American Republic at 340-43 (cited in note 23); Hoar, Constitutional Conventions at 5-7 (cited in note 30).
See NH Const of 1784, reprinted in Thorpe, ed, 4 The Federal and State Constitutions at 2470 (cited in note 24); Jameson, American ConstitutionalLaw § 132 at 121 (cited
in note 29) (New Hampshire "submitted their projected Constitutions to a vote of the
electors of the State, in their town meetings-an act which ... constitutes the best
guaranty of the sovereign right of the people over the form of their government that has
ever been devised."); id §§ 157-58 at 142-44 (discussion of Mfassachusetts); Wood, Creation
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In contrast, the Federalists responded to their legal problems
by using the convention imagery twice: first in Philadelphia, and
second in the states. This second round was essential in legitimating their exercise in rule breaking. Without it, the Federalists would have been obliged to defend their lawbreaking activity
to the state legislatures that had sent delegates to Philadelphia
in the first place. By appealing for ratifying conventions, however, they could redefine the relevant question. No longer would
they be required to act defensively when their opponents accused
them of breaking the rules. They could go on the offensive and
deny that the Antifederalists' legalistic objections could be appropriately invoked to prevent a convention of the People from deliberating on its fate. After all, if the citizenry found the illegality
really troubling, they would simply elect so many Antifederalist
delegates to the convention that the Constitution would be
doomed.
This referendum-like appeal placed the Antifederalists at a
distinct ideological disadvantage. No less than the Federalists,
they too were children of the American Revolution. They too had
engaged in countless illegal activities against the British in the
name of the People. As children of the Radical Whig tradition,
they were perfectly aware of the role played by the illegal Convention of 1688 during the Glorious Revolution. Once the Federalists had adapted traditional convention imagery to propose a
popular decision on the constitutional question, the
Antifederalists were left looking like legalistic nit-pickers--and
they knew it. Since the calling of ratifying conventions was a
bitterly fought question in some of the state legislatures, the
Federalists' success in taking the high ideological ground could
well have made the difference.
Once again, we have no standard word to describe the distinctive character of their innovaton. So please forgive us when
we call the Federalist ratifying conventions an exercise in quasidirect democracy. To grasp this distinctive concept, begin with
the sense in which the Federalist initiative approached the notion of "direct" democracy, as exemplified by a popular referendum. As in a referendum, the elections for convention delegates
were focused on a concrete proposal-the Federalist Constitution
of 1787. As a consequence, debate amongst the general citizenry
centered on the constitutional issues in a way that is not typical

of the American Republic 340-43 (cited in note 23) (examining both Massachusetts and

New Hampshire).
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of ordinary election campaigns. At the same time, the process
was only quasi-direct-the voters did not cast ballots on the merits of the Federalist Constitution (as in a referendum), but rather
for delegates, who would then deliberate further on the matter.
This quasi-direct method allowed for a more complex process of
decision than the simple yes/no of a modern plebiscite. Delegates
could be elected who were publicly uncommitted on the merits;
others might pay the political price involved in changing positions they announced before the voters. Yet, for all this flexibility,
convention delegates had a much clearer sense of a "mandate"
from the People to move in a particular direction-either for or
against the Federalist proposal. This sense of a popular "mandate" is usually more muffled, and is often quite nonexistent, in
normal electoral contests.
The convention mode, in short, represented a distinctive mix
of popular will and elite deliberation. On the one hand, debate
and decisions in the electoral campaign pushed the convention in
a definite direction. On the other, the delegates still had leeway
to debate and refine the nature of the "mandate" that their success at the polls represented. The Federalists were trying for the
best of two worlds-combining the popular involvement of "direct
democracy" with the enhanced deliberation of "representative
democracy." The aim, in short, was for a deliberative plebiscite.'
Of course, by aiming so high, the Federalists risked missing
both targets: their conventions might lack the distinctive democratic credibility of a referendum while lacking the deliberative
quality of the best representative bodies. In fact, the historical
record is mixed. While there was a great deal of focused deliberation in the election campaigns and at the conventions, the quantity of citizenship participation was not nearly as impressive as
its quality. It is now commonly recognized that property requirements did not disqualify a substantial percentage of white male
voters from casting a ballot; indeed, a few states suspended all
property requirements for this special election.255 Nonetheless,

' Interestingly, early Swiss referendum practice also avoided the sharp yes/no alternatives of modem plebiscites. See Benjamin R. Barber, The Death of Communal Liberty
189-94 (Princeton, 1974).

'

Georgia's state constitution enfranchised 90 percent of adult males. Dinkin, Voting

in Revolutionary America at 37 (cited in note 155). Georgia's election of delegates to the
ratifying convention used the same voting requirements. Beard, An Economic Interpreta.
tion of the Constitutionat 236-37 (cited in note 165). North Carolina had also enfranchised
90 percent of its white adult males with a provision permitting all taxpayers to vote,
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participation rates were unspectacular. In only three states did
voter turnout seem higher than the historical norm; in four, lower; in the rest, about the same.255 Some elections were held in

Dinkin, Voting in Revolutionary America at 36-37 (cited in note 155), and this provision
was used in the vote for delegates to the first ratifying convention, McDonald, We the
People at 311 (cited in note 165). New Hampshire extended the vote to all taxpayers,
freeholders, and poll taxpayers, thereby enfranchising a similar percentage of white men
eligible to vote in the ratifying election. Dinkin, Voting in RevolutionaryAmerica at 33, 39
(cited in note 155). Pennsylvania granted suffrage to all taxpayers, allowing 90 percent of
white adult males to vote. Id at 36. A similar percentage was reached in New Jersey. Id
at 37. In Massachusetts, the property requirements enfranchised 60-70 percent of the
white adult males on the seaboard and 80-90 percent of those inland, id at 37, and the
requirements were used in the ratifying election, Beard, An Economic Interpretationof the
Constitutionat 226 (cited in note 165).
In South Carolina, about 80 percent of the free adult males were enfrachised by the
1778 Constitution. Dinkin, Voting in Revolutionary America at 37 (cited in note 155). In
Delaware, a similar percentage were enfranchised, and these qualifications were used for
the ratifying election. In Virginia, a freehold requirement enfranchised about 70 percent
of the white adult males.
Connecticut and Rhode Island combined property qualifications with oath requirements, which meant that only 60 percent of the men were enfrachised. Id at 39. These
requirements were used for the ratifying election in Connecticut. Beard, An Economic
Interpretationof the Constitution at 240-41 (cited in note 165). We have found no data on
voting requirements in Rhode Island on the constitutional referendum.
In New York and Maryland, all property qualifications were dropped for the election
to the ratifying convention. Journal of the Assembly of the State of New-York, 11th Sess
48-49 (New York, 1988) (Jan 31, 1788); Journal of the Senate of the State of New York,
11th Sess, 1st Mtg 20-21 (New York, 1788) (Jan 31, 1788); McDonald, We the People at
149 (cited in note 165) (discussing Maryland).
In general, we agree with Robert Brown: "[piresent evidence seems to indicate that
there were no 'propertyless masses' who were excluded from the suffrage at the time.
Most men were middle-class farmers who owned realty and were qualified voters .... Figures which give percentages of voters in terms of the entire population are
misleading, since less than twenty per cent of the people were adult men." Robert E.
Brown, Charles Beard and the Constitution:A CriticalAnalysis of "AnEconomic Interpretation of the Constitution"197 (Princeton, 1956).
' New York, Georgia, and Connecticut probably had higher turnout for their ratifying elections. In New York, more than 24,500 persons went to vote, nearly 43A percent of
the electorate, while in the accompanying election for the New York Assembly, 31.8
percent voted in the five counties where data is available. This compared to much lower
percentages in prior elections for state offices. Dinkin, Voting in RevolutionaryAmerica at
122 (cited in note 155).
Though little data exists for Georgia's ratifying election, the data from Chatham
County is suggestive. There, 59.2 percent of the adult white males (401 people) voted for
delegates to the state ratifying convention. This contrasts with general election figures of
1783, when 39.9 percent of the adult white males (270 people) participated, and 36.3 percent (246 people) in 1784. Id at 129. Connecticut was similar to Georgia: it was plagued
by low turnout in the gubernatorial races through the 1780s (about 15 percent of adult
men and about 25 percent of qualified voters). Like Georgia, participation may have been
higher for the ratifying election, though the data is sparse. Id at 119-20.
In most other states, turnout remained constant. In South Carolina, about 20 percent of the free adult males voted in state and local elections. Id at 128. The only returns
available for the ratifying election are for St. Philip's and St. Michael's Parish (Charles-
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the dead of winter, not the best time for large turnouts. 7 Balloting for delegates was not generally combined with votes for
other positions. This meant that candidates for other offices did
not have an incentive to bring their followers to the polls, who

ton), where about 22 percent voted (and voted overwhelmingly for Federalists). Id; McDonald, We the People at 203 (cited in note 165). Moreover, Charleston may have enjoyed
a higher turnout rate than other towns in the State. Dinkin, Voting in Revolutionary
America at 128 (cited in note 155).
In North Carolina, turnout fluctuated between 30 percent and 40 percent in state
elections. Id at 127. The only figure for the ratifying elections is from Dobbs County,
which shows that 40 percent of the white adult males turned in their ballots before the
Federalists ran off with the ballot box. Id. In Massachusetts, participation in state governor elections from 1780 to 1786 drew only between 10 and 17 percent of the electorate,
but factionalism and Shays's Rebellion increased participation in 1787 and the following
two years to a range between 23 and 29 percent. Participation in the ratifying election
was about 27 percent. Id at 117-18.
Maryland enjoyed one of the highest turnout rates in post-Revolutionary America. Id
at 115. However, the data for the ratifying convention is mixed-one report claiming that
participation was only 25 percent of eligible voters, another claiming that participation
was 43 percent in Baltimore and 48.8 percent in Montgomery County. Id at 116.
In Virginia, by way of contrast, data from seven counties shows that the turnout was
lower at the ratifying election (26.5 percent of white adult males) than for the 1788 and
1789 state elections, where much larger percentages (hovering at about 35 percent to 40
percent) participated. Id at 125. Similarly, in Pennsylvania, where more data is available,
about 25 percent of white adult males voted in the annual elections from 1783 to 1788,
while only 17 percent voted for delegates to the state ratifying convention. Id at 114-15.
This was part of the minority protest:
The election of members of the Convention was held at so early a period, and the
want of information was so great, that some of us did not know of it until after it was
over .... We apprehend that no change can take place that will affect the internal
government or Constitution of this commonwealth, unless a majority of the people
should evidence a wish for such a change; but on examining the number of votes
given for members of the present State Convention, we find that of upwards of seventy thousand freemen who are entitled to vote in Pennsylvania, the whole convention
has been elected by about thirteen thousand voters, and though two-thirds of the
members of the Convention have thought proper to ratify the proposed Constitution,
yet those two-thirds were elected by the votes of only six thousandand eight hundred
freemen.
John Bach McMaster and Fredrick D. Stone, eds, Pennsylvaniaand the Federal Constitution, 1787-1788 459-60 (Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1888). Turnout in New Hampshire may have decreased as well-though data is scant. The state enjoyed a high annual
participation rate in its election for the governor-hovering at about 37 percent. Dinkin,
Voting Rights in America at 108-09 (cited in note 155). Unfortunately, little data exists on
turnout to the ratifying election, but it may have been lighter. Id at 110. In Rhode Island,
turnout at the 1788 vote to decide ratification was about 24.4 percent-but this was affected by the Federalist boycott, and contrasts with the 33 percent turnout since 1786. Id
at 111-12.
Delaware and New Jersey lack enough data from which to form a conclusion about
turnout. Id at 122-24.
' Bad weather seems to have especially affected the turnout in Virginia and New
Hampshire. Brown, Charles Beard and the Constitution at 167 (cited in note 255).
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then might also cast ballots for convention delegates." s And of
course, a vast majority of Americans-women and slaves-were
simply excluded from the process.
Moreover, if judged by the mechanistic standards of the modern referendum, the legitimacy of the Federalist triumph will
forever be open to serious question. We simply do not have reliable electoral data from most states.2 9 But this, in a sense, only dramatizes our point-it is anachronistic to impose some simple mathematical formula upon the complex process through
which the Federalists won the authority to speak in the name of
the People.2 10 Rather than the product of a magic moment at
Georgia, New York, and New Hampshire were exceptions to this rule. Dinkin,
Voting in Revolutionary America at 129 (cited in note 155); McDonald, We the People at
237 (cited in note 165).
' As far as hard data is concerned, pickings are very slim. We know that the Federalists were overwhelmingly defeated in New York by a vote of about 16,000 to 7,000,
McDonald, We the People at 286 n 120 (cited in note 165), and that in Rhode Island the
vote against the Constitution was 2,708 to 237 (although an indeterminate number of
Federalists boycotted the election), id at 322. As to other states, we possess very fragmentary returns or rough guesses. We know that the Federalists won a large majority in the
counties of Philadelphia, Northampton, and Northumberland in Pennsylvania. Id at 165.
In Maryland, the vote in favor of ratification was about two to one. Id at 149. In New Jersey, people seemed to have voted overwhelmingly for the Federalists, Dinkin, Voting in
Revolutionary America at 18 (cited in note 155); the election was not so overwhelming in
Virginia, but it does appear that the Federalists prevailed here as well, see text accompanying note 180.
While Delaware's convention voted unanimously for the Constitution, allegations of
voter fraud cloud the picture. Id at 17. Georgia's convention was also unanimous, but we
have been unable to discover any hard returns. While Connecticut politics was largely
dominated by Federalists, and the state convention had little difficulty ratifying the
Constitution, voting results are absent. McDonald, We the People at 130, 136-38 (cited in
note 165).
As for Antifederalist victories, we know that they entered the state conventions with
strong majorities in North Carolina, New Hampshire, New York, and Massachusetts, but
(apart from New York) we do not know how these majorities correlated with popular votes
on a statewide basis. There does seem strong reason to suspect that malapportionment in
South Carolina deprived the Antifederalists of the fruits of a statewide electoral victory.
See Roll, 56 J Am Hist at 30-31 (cited in note 170).
Altogether, it is impossible to know how all this adds up in a strict mathematical
way. This point is generally obscured by scholarly "vote counts" which merely assume that
the proportion of delegates at each convention track the percentage of the popular vote.
See, for example, Evelyn C. Fink and William H. Riker, The Strategy of Ratification,in
Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman, eds, The FederalistPapers and the New Institutionalism 220, 230 (Agathon, 1989).
' This leads us to refine a second area of disagreement with Professor Amar, who
has adopted a mechanistic formula to capture the Founding commitment to popular
sovereignty. In his view, the Federalists were simple majoritarians, and popular sovereignty meant nothing more than the right of the majority to impose its will anytime it
wanted to do so. Amar, 94 Colum L Rev at 481-87 (cited in note 1). In our view, the practice of popular sovereignty is a far more complex matter-involving an ongoing institutional exchange between political leaders and ordinary citizens in which the formal act of

1995]

Our UnconventionalFounding

the ballot box, the Constitution gained its legitimacy from a complex dialogue between citizens and their representatives-in both
established and transformative institutions-extending over
months and years. It is only by sustaining public support in their
long march through a broad variety of institutions, defeating
their opponents time and again, that the Federalists earned their
higher lawmaking authority.
We still have much to learn from this distinctive interplay
between the deliberations of ordinary citizens- and the efforts of
political leaders to crystallize them into a series of institutional
victories. Of course, the Federalists had it easy. They claimed a
popular mandate from a relatively homogeneous and restrictive
constituency, while modern American movements confront an
even more formidable challenge as they seek to crystallize the
considered judgments of an incredibly diverse citizenry.
But it would be wrong to understate the remarkable achievement of our unconventional Founders. When placed in historical
context, their call for ratifying conventions represented a breakthrough for democratic ideals. The Federalist experiment in quasi-direct democracy was way ahead of its time. In the half-century after 1787, thirty-four state constitutions would be enacted
into law, but only six were ratified through a special procedure
involving a focused vote by the People-and precisely two of
these took place outside of New England. Popular ratification became a national norm only after the Jacksonian Revolution of the
1830s."' When set within its time and place, the Federalist call
for ratifying conventions was a radical experiment in democracy-inviting ordinary citizens to make their influence felt on the
most fundamental matters of political self-definition. 2

voting plays only a part. See Ackerman, 1 We The People: Foundationsat 266-94 (cited in
note 2).
2"
Outside New England, the first case of popular ratification was Louisiana in 1812
(under very special circumstances); New York submitted its new constitution to the
People in 1821. See Daniel Rodgers, Contested Truths: Keywords in American Politics
Since Independence 87 n 10 (Basic Books, 1987), who continues:
Unwillingness to hazard a ratification election did not mean that the constitutionwriting bodies were indifferent to the people's will. Most of them, after 1789, consisted of men directly and especially elected to their tasks, presumably with some
notion of what their constituents wanted. To make doubly sure, many states invented
some sort of machinery to test their work against the currents of popular opinion
[short of running a special election].
Rodgers's entire chapter on constitutional conventions is well worth reading.
2
See generally Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (Knopf,
1992); James G. Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the
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It is impossible to understand the Federalists' success without taking full account of the power of this radical ideal. After
all, their opponents could have responded to the Federalists'
revolutionary break with existing rules by boycotting the elections, thereby depriving them of a great deal of their legitimacy.
Instead, they responded to the Federalists' appeal to the People
by competing for popular support in a relatively fair and open
contest. Indeed, the contest was so open that the Antifederalists
almost won despite the Federalists' success in changing the rules
to their advantage. For present purposes, the most important
point is not the narrowness of the Federalist victory, but the way
in which the Antifederalists' engaged competition in the ratifying
conventions allowed the victors to claim that theirs was more
than a factional triumph. After so many of their political opponents had leaped onto the bandwagon starting at Annapolis, it
would be hard for them to jump off and condemn the outcome
simply because they lost.
After three years of engaged institutional struggle, the Federalists had reached a point where even bitter opponents had a
hard time denying that the Constitution represented a considered
judgment of We the People of the United States. To summarize
this bandwagon dynamic, it may be clarifying to distinguish
between its negative and positive aspects. Negatively, unconventional action served to constrain the destabilizing consequences of
a breach of the basic rules for constitutional revision-providing
the political participants with an institutional context for decision that was sufficiently familiar to engage in constructive debate and decision. Positively, the elaboration of new forms of
quasi-direct democracy allowed the public to intervene in the
process in a specially focused way-without reducing the notion
of a mandate to a mechanical yes/no vote in a formal referendum.
Having isolated this distinctive mixture of constrained illegality
and quasi-direct democracy, we conclude by putting the Federalist contribution in larger constitutional perspective.

VI. THE FOUNDING PRECEDENT
We have taken the first step in reconstructing the professional narrative that informs the modern study of constitutional law.
All too often, this begins by placing the Federalists on a pedestal:
they are the Founders,whose constitutional achievement dwarfs

American ConstitutionalOrder, 139 U Pa L Rev 287 (1990).

Our Unconventional Founding

1995]

anything attained at later moments of transformation. Even
Reconstruction is accorded a lesser place in the standard account-while the Republicans made important substantive
changes in our constitutional principles, they are portrayed as if
they enacted the Reconstruction Amendments in obedience to the
rules and principles established by the Federalists in Article V.
The most striking transformations of the twentieth century are
accorded an even more humble status. The New Deal Revolution
is understood as if it were a constitutional footnote to some nationalistic opinions by John Marshall; the Civil Rights Revolution, as if it were simply the fulfillment of promises made in
1868. As we look forward to the twenty-first century, we are
telling ourselves a story that casts us as tired epigones of bygone
2

ages.

But there is a different story that we can tell ourselves-one
that is both truer to the past and more revealing about our present and future possibilities. Rather than putting the Founding on
an unapproachable pedestal, we should learn to look upon the
Federalists as pioneers of an ongoing tradition of revolutionary
reform. Rather than casting later generations as epigones, we
should return to our sources and grasp the many ways that constitutional practice at later turning points resembled the unconventional aspects of the Founding. In particular, Reconstruction
Republicans and New Deal Democrats were no more willing than
the Federalists to play by the preexisting rules of constitutional
revision. ' But Eke them, they broke the rules without seeking
to destroy the entire institutional framework. Like them, they
sought to adapt preexisting institutions in ways that ultimately
earned them the constitutional authority to claim a mandate in
the name of We the People. The challenge is to clarify how these
later exercises in revolutionary reform were similar and different
from those at the Founding.
This is a large task, but here is an orienting sketch. Begin
with the basic problem that led the Federalists to their revolutionary break with the rules. The Federalists were the first, but
not the last, to assert that the preexisting system gave the states
too much power to veto constitutional initiatives emerging from

'

For more on the concept of a professional narrative, and its existing condition, see

Ackerman, 1 We the People:Foundationsat 3-33 (cited in note 2).
'
Id at 34-57; Bruce Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 Yale L
J 453, 499-515 (1989); Bruce Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations(Harvard, forthcoming 1997).
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the center. While it is a mistake to view them as embracing the
more emphatic nationalisms of Reconstruction Republicans or
New Deal Democrats, Federalists were espousing a vision of the
Union that was relatively nationalistic for its time and
place-nationalistic enough to make it impossible to enact
through a system that gave so much power to the states. And so
we have heard them adopt a strong nationalistic stance in dealing with the efforts of the Antifederalists in general, and Rhode
Island in particular, to insist upon playing by the old state-centered rules of the game.
We can hear the same voice during Reconstruction and the
New Deal." 5 Like the Federalists, nineteenth-century Republicans and twentieth-century Democrats confronted opponents who
insisted upon the established rules of constitutional revision.
Like the Antifederalists, these constitutional conservatives were
confident that they would win the old game so long as it was
played fairly. Republicans and Democrats responded in the same
unconventional way as the Federalists and for the same reason:
the old state-centered rules threatened to stifle their efforts to
speak in the name of We the People of the United States.
At the same time Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal
Democrats played fast and loose with the old rules, they followed
the Federalists in making unconventional use of established
institutions. They too created institutional bandwagons that
would give them the popular mandate they sought for their revolutionary reforms. The particular institutions used by Republicans and Democrats in constructing their bandwagons were different from those used by the Federalists. But that is because the
Federalist transformation had created a new institutional background that set the stage for the unconventional activities of
Republicans and Democrats. While the Federalists used constitutional conventions and the Continental Congress to legitimate
their end run around state-centered rules of ratification, Republicans and Democrats used the new national institutions created
by the Federalists-the Presidency, Congress, and the Supreme
Court-to legitimize the same result.
It has not been our task here to trace the development of
these more modern institutional bandwagonsY6 But for present
purposes, the details are less important than their broad similarities to the Federalist effort. In justifying their end run around

See Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations(cited in note 264).
See id; Ackerman, 99 Yale L J 453 (cited in note 264).
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state-centered ratification rules, nineteenth-century Republicans
and twentieth-century Democrats not only resembled eighteenthcentury Federalists in asserting more nationalistic conceptions of
We the People than their opponents. They also sought to give
new meaning to the idea of popular sovereignty by making it far
more inclusionary than anything contemplated by the eighteenth
century. The inclusionary thrust is especially evident in the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment-where the black voters
of the South provided a crucial contribution to the Republicans'
effort to win ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although
this process of ratification raised many awkward questions under
Article V, the Republicans could defend their actions by asserting
that the expanded suffrage in the South provided the People with
an unprecedented opportunity to decide their fate.2 67
Inclusionary ideals were once again a central aspect of the New
Deal's end run around Article V. Roosevelt repeatedly warned
that formal amendments would be sabotaged in state legislatures
by the die-hard economic elites that the People had already repudiated in national elections.2
These revolutionary appeals to an inclusionary form of nationalism gained credibility because they built upon years of
political mobilization. The Federalist success in breaking with
the old rules was unthinkable without the ability of Washington
and others to draw heavily on the mobilized support they had
won during the American Revolution. The unconventional ratifi,cation of the Civil War Amendments had everything to do with
the Republican Party's ability to convince a majority that their
constitutional amendments expressed the meaning of the terrible
sacrifice made for the Union during the Civil War. Political mobilization reached another peak during the New Deal, leading to a
fundamental reorganization of the party system. Without massive
infusions of workers, farmers, and minorities into the Democratic
Party, Roosevelt's claim of a national mandate for fundamental
change would have been hollow.269

See Michael L. Benedict, A Compromise of Principle: CongressionalRepublicans
and Reconstruction 1863-1869 108 (Norton, 1974); Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transfor.
mations (cited in note 264).
Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations (cited in note 264).
2 See Kristi Anderson, The Creation of a Democratic Majority, 1928-1936 19-52
(Chicago, 1979). See also James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment
and Realignment of PoliticalPartiesin the United States 208-39 (Brookings, rev ed 1983);
Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics 68
(Norton, 1970).
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But in all three cases, revolutionary appeals to an
inclusionary nationalism would have failed without the skillful
use of the bandwagon effect. Even at their moments of maximum
success, inclusionary nationalists were required to confront skeptical decentralists who saw the dark side of their state-building
activities. Where the Federalists saw the need for new energetic
commitments on the national level, the Antifederalists saw the
clear and present danger of oppression, as did the Democrats in
the 1860s and the Republicans in the 1930s. If the revolutionary
reformers refused to confront their critics, or their critics simply
boycotted the constitutional processes that the reformers created,
neither Federalists nor Republicans nor Democrats would have
won the constitutional authority needed for enacting enduring
solutions in the name of a redefined American People.
In short, we are calling upon our fellow lawyers to learn
from the Founding in a new way. Just as we already begin our
study of doctrine by studying the Founding text, we should learn
to look upon the Founding as a great precedent in the ongoing
practice of popular sovereignty. Just as we use the original understanding as a benchmark for further doctrinal reflections, we
should use our unconventional Founding as a benchmark in assessing the claims of later Americans to make new constitutional
law in the name of the People. Some generations, of course, have
not used their higher lawmaking authority in very creative ways.
But others have equalled the Federalists in winning constitutional legitimacy for their transformative programs by unconventionally adapting preexisting institutions.
The New Deal is a case in point. It is the only moment in our
history when a nationalist and inclusionary movement gained the
overwhelming support of every region, race, and class in America
for its revolutionary reforms. In contrast, the Federalists and
Reconstruction Republicans just barely won even after changing
the rules to their advantage. Moreover, the New Dealers are far
closer to us in time than are the Americans who fought and won
the Revolution and the Civil War. If any of these three great
movements deserve constitutional recognition from modern
Americans, it is the one closest in time and possessing the most
overwhelming popular mandate."'

20 We should note, however, that even the New Deal excluded most blacks, de facto if
not de jure, from the processes of popular decision. For further discussion of this point,
and its implications, see Ackerman, 1 We the People:Foundationsat 295-322 (cited in note
2); Bruce Ackerman, Rooted Cosmopolitanism, 104 Ethics 516 (1994).
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But constitutionalists cannot afford to remain fixated on any
single moment. Both the Civil Rights Revolution and the Reagan
Revolution must be integrated into the larger constitutional narrative. We must compare each of these movements with their
great predecessors: How did their engagement in the higher lawmaking process compare (both positively and negatively) with
those attempted by Federalists, Republicans, and Democrats?
Such inquiries allow constitutional law to test the perennial
claims of politicians to speak in the name of the People, enabling
Americans to seperate the rare act of constitutive popular decision from the ebb and flow of normal politics. Only those movements deserve higher law recognition that manage to build a sustained bandwagon of democratic victories that resemble the great
constitutional triumphs of Federalists, Republicans, and Democrats in the nation's past.
Though these backward-looking exercises provide an essential test of the validity of present-day efforts at higher lawmaking, they should never be allowed to exhaust the meaning of the
Founding. So long as the Republic lives, the Founding will serve
as a caution for the future: The Glorious Revolution has no end,
but only new beginnings; we cannot sustain our constitutional
tradition without unconventional innovation and democratic
renewal; we cannot sustain our tradition without leaving a large
space for the People, and their ongoing effort to take control of
their government.

